Institutes of Oratory
On the Education of an Orator
Quintilian
QUINTILIAN TO TRYPHO
[An eminent bookseller at Rome, mentioned by Martial, iv. 72; xiii. 3]
WISHING HEALTH.
You have prevailed on me, by your daily importunity, to proceed at once to publish the books on the
Education of an Orator,
which I had addressed to my friend Marcellus; for, for my
own part, I thought that they were not yet sufficiently advanced
towards perfection. On the composition of them, as you
know, I spent little more than two years, while distracted by
so many other occupations; and this time was devoted, not
so much to the labor of writing, as to that of research for the
almost boundless work which I had undertaken, and to the
perusal of authors, who are innumerable. Following, besides, the
advice of Horace, who, in his Art of Poetry, recommends that
publication should not be hurried, and that a work should be
retained till the ninth year, I allowed time for re-considering
them, in order that, when the ardor of invention had cooled,
I might judge of them, on a more careful re-perusal, as a
mere reader. Yet if they are so much demanded, as you
say, let us give our sails to the winds, and pray for success
as we loose our cable. But much also depends on your
faithfulness and care, that they may come into the hands of
the public in as correct a state as possible.
Preface
Addressed to
Marcellus Victorius
When certain persons, after I had secured rest from my
labors, which for twenty years I had devoted to the instruction
of youth, requested of me, in a friendly manner, to write something
on the art of speaking, I certainly resisted their solicitations for a long time; because I was not ignorant that authors
of the greatest celebrity in both languages had bequeathed to
posterity many treatises having reference to this subject,
written with the greatest care. 2. But by the very plea on
which I thought that excuse for my refusal would be more
readily admitted, my friends were rendered still more urgent;
"since," they said, "amidst the various opinions of former
writers, some of them contradicting each other, choice was
difficult;" so that they appeared, not unjustifiably, to press
upon me the task, if not of inventing new precepts, at least
of pronouncing judgment concerning the old. 3. Although however it was not so much the confidence of accomplishing
what was required of me, as the shame of refusing, that
prevailed with me, yet, as the subject opened itself more
widely, I voluntarily undertook a heavier duty than was laid
upon me, not only that I might oblige my best friends by
fuller compliance, but also that, while pursuing a common road,
I might not tread merely in other men's footsteps.
4. Other authors, who have committed to writing the art of
oratory, have in general commenced in such a manner, as
if they were to put the last hand of eloquence to those who
were accomplished in every other kind of learning; whether
from despising the branches of knowledge which we previously
learn, as insignificant, or from supposing that they did not fall
under their province, the duties of the professions being
distinct; or, what is more probable, from expecting no credit
to their ability in treating of subjects, which, however
necessary, are yet far removed from display; as the pinnacles
of buildings are seen, while the foundations are hid. 5. For
myself, as I consider that nothing is unnecessary to the art of
oratory, without which it must be confessed that an orator
cannot be formed, and that there is no possibility of arriving
at the summit of any thing without previous initiatory efforts;
I shall not shrink from stooping to those lesser matters, the
neglect of which leaves no place for greater; and shall
proceed to regulate the studies of the orator from his infancy,
just as if he were entrusted to me to be brought up.
6. This work, Marcellus Victorius, I dedicate to you, whom,
as being most friendly to me, and animated with an extra-ordinary love of letters, I deemed most worthy of such a
pledge of our mutual affection; and not indeed on these
considerations alone, though these are of great weight, but
because my treatise seemed likely to be of use for the
instruction of your son, whose early age shows his way clear to
the full splendor of genius; a treatise which I have resolved
to conduct, from the very cradle as it were of oratory, through
all the studies which can at all assist the future speaker, to the
summit of that art. 7. This I the rather designed, because
two books on the Art of Rhetoric were already in circulation
under my name, though neither published by me nor composed
for that object; for, after holding two days' discourse with me,
some youths, to whom that time was devoted, had caught up
the first by heart; the other, which was learned indeed in a
greater number of days (as far as they could learn by taking
notes), some of my young pupils, of excellent disposition, but
of too great fondness for me, had made known through the indiscreet
honor of publication. 8. In these books, accordingly,
there will be some things the same, many altered, very many
added, but all better arranged, and rendered, as far as I shall
be able, complete.
9. We are to form, then, the perfect orator, who cannot
exist unless as a good man; and we require in him, therefore, not only
consummate ability in speaking, but every excellence of mind. 10. For I
cannot admit that the principles of moral and honorable conduct are, as some have
thought, to be left to the philosophers; since the man who can
duly sustain his character as a citizen, who is qualified for the
management of public and private affairs, and who can govern
communities by his counsels, settle them by means of laws,
and improve them by judicial enactments, can certainly be
nothing else but an orator. 11. Although I acknowledge,
therefore, that I shall adopt some precepts which are contained
in the writings of the philosophers, yet I shall maintain, with
justice and truth, that they belong to my subject, and have
a peculiar relation to the art of oratory
12. If we have constantly occasion to discourse of justice,
fortitude, temperance, and other similar topics, so that a cause can scarce be
found in which some such discussion does not occur, and if all
such subjects are to be illustrated by invention and
elocution, can it be doubted that, wherever power of intellect
and copiousness of language are required, the art of the
orator is to be there pre-eminently exerted? 13. These two
accomplishments, as Cicero very plainly proves, were, as
they are joined by nature, so also united in practice, so that
the same persons were thought at once wise and eloquent.
Subsequently, the study divided itself, and, through want of
art, it came to pass that the arts were considered to be
diverse; for, as soon as the tongue became an instrument of
gain, and it was made a practice to abuse the gifts of eloquence,
those who were esteemed as eloquent abandoned the
care of morals, which, when thus neglected, became as it were
the prize of the less robust intellects.
14. Some, disliking the toil of cultivating eloquence, afterwards returned to
the discipline of the mind and the establishment of rules
of life, retaining to themselves the better part, if it could
be divided into two; but assuming, at the same time, the
most presumptuous of titles, so as to be called the only
cultivators of wisdom; a distinction which neither the most
eminent commanders, nor men who were engaged with the
utmost distinction in the direction of the greatest affairs, and
in the management of whole commonwealths, ever ventured
to claim for themselves; for they preferred rather to practice
excellence of conduct than to profess it. 15. That many of the ancient
professors of wisdom, indeed, both delivered virtuous precepts, and even
lived as they directed others to live, I will readily admit; but, in our
own times, the greatest
vices have been hid under this name in many of the professors;
for they did not strive, by virtue and study, to be esteemed
philosophers; but adopted a peculiarity of look, austerity of
demeanor, and a dress different from that of other men, as
cloaks for the vilest immoralities.
16. But those topics, which are claimed as peculiar to
philosophy, we all everywhere discuss; for what person (if he
be not an utterly corrupt character) does not sometimes speak
of justice, equity, and goodness? who, even among rustics,
does not make some inquiries about the causes of the operations
of nature? As to the proper use and distinction of words, it
ought to be common to all, who make their language at all
an object of care. 17. But it will be the orator that will
understand and express those matters best, and if he should ever
arrive at perfection, the precepts of virtue would not have to
be sought from the schools of the philosophers. At present it
is necessary to have recourse, at times, to those authors who
have, as I said, adopted the deserted, but pre-eminently better,
part of philosophy, and to reclaim as it were what is our own;
not that we may appropriate their discoveries, but that we may
show them that they have usurped what belonged to others.
18. Let the orator, therefore, be such a man as may be
called truly wise, not blameless in morals only (for that, in
my opinion, though some disagree with me, is not enough),
but accomplished also in science, and in every qualification for speaking; a character such
as, perhaps, no man
ever was. 19. But we are not the less, for that reason, to aim
at perfection, for which most of the ancients strove; who,
though they thought that no wise man had yet been found, nevertheless
laid down directions for gaining wisdom. 20.
For the perfection of eloquence is assuredly something, nor
does the nature of the human mind forbid us to reach it; but
if to reach it be not granted us, yet those who shall strive to
gain the summit will make higher advances than those who,
prematurely conceiving a despair of attaining the point at
which they aim, shall at once sink down at the foot of the
ascent.
21. Indulgence will so much the more then be granted me,
if I shall not even pass over those lesser matters, which yet
are necessary to the work which I have undertaken. The first
book will, therefore, contain those particulars which are antecedent to the duties of the teacher of rhetoric. In the second
we shall consider the first elements of instruction under the
hands of the professor of rhetoric, and the questions which are
asked concerning the subject of rhetoric itself. 22. The five
next will be devoted to invention (for under this head will also
be included arrangement), and the four following to elocution,
within the scope of which fall memory and pronunciation.
One will be added, in which the orator himself will be completely
formed by us, since we shall consider, as far as our
weakness shall be able, what his morals ought to be, what
should be his practice in undertaking, studying, and pleading
causes; what should be his style of eloquence, what termination
there should be to his pleading, and what may be his
employments after its termination.
23. Among all these discussions shall be introduced, as
occasion shall require, the ART OF SPEAKING, which will not
only instruct students in the knowledge of those things to
which alone some have given the name of art, and interpret
(so to express myself) the law of rhetoric, but may serve to
nourish the faculty of speech, and strengthen the power of
eloquence; 24. for, in general, those bare treatises on art,
through too much affectation of subtilty, break and cut down
whatever is noble in eloquence, drink up as it were all the blood
of thought, and lay bare the bones, which, while they ought to
exist, and to be united by their ligaments, ought still to be
covered with flesh. 25. We therefore have not, like most
authors, included in our books that small part merely, but
whatever we thought useful for the education of the orator,
explaining every point with brevity; for if we should say, on
every particular, as much as might be said, no end would be
found to our work.
26. It is to be stated, however, in the first place, that precepts
and treatises on art are of no avail without the assistance of
nature; and these instructions, therefore, are not written for him
to whom talent is wanting, any more than treatises on
agriculture for barren ground.
27. There are also certain other natural aids, as power
of voice, a constitution capable of labor, health, courage,
gracefulness; qualities which, if they fall to our lot in a
moderate degree, may be improved by practice, but which are
often so far wanting that their deficiency renders abortive the
benefits of understanding and study; and these very qualities,
likewise, are of no profit in themselves without a skillful
teacher, persevering study, and great and continued exercise
in writing, reading, and speaking.
Book I
Chapter I.
1. Let a father, then, as soon as his son is born, conceive,
first of all, the best possible hopes of him; for he will thus
grow the more solicitous about his improvement from the very
beginning; since it is a complaint without foundation that
"to very few people is granted the faculty of comprehending
what is imparted to them, and that most, through dullness of
understanding, lose their labor and their time." For, on the
contrary, you will find the greater number of men both ready
in conceiving and quick in learning; since such quickness is
natural to man; and as birds are born to fly, horses to run,
and wild beasts to show fierceness, so to us peculiarly belong
activity and sagacity of understanding; whence the origin of
the mind is thought to be from heaven. 2. But dull and unteachable
persons are no more produced in the course of
nature than are persons marked by monstrosity and deformities;
such are certainly but few. It will be a proof of this
assertion, that, among boys, good promise is shown in the far
greater number; and, if it passes off in the progress of time,
it is manifest that it was not natural ability, but care, that was
wanting.
3. But one surpasses another, you will say, in
ability. I grant that this is true; but only so far as to
accomplish more or less; whereas there is no one who has not
gained something by study. Let him who is convinced of this
truth, bestow, as soon as he becomes a parent, the most vigilant
possible care on cherishing the hopes of a future orator.
4. Before all things, let the talk of the child's nurses not be
ungrammatical. Chrysippus wished them, if possible, to be
women of some knowledge; at any rate he would have the
best, as far as circumstances would allow, chosen. To their
morals, doubtless, attention is first to be paid; but let them
also speak with propriety. 6. It is they that the child will hear
first; it is their words that he will try to form by imitation.
We are by nature most tenacious of what we have imbibed in
our infant years; as the flavor, with which you scent vessels
when new, remains in them; nor can the colors of wool, for
which its plain whiteness has been exchanged, be effaced;
and those very habits, which are of a more objectionable
nature, adhere with the greater tenacity; for good ones are
easily changed for the worse, but when will you change bad
ones into good? Let the child not be accustomed, therefore,
even while he is yet an infant, to phraseology which must be
unlearned.
6. In parents I should wish that there should be as much
learning as possible. Nor do I speak, indeed, merely of
fathers; for we have heard that Cornelia, the mother of the
Gracchi (whose very learned writing in her letters has come
down to posterity), contributed greatly to their eloquence;
the daughter of Laelius is said to have exhibited her father's elegance in her conversation; and the oration of
the daughter of Quintus Hortensius, delivered before the
Triumviri, is read not merely as an honor to her sex. 7.
Nor let those parents, who have not had the fortune to get
learning themselves, bestow the less care on the instruction of
their children, but let them, on this very account, be more
solicitous as to other particulars.
Of the boys, among whom he who is destined to this
prospect is to be educated, the same may be said as concerning
nurses.
8. Of paedagogi this further may be said, that they should
[there is no word in our language for the paedagogus, who was a
slave of good character, and sometimes of some education, that had
the charge of young persons]
either be men of acknowledged learning, which I should wish to be the
first object, or that they should be conscious of their want of learning; for none are more pernicious than those
who, having gone some little beyond the first elements, clothe
themselves in a mistaken persuasion of their own knowledge;
since they disdain to yield to those who are skilled in teaching,
and, growing imperious, and sometimes fierce, in a certain
right, as it were, of exercising their authority (with which that
sort of men are generally puffed up), they teach only their
own folly. 9. Nor is their misconduct less prejudicial to the
manners of their pupils; for Leonides, the tutor of Alexander,
as is related by Diogenes of Babylon, tinctured him with certain bad
habits, which adhered to him, from his childish education, even when he
was grown up and become the greatest of kings.
10. If I seem to my reader to require a great deal, let him
consider that it is an orator that is to be educated; an arduous task,
even when nothing is deficient for the formation of
his character; and that more and more difficult labors yet remain;
for there is need of constant study, the most excellent teachers, and a variety of mental exercises.
11. The best of rules, therefore, are to be laid down; and if any one
shall refuse to observe them, the fault will lie, not in the
method, but in the man.
If however it should not be the good fortune of children
to have such nurses as I should wish, let them at least have one
attentive paedagogus, not unskilled in language, who, if anything
Is spoken incorrectly by the nurse in the presence of his pupil,
may at once correct it, and not let it settle in his mind. But
let it be understood that what I prescribed at first is the right
course, and this only a remedy.
12. I prefer that a boy should begin with the Greek
language, because he will acquire Latin, which is in general use,
even though we tried to prevent him, and because, at the same
time, he ought first to be instructed in Greek learning, from
which ours is derived. 13. Yet I should not wish this rule to be
so superstitiously observed that he should for a long time speak
or learn only Greek, as is the custom with most people; for
hence arise many faults of pronunciation, which is viciously
adapted to foreign sounds, and also of language, in which
when Greek idioms have become inherent by constant usage,
they keep their place most pertinaciously even when we speak
a different tongue. 14. The study of Latin ought therefore
to follow at no long interval, and soon after to keep pace with the
Greek; and thus it will happen, that, when we have begun to
attend to both tongues with equal care, neither will impede
the other.
15. Some have thought that boys, as long as they are under
seven years of age, should not be set to learn, because that is
the earliest age that can understand what is taught, and
endure the labor of learning. Of which opinion a great many
writers say that Hesiod was, at least such writers as lived
before Aristophanes the grammarian, for he was the first to deny that
the Hypothecae, in which this opinion is found, was
the work of that poet. 16. But other writers likewise, among
whom is Erastothenes, have given the same advice. Those,
however, advise better, who, like Chrysippus, think that no part
of a child's life should be exempt from tuition; for Chrysippus,
though he has allowed three years to the nurses, yet is of opinion
that the minds of children may be imbued with excellent
instruction even by them.
17. And why should not that age
be under the influence of learning, which is now confessedly
subject to moral influence? I am not indeed ignorant
that, during the whole time of which I am speaking, scarcely
as much can be done as one year may afterwards accomplish,
yet those who are of the opinion which I have mentioned, appear
with regard to this part of life to have spared not so much
the learners as the teachers. 18. What else, after they are
able to speak, will children do better, for they must do something?
Or why should we despise the gain, how little soever
it be, previous to the age of seven years? For certainly, small
as may be the proficiency which an earlier age exhibits, the
child will yet learn something greater during the very year in
which he would have been learning something less. 19. This
advancement extended through each year, is a profit on the
whole; and whatever is gained in infancy is an acquisition to
youth. The same rule should be prescribed as to the following
years, so that what every boy has to learn, he may not be too
late in beginning to learn. Let us not then lose even the
earliest period of life, and so much the loss, as the elements of
learning depend on the memory alone, which not only exists
in children, but is at that time of life even most tenacious.
20. Yet I am not so unacquainted with differences of age,
as to think that we should urge those of tender years severely,
or exact a full complement of work from them; for it will be
necessary, above all things, to take care lest the child should
conceive a dislike to the application which he cannot yet love,
and continue to dread the bitterness which he has once tasted,
even beyond the years of infancy. Let his instruction be an
amusement to him; let him be questioned, and praised; and
let him never feel pleased that he does not know a thing; and
sometimes, if he is unwilling to learn, let another be taught
before him, of whom he may be envious. Let him strive for
victory now and then, and generally suppose that he gains it;
and let his powers be called forth by rewards, such as that age
prizes.
21. We are giving small instructions, while professing to
educate an orator; but even studies have their infancy; and as the
rearing of the very strongest bodies commenced with milk and the cradle,
so he, who was to be the most eloquent of men, once uttered cries, tried
to speak at first with a stuttering voice, and hesitated at the shapes of the letters. Nor, if it
is impossible to learn a thing completely, is it therefore unnecessary to learn it at all.
22. If no one blames a father, who
thinks that these matters are not to be neglected in regard
to his son, why should he be blamed who communicates to the
public what he would practice to advantage in his own house?
And this is so much the more the case, as younger minds
more easily take in small things and as bodies cannot be
formed to certain flexures of the limbs unless while they are
tender, so even strength itself makes our minds likewise more
unyielding to most things.
22. Would Philip, king of
Macedonia, have wished the first principles of learning to be
communicated to his son Alexander by Aristotle, the greatest
philosopher of that age, or would Aristotle have undertaken that
office, if they had not both thought that the first rudiments of
instruction are best treated by the most accomplished teacher,
and have an influence on the whole course? 24. Let us suppose,
then, that Alexander were committed to me, and laid in
my lap, an infant worthy of so much solicitude (though every
man thinks his own son worthy of similar solicitude), should I
be ashamed, even in teaching him his very letters, to point out
some compendious methods of instruction?
For that at least, which I see practiced in regard to most
children, by no means pleases me, namely, that they learn the
names and order of the letters before they learn their shapes.
25. This method hinders their recognition of them, as, while
they follow their memory that takes the lead, they do not fix
their attention on the forms of the letters. This is the reason
why teachers, even when they appear to have fixed them
sufficiently in the minds of children, in the straight order in
which they are usually first written, make them go over them
again the contrary way, and confuse them by variously changing
the arrangement, until their pupils know them by their shape, not by their place. It will be best for children,
therefore, to be taught the appearances and names of the
letters at once, as they are taught those of men. 26. But that
which is hurtful with regard to letters, will be no impediment
with regard to syllables. I do not disapprove, however, the
practice, which is well known, of giving children, for the sake
of stimulating them to learn, ivory figures of letters to play
with, or whatever else can be invented, in which that infantine
age may take delight, and which may be pleasing to handle,
look at, or name.
27. But as soon as the child shall have begun to trace the
forms of the letters, it will not be improper that they should
be cut for him, as exactly as possible, on a board, that his
style [the iron pencil used for writing on waxed
tablets] may be guided along them as along grooves, for he will
then make no mistakes, as on wax (since he will be kept in
by the edge on each side, and will be unable to stray beyond
the boundary); and, by following these sure traces rapidly
and frequently, he will form his hand, and not require the
assistance of a person to guide his hand with his own hand
placed over it. 28. The accomplishment of writing well and
expeditiously, which is commonly disregarded by people of
quality, is by no means an indifferent matter; for as writing
itself is the principal thing in our studies, and that by which
alone sure proficiency, resting on the deepest roots, is secured,
a too slow way of writing retards thought, a rude and confused
hand cannot be read; and hence follows another task, that of
reading off what is to be copied from the writing. 29. At all
times, therefore, and in all places, and especially in writing
private and familiar letters, it will be a source of pleasure to
us, not to have neglected even this acquirement.
30. For learning syllables there is no short way; they must all be
learned throughout; nor are the most difficult of them, as is the
general practice, to be postponed, that children may be at a loss,
forsooth, in writing words. 31. Moreover, we must not even trust to the
first learning by heart; it will be better to have syllables repeated,
and to impress them long upon the memory; and in reading too, not to
hurry on, in order to make it continuous or quick, until the clear and
certain connection of the letters become familiar, without at least any
necessity to stop for recollection. Let the pupil then begin to form
words from syllables, and to join phrases together from words. 32. It is
incredible how much retardation is caused to reading by haste; for
hence arise hesitation, interruption, and repetition, as children attempt
more
than they can manage; and then, after making mistakes, they
become distrustful even of what they know. 33. Let reading,
therefore, be at first sure, then continuous, and for a long
time slow, until, by exercise, a correct quickness is gained.
34. For to look to the right, as everybody teaches, and to look
forward, depends not merely on rule, but on habit, since,
while the child is looking to what follows, he has to prononce
what goes before, and, what is very difficult, the direction of
his thoughts must be divided, so that one duty may be discharged with his voice, and another with his eyes.
When the child shall have begun, as is the practice, to write
words, it will cause no regret if we take care that he may not
waste his efforts on common words, and such as perpetually occur. 35.
For he may readily learn the explanations of obscure terms, which the
Greeks call glosses, while some other
occupation is before him, and acquire, amidst his first rudiments, a
knowledge of that which would afterwards demand a special time for it.
Since, too, we are still attending to small matters, I would express a
wish that even the lines, which are set him for his imitation in
writing, should not contain useless sentences, but such as convey some
moral instruction. 36. The remembrance of such admonitions will attend
him to old age, and will be of use even for the formation of his character. It
is possible for him, also, to learn the sayings of eminent men,
and select passages, chiefly from the poets (for the reading
of poets is more pleasing to the young), in his play-time;
since memory (as I shall show in its proper place) is most necessary to an orator, and is eminently strengthened and nourished
by exercise; and, at the age of which we are now speaking,
and which cannot, as yet, produce anything of itself, it is
almost the only faculty that can be improved by the aid of
teachers. 37. It will not be improper, however, to require of
boys of this age (in order that their pronunciation may be
fuller and their speech more distinct) to roll forth, as rapidly
us possible, certain words and lines of studied difficulty, composed
of several syllables, and those roughly clashing together,
and, as it were, rugged-sounding; the Greeks call them χαλεποι.
This may seem a trifling matter to mention, but when it is
neglected, many faults of pronunciation, unless they are removed
in the years of youth, are fixed by incorrigible ill habit
for the rest of life.
CHAPTER II.
1 . But let us suppose that the child now gradually increases
in size, leaves the lap, and applies himself to learning in
earnest. In this place, accordingly, must be considered the
question, whether it be more advantageous to confine the
learner at home, and within the walls of a private house, or to
commit him to the large numbers of a school, and, as it were,
to public teachers. 2. The latter mode, I observe, has had
the sanction of those by whom the polity of the most eminent
states was settled, as well as that of the moat illustrious
authors.
Yet it is not to be concealed, that there are some who, from
certain notions of their own, disapprove of this almost public
mode of instruction. These persons appear to be swayed
chiefly by two reasons: one, that they take better precautions
for the morals of the young, by avoiding a concourse of human
beings of that age which is most prone to vice; (from which
cause I wish it were falsely asserted that provocations to
immoral conduct arise;) the other, that whoever may be
the teacher, he is likely to bestow his time more liberally
on one pupil, than if he has to divide it among several.
3. The first reason indeed deserves great consideration; for if
it were certain that schools, though advantageous to studies,
are pernicious to morals, a virtuous course of life would
seem to me preferable to one even of the most distinguished
eloquence. But in my opinion, the two are combined and
inseparable; for I am convinced that no one can be an orator
who is not a good man; and, even if any one could, I should
be unwilling that he should be. On this point, therefore, I
shall speak first.
4. People think that morals are corrupted in schools; for
indeed they are at times corrupted; but such may be the case even
at home. Many proofs of this fact may be adduced; proofs of character
having been vitiated, as well as preserved with the
utmost purity, under both modes of education. It is the disposition
of the individual pupil, and the care taken of him, that
make the whole difference. Suppose that his mind be prone
to vice, suppose that there be neglect in forming and guarding
his morals in early youth, seclusion would afford no less
opportunity for immorality than publicity; for the private
tutor may be himself of bad character; nor is intercourse with
vicious slaves at all safer than that with immodest free-born
youths. 5. But if his disposition be good, and if there be
not a blind and indolent negligence on the part of his parents,
it will be possible for them to select a tutor of irreproachable character, (a matter to which the utmost attention is paid
by sensible parents,) and to fix on a course of instruction of
the very strictest kind; while they may at the same time place
at the elbow of their son some influential friend or faithful
freedman, whose constant attendance may improve even those
of whom apprehensions may be entertained.
6. The remedy for this object of fear is easy. Would that
we ourselves did not corrupt the morals of our children! We
enervate their very infancy with luxuries. That delicacy of
education, which we call fondness, weakens all the powers,
both of body and mind. What luxury will he not covet in his
manhood, who crawls about on purple! He cannot yet articulate
his first words, when he already distinguishes scarlet, and
wants his purple. 7. We form the palate of children before
we form their pronunciation. They grow up in sedan chairs;
if they touch the ground, they hang by the hands of attendants
supporting them on each side. We are delighted if they utter
any thing immodest. Expressions which would not be tolerated
even from the effeminate youths of Alexandria, we hear
from them with a smile and a kiss. Nor is this wonderful; we
have taught them; they have heard such language from ourselves. 8. They see our mistresses, our male objects of
affection; every dining-room rings with impure songs; things
shameful to be told are objects of sight. From such practices
springs habit, and afterwards nature. The unfortunate
children learn these vices before they know that they are
vices; and hence, rendered effeminate and luxurious, they do
not imbibe immorality from schools, but carry it themselves
into schools.
9. But, it is said, one tutor will have more time for one
pupil. First of all, however, nothing prevents that one pupil,
whoever he may be, from being the same with him who is
taught in the school. But if the two objects cannot be united,
I should still prefer the day-light of an honorable seminary to
darkness and solitude; for every eminent teacher delights in a large
concourse of pupils, and thinks himself worthy of a still more numerous
auditory. 10. But inferior teachers, from a consciousness of their inability, do not disdain to fasten on single
pupils, and to discharge the duty as it were of paedagogi.
11. But supposing that either interest, or friendship, or
money, should secure to any parent a domestic tutor of the
highest learning, and in every respect unrivalled, will he however
spend the whole day on one pupil? Or can the application of any pupil be so constant as not to be sometimes
wearied, like the sight of the eyes, by continued direction to
one object, especially as study requires the far greater portion
of time to be solitary. 12. For the tutor does not stand by
the pupil while he is writing, or learning by heart, or thinking;
and when he is engaged in any of those exercises, the company
of any person whatsoever is a hindrance to him. Nor does
every kind of reading require at all times a praeloctor or
interpreter; for when, if such were the case, would the knowledge
of so many authors be gained? The time, therefore,
during which the work as it were for the whole day may be
laid out, is but short.
13. Thus the instructions which are to
be given to each, may reach to many. Most of them, indeed,
are of such a nature that they may be communicated to all at
once with the same exertion of the voice. I say nothing of the
topics and declamations of the rhetoricians, at which, certainly, whatever be the number of the audience, each will
still
carry off the whole. 14. For the voice of the teacher is not
like a meal, which will not suffice for more than a certain
number, but like the sun, which diffuses the same portion of light
and heat to all. If a grammarian, too, discourses on the
art of speaking, solves questions, explains matters of history, or
illustrates poems, as many as shall hear him will profit by his
instructions. 15. But, it may be said, number is an obstacle
to correction and explanation. Suppose that this be a disadvantage
in a number, (for what in general satisfies us in
every respect?) we will soon compare that disadvantage with
other advantages.
Yet I would not wish a boy to be sent to a place where he
will be neglected. Nor should a good master encumber himself with
a greater number of scholars than he can manage;
and it is to be a chief object with us, also, that the master may
be in every way our kind friend, and may have regard in his teaching,
not so much to duty, as to affection. Thus we shall
never be confounded with the multitude. 10. Nor will any
master, who is in the slightest degree tinctured with literature,
fail particularly to cherish that pupil in whom he shall observe
application and genius, even for his own honor. But even if
great schools ought to be avoided (a position to which I cannot
assent, if numbers flock to a master on account of his merit),
the rule is not to be carried so far that schools should be
avoided altogether. It is one thing to shun schools, another to
choose from them.
17. If I have now refuted the objections which are made to schools,
let me next state what opinions I myself entertain. 18. First of all,
let him who is to be an orator, and who must live amidst the greatest
publicity, and in the full day-light of public affairs, accustom
himself, from his boyhood, not to be abashed at the sight of men, nor
pine in a solitary and as it were recluse way of life. The mind requires
to be constantly excited and roused, while in such retirement it either
languishes, and contracts rust, as it were, in the shade, or, on the
other hand, becomes swollen with empty conceit, since he who compares
himself to no one else, will necessarily attribute too much to his own
powers. 19. Besides, when his acquirements
are to he displayed in public, he is blinded at the light
of the sun, and stumbles at every new object, as having learned
in solitude that which is to be done in public. 20. I say
nothing of friendships formed at school, which remain in full
force even to old age, as if cemented with a certain religious
obligation; for to have been initiated in the same studies is a
not less sacred bond than to have been initiated in the same sacred
rites. That sense, too, which is called common sense,
where shall a young man learn when he has separated himself
from society, which is natural not to men only, but even to dumb
animals?
21. Add to this, that, at home, he can learn only
what is taught himself; at school, even what is taught others.
22. He will daily hear many things commended, many things
corrected; the idleness of a fellow student, when reproved, will
be a warning to him; the industry of any one, when commended, will be a stimulus; emulation will be excited by
praise; and he will think it a disgrace to yield to his equals in
age, and an honor to surpass his seniors. All these matters
excite the mind; and though ambition itself be a vice, yet it
is often the parent of virtues.
23. I remember a practice that was observed by my masters,
not without advantage. Having divided the boys into classcs,
they assigned thorn their order in speaking in conformity in
the abilities of each; and thus each stood in the higher place to
declaim according as he appeared to excel in proficiency. 24.
Judgments were pronounced on the performances; and
great was the strife among us for distinction; but to take the
lead of the class was by far the greatest honor. Nor was
sentence given on our merits only once; the thirtieth day
brought the vanquished an opportunity of contending again.
Thus he who was most successful, did not relax his efforts,
while uneasiness incited the unsuccessful to retrieve his
honor. 26. I should be inclined to maintain, as far as I
can form a judgment from what I conceive in my own mind,
that this method furnished stronger incitements to the study
of eloquence, than the exhortations of preceptors, the watchfulness
of paedagogi, or the wishes of parents.
26. But as emulation is of use to those who have made some
advancement in learning, so, to those who are but beginning,
and are still of tender age, to imitate their school-fellows is more
pleasant than to imitate their master, for the very reason that it
is more easy; for they who are learning the first rudiments will
scarcely dare to exalt themselves to the hope of attaining
that eloquence which they regard as the highest; they will
rather fix on what is nearest to them, as vines attached to
trees gain the top by taking hold of the lower branches first.
27. This is an observation of such truth, that it is the care even of
the master himself, when he has to instruct minds
that are still unformed, not (if he prefer at least the useful to
the showy) to overburden the weakness of his scholars, but to
moderate his strength, and to let himself down to the capacity
of the learner. 28. For as narrow-necked vessels reject a
great quantity of the liquid that is poured upon them, but are
filled by that which flows or is poured into them by degrees,
so it is for us to ascertain how much the minds of boys can
receive, since what is too much for their grasp of intellect will
not enter their minds, as not being sufficiently expanded to
admit it. 29. It is of advantage therefore for a boy to have
school-fellows whom he may first imitate, and afterwards try to
surpass. Thus will he gradually conceive hope of higher excellence.
To these observations I shall add, that masters themselves,
when they have but one pupil at a time with them, cannot feel
the same degree of energy and spirit in addressing him, as
when they are excited by a large number of hearers. 30. Eloquence depends in a great degree on the state of the mind,
which must conceive images of objects, and transform itself, so
to speak, to the nature of the things of which we discourse.
Besides, the more noble and lofty a mind is, by the more
powerful springs, as it were, is it moved, and accordingly is
both strengthened by praise, and enlarged by effort, and is
filled with joy at achieving something great. 31. But a
certain secret disdain is felt at lowering the power of eloquence, acquired by so much labor, to one auditor; and the
teacher is ashamed to raise his style above the level of ordinary
conversation. Let any one imagine, indeed, the air of a man
haranguing, or the voice of one entreating, the gesture, the
pronunciation, the agitation of mind and body, the exertion,
and, to mention nothing else, the fatigue, while he has but
one auditor; would not he seem to be affected with something
like madness? There would be no eloquence in the world,
if we were to speak only with one person at a time.
CHAPTER III
1. Let him that is skilled in teaching, ascertain first of all,
when a boy is entrusted to him, his ability and disposition.
The chief symptom of ability in children is memory, of which
the excellence is twofold, to receive with ease and retain with
fidelity. The next symptom is imitation; for that is an indication
of a teachable disposition, but with this provision, that
it express merely what it is taught, and not a person's manner or walk,
for instance, or whatever may be remarkable for deformity. 2. The boy who shall make it his aim to raise a
laugh by his love of mimicry, will afford me no hope of good
capacity; for he who is possessed of great talent will be
well disposed; else I should think it not at all worse
to be of a dull, than of a bad, disposition; but he who is honorably
inclined will be very different from the stupid or
idle.
3. Such a pupil as I would have, will easily learn what
is taught him, and will ask questions about some things, but
will still rather follow than run on before. That precocious
sort of talent scarcely ever comes to good fruit. 4. Such are
those who do little things easily, and, impelled by impudence,
show at once all that they can accomplish in such matters.
But they succeed only in what is ready to their hand; they
string words together, uttering them with an intrepid countenance,
not in the least discouraged by bashfulness; and do
little, but do it readily. 5. There is no real power behind, or
any that rests on deeply fixed roots; but they are like seeds
which have been scattered on the surface of the ground
and shoot up prematurely, and like grass that resembles
corn, and grows yellow, with empty ears, before the time of
harvest. Their efforts give pleasure, as compared with their
years; but their progress comes to a stand, and our wonder
diminishes.
6.. When a tutor has observed these indications, let him next
consider how the mind of his pupil is to be managed. Some boys
are indolent, unless you stimulate them; some are indignant at
being commanded; fear restrains some, and unnerves others;
continued labor forms some; with others, hasty efforts succeed better.
7. Let the boy be given to me, whom praise stimulates, whom honor
delights, who weeps when he is unsuccessful. His powers must be
cultivated under the influence of ambition; reproach will sting him to the quick; honor will
incite him; and in such a boy I shall never be apprehensive
of indifference.
8. Yet some relaxation is to be allowed to all; not only
because there is nothing that can bear perpetual labor, (and
even those things that are without sense and life are unbent by
alternate rest, as it were, in order that they may preserve their
vigor,) but because application to learning depends on the
will, which cannot be forced. 9. Boys, accordingly, when re-invigorated
and refreshed, bring more sprightliness to their
learning, and a more determined spirit, which for the most
part spurns compulsion. 10. Nor will play in boys displease me; it is also a sign of vivacity; and I cannot expect
that he who is always dull and spiritless will be of an eager
disposition in his studies, when he is indifferent even to that
excitement which is natural to his age.
11. There must however be bounds set to relaxation, lest the refusal of it beget an
aversion to study, or too much indulgence in it a habit of
idleness. There are some kinds of amusement, too, not
unserviceable for sharpening the wits of boys, as when they
contend with each other by proposing all sorts of questions in
turn. 12. In their plays, also, their moral dispositions show
themselves more plainly, supposing that there is no age so
tender that it may not readily learn what is right and wrong;
and the tender age may best be formed at a time when it is ignorant
of dissimulation, and most willingly submits to instructors;
for you may break, sooner than mend, that which has hardened
into deformity. 13. A child is as early as possible, therefore,
to be admonished that he must do nothing too eagerly, nothing
dishonestly, nothing without self-control and we must always
keep in mind the maxim of Virgil, Adeo in teneris consuescere
multum est, "of so much importance is the acquirement of habit
in the young."
14. But that boys should suffer corporal punishment, though
it be a received custom, and Chrysippus makes no objection to
it, I by no means approve; first, because it is a disgrace, and
a punishment for slaves, and in reality (as will be evident if
you imagine the age changed) an affront; secondly, because,
if a boy's disposition be so abject as not to be amended by
reproof, he will be hardened, like the worst of slaves, even to
stripes; and lastly, because, if one who regularly exacts his
tasks be with him, there will not be the least need of any
such chastisement. 15. At present, the negligence of paedagogi
seems to be made amends for in such a way that boys are not
obliged to do what is right, but are punished whenever they
have not done it. Besides, after you have coerced a boy with
stripes, how will you treat him when he becomes a young man,
to whom such terror cannot be held out, and by whom more difficult
studies must be pursued?
16. Add to these considerations, that many things unpleasant to be mentioned, and
likely afterwards to cause shame, often happen to boys while
being whipped, under the influence of pain or fear; and such
shame enervates and depresses the mind, and makes them
shun people's sight and feel a constant uneasiness. 17. If,
moreover, there has been too little care in choosing governors
and tutors of reputable character. I am ashamed to say how
scandalously unworthy men may abuse their privilege of
punishing, and what opportunity also the terror of the
unhappy children may sometimes afford to others. I will not
dwell upon this point; what is already understood is more than
enough. It will be sufficient therefore to intimate, that no
man should be allowed too much authority over an age so weak
and so unable to resist ill treatment.
18. I will now proceed to show in what studies he who is to
be so trained that he may become an orator, must be instructed,
and which of them must be commenced at each particular
period of youth.
CHAPTER IV.
1. In regard to the boy who has attained facility in reading and
writing, the next object is instruction from the grammarians.
Nor is it of importance whether I speak of the
Greek or Latin grammarian, though I am inclined to think
that the Greek should take the precedence. 2. Both have the
same method. This profession, then, distinguished as it is,
most compendiously, into two parts, the art of speaking correctly, and the
illustration of the poets, carries more beneath the
surface than it shows on its front. 3. For not only is the art
of writing combined with that of speaking, but correct reading
also precedes illustration, and with all these is joined the exercise
of judgment, which the old grammarians, indeed, used
with such severity, that they not only allowed themselves to
distinguish certain verses with a particular mark of censure,
and to remove, as spurious, certain books which had been inscribed
with false titles, from their sets, but even brought
some authors within their canon, and excluded others altogether
from classification.
4. Nor is it sufficient to have read the
poets only; every class of writers must be studied, not simply
for matter, but for words, which often receive their authority
from writers. Nor can grammar be complete without a knowledge
of music, since the grammarian has to speak of metre
and rhythm; nor if he is ignorant of astronomy, can he understand
the poets, who, to say nothing of other matters, so often
allude to the rising and setting of the stars in marking the
seasons; nor must he be unacquainted with philosophy, both
on account of numbers of passages, in almost all poems, drawn
from the most abstruse subtleties of physical investigation, and
also on account of Empedocles among the Greeks, and Varro
and Lucretius among the Latins, who have committed the precepts
of philosophy to verse. 5. The grammarian has also
need of no small portion of eloquence, that he may speak aptly
and fluently on each of those subjects which are here mentioned.
Those therefore are by no means to be regarded who deride
this science as trilling and empty, for unless it lays a sure
foundation for the future orator, whatever superstructure you
raise will fall; it is a science which is necessary to the young,
pleasing to the old, and an agreeable companion in retirement,
and which alone, of all departments of learning, has in it
more service than show.
6. Let no man, therefore, look down on the elements of
grammar as small matters; not because it requires great
labor to distinguish consonants from vowels, and to divide
them into the proper number of semivowels and mutes, but
because, to those entering the recesses, as it were, of this
temple, there will appear much subtlety on points, which may
not only sharpen the wits of boys, but may exercise even
the deepest erudition and knowledge. 7. Is it in the power
of every ear to distinguish accurately the sounds of letters?
No more, assuredly, than to distinguish the sounds of musical
strings. But all grammarians will at least descend to the discussion
of such curious points as these: whether any necessary
letters be wanting to us, not indeed when we write Greek, for
then we borrow two letters [Y and Z] from the Greeks, but, properly, in
Latin: 8. as in these words, seruus et uulgus, the Aeolic digamma
is required; [when the Romans pronounced the consonant v, they did not
distinguish it from the vowel, but designated both by the character u.
In writing such words as servua and vulgus, therefore, the want of a
distinct character for each was greatly felt, the same letter being
used twice, as seruus, vulgus, with two different sounds. See Cassiodorus de
Orthographia. Putsch, p. 2282. The sound of the digamma was, however, that of the English w,
when it commenced a syllable. Claudius Caesar attempted to bring the
digamma into use, but old custom was too strong for him, as Priscian
says, Putsch, p. 546. See Tacit. Ann. xi. 14; Dionys. Hal. Antiq. Rom.
p. 16, ed Sylb.] and there is a certain sound of a letter
between u and i, for we do not pronounce optimum like
opimum; in here, too, neither e nor i is distinctly heard:
whether, again, other letters are redundant (besides the mark
of aspiration, which, if it be necessary, requires also a contrary
mark) [the old Latins, like the Greeks, put the mark of aspiration over
the vowels, as we ourselves see in old manuscripts, in which we read 'avium and 'odie,
and as appears from this passage of Quintilian, for,
says he, if a sign of aspiration be necessary, a sign of the absence of
aspiration is also necessary.], as k, which is itself the mark of certain names, and
q (similar to which in sound and shape, except that q is
slightly warped by our writers, koppa now remains among the
Greeks, though only in the list of numbers), as well as x, the
last of our letters, which indeed we might have done without, if
we had not sought it. 10. With regard to vowels, too, it is the
business of the grammarian to see whether custom has taken
any for consonants, since iam is written as tam, and uos as cos.
But vowels which are joined, as vowels, make either one long
vowel, as the ancients wrote, who used the doubling of them
instead of the circumflex accent, or two; though perhaps some
one may suppose that a syllable may be formed even of three
vowels; but this cannot be the case, unless some of them do the
duty of consonants. 11. The grammarian will also inquire how
two vowels only have the power of uniting with each other,
when none of the consonants can break any letter but another
consonant. But the letter i unites with itself; for coniicit is
from iacit, and so does u, as uulgus and seruus
are now written. Let the grammarian also know that Cicero was inclined
to write aiio and Maiia with a double i, and, if this be done,
the one i will be joined to the other as a consonant. 12. Let
the boy, therefore, learn what is peculiar in letters, what is
common, and what relationship each has to each, and let
him not wonder why scabellum is formed from scamnum, or
why bipennis, an axe with an edge each way, is formed from
pinna, which means something sharp; that he may not follow
the error of those, who, because they think that this word is
from two wings, would have the wings of birds called pinnae.
13. Nor let him know those changes only which declension and prepositions
introduce, as secat secuit, cadit excidit, credit excidit,
calcat exculcat; (so lotus from lavare,
whence also illotus; and there are a thousand other similar
derivations;) but also what alterations have taken place, even
in nominative cases, through lapse of time; for, as Valesii and
Fusii have passed into Valerii and Furii, so
arbos, labos, vapos,
as well as clamos and lases have had their day. 14. This very
letter s, too, which has been excluded from these words, has
itself, in some other words, succeeded to the place of another
letter; for instead of mersare and pulsare, they
once said mertare and pultare. They also said fordeum and foedus, using,
instead of the aspiration, a letter similar to vau; for the
Greeks, on the other hand, are accustomed to aspirate, whence
Cicero, in his oration for Fundanius, laughs at a witness who
could not sound the first letter of that name. [The Greeks used the
aspirated f, or φ and the Greek witness
could not get rid of the aspirate in attempting to pronounce Fundanius.] 15. But we have
also, at times, admitted b into the place of other letters,
whence Burrus and Bruges, and Belena. The same letter moreover has made
bellum out of duellum, whence
some have ventured to call the Duellii, Bellii.
16. Why need I speak of silocus and silites? Why need I mention
that there is a certain relationship of the letter t to d?
Hence it is far from surprising if, on the old buildings of our city,
and well-known temples, is read Alexanter and Cassantra.
Why should I specify that o and u are interchanged? so that
Hecoba and notrix, Culchides and Pulyxena, were used, and,
that this may not be noticed in Greek words only, dederont
and probaveront. So 'Οδυσσευς,
whom the Aeolians made Ουδυσσευς,
was turned into Ulysses. 17. Was not e, too,
put in the place of i, as Menerva, leber, magester, and Dilove
and Veiove for Dilovi and Velovi? But it is enougli for me to
point to the subject; for I do not teach, but admonish those
who are to teach. The attention of the learner will then he
transferred to syllables, on which I shall make a few remarks
under the head of orthography.
He, whom this matter shall concern, will then understand
how many parts of speech there are, and what they are; though as to
their number writers are by no means agreed. 18. For the more ancient,
among whom were Aristotle and Theodectes,
said that there were only verbs, nouns, and convinctions,
because, that is to say, they judged that the force of language
was in verbs, and the matter of it in nouns (since the one is
what we speak, and the other that of which we speak), and that
the union of words lay in convinctions, which, I know, are by
most writers called conjunctions, but the other term seems to
be a more exact translation of συνδεσμος.
19. By the philosophers, and chiefly the Stoics, the number was gradually increased; to the convinctions
were first added articles, then prepositions; to nouns was added the appellation,
next the pronoun, and afterwards the participle, partaking of the nature of
the verb; to verbs themselves were joined adverbs. Our language
does not require articles, and they are therefore divided
among other parts of speech. To the parts of speech already
mentioned was added the interjection.
20. Other writers, however, certainly of competent judgment, have made eight
parts of speech, as Aristarchus, and Palaemon in our own day,
who have included the vocable, or appellation, under the name
or noun, as if a species of it. But those who make the noun
one, and the vocable another, reckon nine. But there were
some, nevertheless, who even distinguished the vocable from the
appellation, so that the vocable should signify any substance
manifest to the sight and touch, as a house, a bed; the appellation,
that to which one or both of these properties should
be wanting, as the wind, heaven, God, virtue. They added also
the asseveration, as heu, "alas!" and the attrectation, as
fascentim, "in bundles;" distinctions which are not approved
by me. 21. Whether προσηγορια should be translated by
vocable or appellation, and whether it should be comprehended
under the noun or not, are questions on which, as being of
little importance, I leave it free to others to form an opinion.
22. Let boys in the first place learn to decline nouns and
conjugate verbs; for otherwise they will never arrive at the
understanding of what is to follow; an admonition which it
would be superfluous to give, were it not that most teachers,
through ostentatious haste, begin where they ought to end, and,
while they wish to show off their pupils in matters of greater
display, retard their progress by attempting to shorten the
road. 23. But if a teacher has sufficient learning, and (what
is often found not less wanting) be willing to teach what he
has learned, he will not be content with stating that there are
three genders in nouns, and specifying what nouns have two
or all the three genders. 24. Nor shall I hastily deem that
tutor diligent, who shall have shown that there are irregular
nouns, called epicene, in which both genders are implied undee
one, or nouns which, under a feminine termination, signify
males, or, with a neuter termination, denote females; as Muraena
and Glycerium. 25. A penetrating and acute teacher will
search into a thousand origins of names; derivations which have
produced the names Rufus, "red," and Longus,
"long," from personal peculiarities; (among which will be some of
rather obscure etymology, as Sulla, Burrhus, Galba, Plancus,
Pansa, Scaurus, and others of the same kind;) some also from
accidents of birth, as Agrippa, Opiter, Cordus, Posthumus;
some from occurrences after birth, as Vopiscus; while others
as Cotta, Scipio, Laenas, Seranus, spring from various causes
26. We may also find people, places, and many other things
among the origins of names. That sort of names among slaves
which was taken from their masters, whence Marcipores and
Publipores [Marcipor for Marci puer; Publipor
for Publii puer], has fallen into disuse. Let the tutor consider,
also, whether there is not among the Greeks ground for a sixth case,
and among us oven for a seventh; for when I say
hasta percussi, "I have struck with a spear," I do not express
the sense of an ablative case, nor, if I say the same thing in
Greek, that of a dative.
27. As to verbs, who is so ignorant as not to know their
kinds, qualities, persons, and numbers Those things belong
to the reading school, and to the lower departments of instruction.
But such points as are not determined by inflexion,
will puzzle some people; for it may be doubted, as to certain
words, whether they are participles, or nouns formed from the
verb, as lectus, sapiens. 28. Some verbs look like nouns,
as frandalor, nutritor. Is not the verb in Itur in antiquam silvam
of a peculiar nature, for what beginning of it can you find?
Fletur is similar to it. We understand the passive sometimes
in one way, as,
Panditur interea domus omnipotentis Olympi;
sometimes in another, as,
Totis
Usque adeo turbatur agris.
There is also a third way, as urbs habitatur, whence likewise
campus curritur, mare navigatur. 29. Pransus also and potus
have a different signification from that which their form indicates.
I need hardly add, that many verbs do not go through
the whole course of conjugation. Some, too, undergo a change,
as fero in the preterperfect; some are expressed only in the
form of the third person, as licet, piget; and some bear a
resemblance to nouns passing into adverbs; for, as we say noctu
and diu, so we say dictu and factu; since these words are
indeed participial, though not like dicto and facto.
CHAPTER V.
1. Since all language has three kinds of excellence, to
he correct, perspicuous, and elegant, (for to speak with propriety,
which is its highest quality, most writers include under
elegance,) and the same number of faults, which are the opposites
of the excellences just mentioned, let the grammarian
consider well the rules for correctness which constitute the first
part of grammar. 2. These rules are required to be observed,
verbis aut singulis aut pluribus, in regard to one or more words.
The word verbum I wish to be here understood in a general
sense, for it has two significations: the one, which includes all
words of which language is composed, as in the verse of
Horace,
Verbaque provisam rem non invita sequentur,
"And words, not unwilling, will follow provided matter;" the
other, under which is comprehended only one part of speech,
as lego, scribo; to avoid which ambiguity some have preferred
the terms voces, dictiones, locutiones. 3. Words, considered
singly, are either our own, or foreign, simple or compound,
proper or metaphorical, in common use or newly invented.
A word taken singly is oftener objectionable than faultless; for
however we may express anything with propriety, elegance, and sublimity,
none of these qualities arise from anything but the connection and order
of the discourse; since we commend single words merely as being well
suited to the matter. The only good quality, which can be remarked in
them, is their vocalitas, so to speak, called ευφωνια,
"euphony;" which depends upon selection, when of two words, which have the same
signification, and are of equal force, we make choice of the one that
has the better sound.
5. First of all, let the offensiveness of
barbarisms and solecisms be put away. But as these faults are sometimes
excused, either from custom, or authority, or, perhaps, from their
nearness to beauties, (for it is often difficult to distinguish faults
from figures of speech,) let the grammarian, that so uncertain a subject
of observation may deceive no one, give his earnest attention to that
nice discrimination, of which we shall speak more fully in the part
where we shall have to treat of figures of speech. 6. Meanwhile, let
an offense committed in regard to a single word, be called a barbarism.
But some one may stop me with the remark, what is there here worthy of
the promise of so great a work? Or who does not know that barbarisms
are committed, some in writing, others in speaking? (because what is
written incorrectly must also be spoken incorrectly; though he who
speaks incorrectly may not necessarily make mistakes in writing;) the
first sort being caused by addition, curtailment, substitution, or
transposition; the second by separation or confusion of syllables,
aspiration, or other faults of sound? But though these
may be small matters, boys are still to be taught, and we put
grammarians in mind of their duty. If any one of them, however,
shall not be sufficiently accomplished, but shall have just
entered the vestibule of the art, he will have to confine himself
within those rules which are published in the little manuals of
professors; the more learned will add many other instructions,
the very first of which will be this, that we understand barbarisms
as being of several kinds.
8. One, with reference to
country, such as is committed when a person inserts an African
or Spanish term in Latin composition; as when the iron ring,
with which wheels are bound, is culled canthus, though Persius
uses this as a received word; as when Catullus got the word ploxenum,
"a box," on the banks of the Po; and in the speech of
Labienus, (if it be not rather the speech of Cornelius Gallus,)
the word casnar, "a parasite," is brought from
Gaul against Pollio; as to mastruca " a shaggy garment," which is n
Sardinian word, Cicero has used it purposely in jest. 9.
Another kind of barbarism is that which we regard as proceeding
from the natural disposition, when he, by whom anything
has been uttered insolently, or threateningly, or cruelly, is
said to have spoken like a barbarian. 10. The third kind
of barbarism is that of which examples are everywhere abundant,
and which every one can form for himself, by adding
n letter or syllable to any word he pleases, or taking one away,
or substituting one for another, or putting one in a place where
it is not right for it to be.
11. But some grammarians, to
make a show of learning, are accustomed, for the most part, to
take examples of these from the poets, and find fault with the
authors whom they interpret. A boy ought to know, however,
that such forms of speech, in writers of poetry, are considered
as deserving of excuse, or even of praise; and learners
must be taught less common instances. 12. Thus Tinca of
Placentia (if we believe Hortensius, who finds fault with
him) was guilty of two barbarisms in one word, saying precula
instead of pergula; first, by the change of a letter, putting c
for g, and secondly, by transposition, placing r before the preceding
e. But Ennius, when committing a like double fault,
by saying Metieo Fufetieo, is defended on the ground oi
poetic licence. 13. In prose, too, there are certain received
changes; for Cicero speaks of an army of Canopitae, though
the people of the city call it Canobus; and many writers have
authorized Tharsomenus for Thrasymenus, [the name of the
well-known lake at which Hannibal defeated the
Romans] although there is
a transposition in it. Other words suffer similar treatment;
for if assentior, "I assent," be thought the proper way of
spelling that word, Sisenna has said assentio, and many have
followed him and analogy; or, if assentio be deied the right
method, the other form, assentior, is supported by common
practice.
14. Yet the prim and dull teacher will suppose
that there is either curtailment in the one case, or addition
in the other. I need hardly add that some forms, which,
taken singly, are doubtless faulty, are used in composition
without blame. 15. For dua, tre, and pondo, are barbarisms
of discordant gender; yet the compounds duapondo, "two
pounds," and trepondo, "three pounds," have been
used by everybody down to our own times; and Messala maintains
that they are used with propriety. 16. It may perhaps seem
absurd to say that a barbarism, which is incorrectness in a
single word, may be committed in number and gender, like a
solecism; yet scala, "stairs," and scopa, "a broom," in the
singular, and hordea, "barley," and mulsa, "mead," in the
plural, as they are attended with no change, withdrawal,
or addition of letters, are objectionable only because plurals
are expressed in the singular, and singulars in the plural; and
those who have used gladia, "swords," have committed a fault
in gender. 17. But this point, too, I am satisfied with
merely noticing, that I myself may not appear to have added
another question to a branch of study already perplexed
through the fault of certain obstinate grammarians.
Faults which are committed in speaking require more
sagacity in criticizing them, because examples of them cannot
be given from writing, except when they have occurred in
verses, as the division of the diphthong in Europai, and the
irregularity of the opposite kind, which the Greeks call
synaeresis and synalaepha, and we conflexio," combination,"
as in the verse in Publius Varro,
Quam te flagranti dejectum fulmine Phaeton;
for, if it were prose, it would be possible to enunciate those
letters by their proper syllables. Those peculiarities, also,
which occur in quantity, whether when a short syllable is
made long, as in Italiam fato profugus, or when a long one
is made short, as in Unius ob noxam et furias, you would not
remark except in verse; and even in verse they are not to be
regarded as faults. 19. Those which are committed in sound,
are judged only by the ear; though as to the aspirate, whether
it be added or retrenched, in variation from common practice,
it may be a question with us whether it be a fault in writing;
if h indeed be a letter, and not merely a mark, as to which
point opinion has often changed with time. 20. The ancients
used it very sparingly even before vowels, as they said aedos
and ircos; and it was long afterwards withheld from conjunction
with consonants, as in Graccus and triumpus. But
suddenly an excessive use of it became prevalent, so that
choronae, chenituriones, praechones, are still to be seen in
certain inscriptions; on which practice there is a well-known
epigram of Catullus. [Epigr. Ixxviii. de Ario sive Hirrio.] Hence there remain, even to our times,
vehementer, conprehendere, and mihi. Among the ancient
writers, also, especially those of tragedy, we find in old copies
mehe for me
22. Still more difficult is the marking of faults in respect
to the tenores, "tones," (which I find called by the old writers
tonores, as if, forsooth, the word were derived from the Greeks,
who call them τονος,) or accents, which the Greeks call
προσωδιαι
when the acute is put for the grave, or the grave for the acute;
as if, in the word Camillus, the first syllable should receive
the acute accent; 23. or if the grave is put for the circumflex,
as when the first syllable of Cethegus has the acute, for thus
the quantity of the middle syllable is altered; or if the circumflex
is put for the grave, as when the second syllable is
circumflexed in * * *, by contracting which from two syllables
into one, and then circumflexing it, people commit two errors.
24. But this happens far more frequently in Greek words, as Atreus,
which, when I was young, the most learned old men
used to pronounce with an acute on the first syllable, so that
the second was necessarily grave, as was also that of Tereus
and Nereus. Such have been the rules respecting accents.
25. But I am quite aware that certain learned men, and some
grammarians also, teach and speak in such a manner as to
terminate a word at times with an acute sound, for the sake
of preserving certain distinctions in words, as in circum in these
lines,
Quae circum litora, circum
Piscosos scopulos,
lest, if they make the second syllable in circum grave, a circus
might seem to be meant, not a circuit. 20. Quantum and
quale, also, when asking a question, they conclude with a
grave accent; when making a comparison, with an acute; a
practice, however, which they observe almost only in adverbs
and pronouns; in other words they follow the old custom.
27. To me it appears to make a difference, that in these
phrases we join the words; for when I say circum litora, I
enunciate the words as one, without making any distinction
between them; and thus one syllable only, as in a single word,
is acute. The same is the case in this homistich,
Trojae qui primus ab oris.
28. It sometimes happens, too, that the law of the metre
alters the accent: as,
Pecudes, pictaeque volucres;
For I shall pronounce volucres with an acute on the middle
syllable, because, though it be short by nature, it is long by
position, that it may not form an iambus, which a heroic
verse does not admit. 29. But these words, taken separately,
will not vary from the rule; or, if custom shall triumph, the
old law of the language will be abolished; the observation of
which law is more difficult among the Greeks, (because they
have several modes of speaking, which they call dialects, and
because what is wrong in one is sometimes right in another;)
but among us the principle of accentuation is very simple.
30. For in every word the acuted syllable is confined within
the number of three syllables, whether those three be the
only syllables in the word, or the three last; and of these,
the acuted syllable is either the next, or next but one, to
the last. Of the three syllables of which I am speaking,
moreover, the middle one will be long, or acute, or circumflex;
a short syllable in that position will, of course, have a grave
sound, and will accordingly acute the one that stands before
it, that is, the third from the end. 31. But in every word
there is an acute syllable, though never more than one; nor
is that one ever the last, and consequently in dissyllables it is
the first. Besides there is never in the same word one syllable
circumflexed and another acuted, for the same syllable that is
circumflexed is also acuted; neither of the two, therefore,
will terminate a Latin word. Those words, however, which
consist but of one syllable, will be either acuted or circumflexed,
that there may be no word without an acute.
32. In sounds also occur those faults of utterance and pronunciation,
of which specimens cannot be given in writing;
the Greeks, who are more happy in inventing names, call them
solacisms, lambdacisms, ισχνοτητες,
and πλατειασμοι:
as also χοιλοστομια,
when the voice is heard, as it were, in the depths
of the throat. 33. There are also certain peculiar and inexpressible
sounds, for which we sometimes find fault with whole
nations. All the incorrectnesses, then, which we have mentioned above,
being removed, there will result that which is
called ορθοεπεια,
that is, a correct and clear utterance of words
with an agreeableness of sound; for so may a right pronunciation be
termed.
34. All other faults arise out of more words than one;
among which faults is the solecism; though about this also
there has been controversy. For even those who admit that
it lies in the composition of words, yet contend that, because
it may be corrected by the amendment of a single word, it is
the incorrectness of a word, and not a fault in composition;
35. since, whether amarae corticis or medio cortice constitutes
a fault in gender, (to neither of which do I object, Virgil
[Ecl. vi. 62, 63; Georg. ii. 74]
being the author of both; but let us suppose that one of the
two is incorrect.) the alteration of one word, in which the fault
lay, produces correctness of phraseology; so that we have
amari corticis or media cortice. This is a manifest
misrepresentation; for neither of the words is wrong, taken separately,
but the fault lies in them when put together; and it is a fault
therefore of phrase.
36. It is, however, a question of greater
sagacity, whether a solecism can be committed in a single
word; as if a man, calling one person to him, should say venite,
or, sending several away from him, should say abi, or discede;
or, moreover, when an answer does not agree with the question,
as if to a person saying quem vides? you should reply ego.
Some also think that the same fault is committed in gesture,
when one thing is signified by the voice, and another by a nod
or by the hand. 37. With this opinion I do not altogether
agree, nor do I altogether dissent from it; for I allow that a
solecism may occur in one word, but not unless there be something
having the force of another word, to which the incorrect
word may be referred; so that a solecism arises from the
union of things by which something is signified or some
intention manifested; and, that I may avoid all cavilling, it
sometimes occurs in one word, but never in a word by itself.
38. But under how many, and what forms, the solecism
occurs, is not sufficiently agreed. Those who speak of it most
fully make the nature of it fourfold, like that of the barbarism;
so that it may be committed by addition, as, Veni de
Susis in Alexandriam; by retrenchment, as Ambulo viam,
Aegypto venio; ne hoc fecit; 39. by transposition, by which the
order of words is confused, as, Quoque ego; Enim hoc voluit;
Aulem non habuit; under which head, whether igitur, placed
at the beginning of a phrase, ought to be included, may
be a matter of dispute, because I see that eminent authors
have been of opposite opinions as to the practice, it being
common among some, while it is never found in others. 40.
These three sorts of irregularity some distinguish from the
solecism, and call a fault of addition "a pleonasm,"
of retrenchment "an ellipsis," of inversion "an anastrophe," and allege
that if these fall under the head of solecism, the hyperbalon
may be included under the same title.
41. Substitution is,
without dispute, when one thing is put for another; an irregularity
which we find affecting all the parts of speech, but
most frequently the verb, because it has most modifications;
and accordingly, under the head of substitution, occur
solecisms in gender, tense, persons, moods, (or states, or qualities,
if any one wish that they should be so called,) being six, or,
as some will have it, eight in number (since into however
many forms you distinguish each of the parts of speech of
which mention has just been made, there will be so many sorts
of errors liable to be committed), as well as in numbers, of
which we have the singular and plural, the Greeks also the
dual. 43. There have, indeed, been some who assigned us
also a dual, scripsere, legere; a termination which was merely
a softening for the sake of avoiding roughness of sound, as,
among the old writers, male merere for male mereris; and
thus what they call the dual consists in that one sort of
termination only, whereas among the Greeks it is found not only
through almost the whole system of the verb, but also in nouns;
though even so the use of it is very rare.
43. But in no one
of our authors is this distinction of ending to be discovered;
on the contrary, the phrases, Devenere locos, Conticuere omnes,
Consedere duces, show us plainly that no one of them
refers to two persons only; dixere, too, though Antonius Rufus
gives it as an example of the contrary, the crier [at
trials the crier of the court, after the pleaders on both
sides had finished their speeches, used to say Dixere, "they have spoken;"] pronounces
concerning more advocates than two. 44. Does not Livy,
also, near the beginning of his first book, say, Tenuere arcem
Sabini, and a little afterwards, In adversum Romani subiere?
But whom shall I follow in preference to Cicero, who, in his
Orator [C. 47], says, "I do not object to scripsere, though I consider
scripserunt to be preferable?"
45. In appellative and other nouns, likewise, the solecism
shows itself in regard to gender, and to number, but especially
to case. Whichsoever of those three shall be put in the place of
another, the error may be placed under this head; as also incorrectnesses
in the use of comparatives and superlatives;
as well as cases in which the patronymic is put for the possessive,
or the contrary. 46. As to a fault committed in regard
to quantity, such as magnum peculiolum, there will be some
who will think it a solecism, because a diminution is used
instead of the integral word; but for my own part, I doubt
whether I should not rather call it a misapplication of a word,
for it is a departure from the signification; and the impropriety
of a solecism is not an error as to the sense of a word, but in
the junction of words. 47. In respect to the participle errors
are committed in gender and case, as in the noun; in tense, as
in the verb; and in number, as in both. The pronoun, also,
has gender, number, and case, all of which admit mistakes of
this kind.
48. Solecisms are committed, too, and in great
numbers, as to parts of speech, but it is not enough merely to
remark this generally, lest the pupil should think a solecism
committed only where one part of speech is put for another,
as a verb where there ought to have been a noun, or an adverb
where there ought to have been a pronoun, and the like.
49. For there are some nouns cognate, as they say, that is,
of the same kind, in regard to which he who shall use another
species than that which he ought to use, will be guilty of no
less an error than if he were to use a word of another genus.
50. Thus an and aut are both conjunctions, yet you would be
incorrect in asking, hic, aut ille, sit? Ne and non are both
adverbs, yet he who should say non feceris for ne feceris, would
fall into a similar error, since the one is an adverb of denying,
the other of forbidding. I will add another example; intro
and intus are both adverbs of place; yet eo intus, and intro
sum, are solecisms. 51. The same faults may be committed in
regard to the different sorts of pronouns, interjections, and
prepositions. The discordant collocation of preceding and following
words, also, in a sentence of one clause, is a solecism.
52. There are expressions, however, which have the appearance
of solecisms, and yet cannot be called faulty, as tragoedia
Thyestes, Ludi Floralia, and Megalesia; for though these
modes of expression have fallen into disuse in later times,
there was never any variation from them among the ancients.
They shall therefore be called figures; figures more common
indeed among the poets, but allowable also to writers and
speakers in prose. 63. But a figure will generally have something
right for its basis, as I shall show in that part of my
work which I just before promised. Yet what is now called
a figure will not be free from the fault of solecism, if it be
used by any one unknowingly. 54. Of the same sort, though,
as I have already said, they have nothing of figure, are names
with a feminine termination which males have, and those with
a masculine termination which females have. But of the
solecism I shall say no more; for I have not undertaken to
write a treatise on grammar, though, as grammar met me in
my road, I was unwilling to pass it without paying my respects
to it.
55. In continuation, that I may follow the course which I
prescribed to myself, let me repeat that words are either Latin
or foreign. Foreign words, like men, and like many of our
institutions, have come to us, I might almost say, from all
nations. 50. I say nothing of the Tuscans, Sabines, and
Praenostines, for though Lucilius attacks Vectius for using their
dialect, as Pollio discovers Patavinity in Livy, I would
consider every part of Italy as Roman. 57. Many Gallic words
have prevailed among us, as rheda, "a chariot,"
and peiorritum, "a four-wheeled cairiage," of which, however, Cicero
uses one, and Horace the other. Mappa, "a napkin," too, a
term much used in the circus, the Carthaginians claim as theirs;
and gurdus, a word which the common people use for foolish,
had, I have heard, its origin in Spain. 58. But this division
of mine is intended to refer chiefly to the Greek language;
for it is from thence that the Roman language is, in a very
great degree, derived; and we use even pure Greek words,
where our own fail, as they also sometimes borrow from us.
Hence arises the question, whether it is proper that foreign
words should be declined with cases in the same way as our
own.
59. if you meet with a grammarian who is a lover of
the ancients, he will say that there should be no departure from
the Latin method; because, as there is in our language an ablative
case, which the Greeks have not, it is by no means
becoming for us to use one case of our own, and five Greek
cases. 60. And he would also praise the merit of those who
studied to increase the resources of the Latin language, and
asserted that they need not introduce foreign practices; under
the influence of which notion they said Castorem, with the
middle syllable long, because such was the case with all our
nouns whose nominative case ends in the same letters as
Castor; and they retained the practice, moreover, of saying
Palaemo, Telamo, and Plato (for so Cicero also called him),
because they found no Latin word that terminated with the
letters o and n.
61. Nor did they willingly allow masculine Greek nouns to end in as
in the nominative case, and accordingly, we read in Caelius, Pelia Cincinnatus; in Messala,
Bene fecit Euthia; in Cicero, Hermagora; so that we need
not wonder that the forms Aenea and Anchisa were used by
most of the old writers: for, said they, if those words were
written as Maecenas, Suffenas, Asprenas, they would end in
the genitive case, not with the letter e, but with the syllable
tis. 62. Hence, to Olympus and tyrannus they gave an acuted
middle syllable, because our language does not permit the first
syllable of a word, if short, to have an acute accent when two
long syllables follow. 63. Thus the genitive had the forms
Achilli and Ulixi; and many others similar. The modern
grammarians have now made it a practice rather to give
Greek declensions to Greek nouns; a practice which cannot,
however, always be observed. For myself, I prefer following
the Latin method, as far as propriety allows; for I would not
now say Calypsonem, like Junonem, though Caius Caesar,
following the older writers, uses this mode of declining. 64.
But custom has prevailed over authority. In other words,
which may be declined without impropriety in either way, he
who shall prefer to use the Greek form will speak, not indeed
like a Roman, but without incurring blame.
65. Simple words are what they are in their first position
[that is,
in their nominative case, the form in
which they are first laid down],
that is, in their own nature. Compound words are either
formed by subjoining words to prepositions, as innocens, (care
being taken that there be not two prepositions inconsistent
with each other, as imperterritus, otherwise two may be at
times joined together, as incompositus, reconditus, and, a word
which Cicero uses, subabsurdum;) or they coalesce, as it were,
from two bodies into one, as maleficus. 66. For to form words
out of three constituent parts I should certainly not grant to
our language; though Cicero says that capsis is compounded of
cape si vis; and some are found to maintain that Lupercalia
also consists of three parts of speech, luere per caprum.
[It is
generally supposed to be from Lupercus, a name of Pan, or a
priest of Pan. Lupercus is thought to be lupos arcens.]
67. As to solitaurilia, it is now believed that it is for suove-taurilia,
and such indeed is the sacrifice, as it is described
also in Homer [Odyss. xi. 130; xxiii. 277]. ST But these words are constructed, not so
much of three words, as of parts of three words. Pacuvius
however appears to have formed compounds, most inelegantly
of a preposition and two other words:
Nerei
Repandirostrum, incurvicervicum pecus,
"The broad-nosed, crook-necked flock of Nereus."
Compounds, however, are formed either of two entire Latin words,
as superfui, subterfugi, (though it is a question whether these
are indeed formed of entire words,) of an entire and incomplete
word, as malevolus; of an incomplete and entire
word, as noctivagus; of two incomplete words, as pedissequus;
of a Latin and a foreign word, as biclinium; of a foreign and
a Latin word, as epilogium and Anticato; or of two foreign
words, as epirhedium, for though the preposition επι is Greek,
and rheda Gallic, and though neither the Greek nor the Gaul
uses the compound, yet the Romans have formed their word of
the two foreign words. 69. Frequently, too, the union causes a
change in the prepositions, as abstulit, aufugit, amisit, though
the preposition is merely ab, and coit, the preposition being
con; and so ignovi, erepti, and similar compounds. 70. But the
composition of words in general is better suited to the Greeks;
with us it is less successful; though I do not think that this
results from the nature of the language; but we look with more
favor on foreign compounds; and, accordingly, while we admire
κυρναυχενα, we hardly defend incurvicervicum from
derision.
71. Words are proper when they signify that to which they
were first applied; metaphorical, when they have one signification
by nature, and another in the place in which they are
used. Common words we use with greater safety; new ones
we do not form without some danger; for if they are well received,
they add but little merit to our style, and, if rejected,
they turn to jokes against us. 72. Yet we must make
attempts; for, as Cicero says, even words which have seemed
harsh at first, become softened by use.
As to the onomatopoeia, it is by no means granted to our
language; for, if we should venture to produce anything like
those justly admired expressions λιγξεβιος,
"the bow twanged," and σιζε οφθαλμος
[Il. iv. 125; Odyss. ix. 394],
"the eye hissed," who would endure it?
We should not even dare to say balare, "to bleat," or hinnire,
"to neigh," unless those words were supported by the
sanction of antiquity.
CHAPTER VI.
1. By speakers, as well as writers, there are certain rules to
be observed. Language is based on reason, antiquity, authority,
custom. It is analogy, and sometimes etymology, that
affords the chief support to reason. A certain majesty, and, if
I may so express myself, religion, graces the antique. Authority
is commonly sought in orators or historians; for, as to the
poets, the obligation of the metre excuses their phraseology,
unless, occasionally, when, though the measure of the feet
offers no impediment to the choice of either of two expressions,
they fancifully prefer one to the other; as in the following
phrases: Imo de stirpe recisum, Aeriae quo congessere palumbes, Silice in nudd,
[Virg. Aen. xii. 208; Ecl. iii. 69; i. 15] and the like; since the judgment of men
eminent in eloquence is in place of reason, and even error is
without dishonor in following illustrious guides. Custom,
however, is the surest preceptor in speaking; and we must use
phraseology, like money, which has the public stamp.
But all these particulars require great judgment, especially
analogy; which, translating it closely from Greek into Latin,
people have called proportion. 4. What it requires is, that a
writer or speaker should compare whatever is at all doubtful,
with something similar concerning which there is no doubt, so
as to prove the uncertain by the certain. This is done in two
ways: by a comparison of similar words, in respect chiefly
to their last syllables (for which reason the words that have but
one syllable are said not to be accountable to analogy), and by
looking to diminutives. 5. Comparison, in nouns, shows
either their gender or their declension; their gender, as, when
it is inquired whether funis be masculine or feminine, panis
may be an object of comparison with it; their declension, as,
if it should be a subject of doubt whether we should say hac
domu or hac domo, and domuum or domorum, domus, anus,
manus may be compared with each other. 6. The formation
of diminutives shows only the gender of words, as (that I may
take the same word for an example) funiculus proves that funis
is masculine.
7. There is also similar reason for comparison in verbs; as if
anyone, following the old writers, should pronounce fervere with the middle syllable short, he would be
convicted of speaking incorrectly, since all verbs which end
with the letters e and o in the indicative mood, when they
have assumed the letter e in the middle syllables in the infinitive,
have it necessarily long, as prandeo, pendeo, spondeo,
prandere, pendere, spondere. 8. But those which have o
only in the indicative, when they end with the same letter e in
the infinitive, shorten it, as lego, dico, curro, legere, dicere,
currere; although there occurs in Lucilius,
Fervit aqua et.fervet; fervit nunc, fervit ad annum.
"The water boils and will boil; it boils now, and will boil for a
year."
But with all respect to a man of such eminent learning, if
he thinks fervit similar to currit and legit, fervo will be a word
like curro and lego, a word which has never been heard by
me. But this is not a just comparison; for servit is like
fervit, and he that follows this analogy must say fervire as
well as servire.
10. The present indicative also is sometimes
discovered from the other moods and tenses; for I remember
that some people who bad blamed me for using the word pepigi,
were convinced by me of their error; they had allowed,
indeed, that the best authors had used pepigi, but denied that
analogy permitted its use, since the present indicative paciscor,
as it had the form of a passive verb, made in the perfect tense
pactus sum. But I, besides adducing the authority of
orators and historians, maintained that pepigi was also
supported by analogy; for, as we read in the Twelve Fables, ni
ita pagunt, I found cadunt similar to pagunt, whence the
present indicative, though it had fallen into disuse through
time, was evidently pago, like cado; and it was therefore
certain that we say pepigi like cecidi.
12. But we must remember that the course of analogy cannot be traced through
all the parts of speech, as it is in many cases at variance with
itself. Learned men, indeed, endeavor to justify some
departures from it, as, when it is remarked how much lepus and
lupus, though of similar terminations in the nominative, differ
in their cases and numbers, they reply that they are not of the
same sort, since lepus is epicene, and lupus masculine;
although Varro, in the book in which he relates the origin of
the city of Rome, uses lupus as feminine, following Ennius and
Fabius Pictor. 13. But those same grammarians, when they
are asked why aper makes apri, and pater patris, assert that
the first is declined absolutely, and the second with reference
to something; and, besides, as both are derived from the
Greek, they recur to the rule that πατρος gives patris, and
καπρου apri.
14. But how will they escape from the fact
that nouns, which end with the letters u and s in the nominative
singular, never, even though feminine, end with the
syllable ris in the genitive, yet that Venus makes Veneris;
and that, though nouns ending in es have various endings in the
genitive, yet their genitive never ends in that same syllable ris,
when, nevertheless, Ceres obliges us to say Cereris? 15. And
what shall I say of those parts of speech, which, though all of
similar commencement, proceed with different inflexions, as
Alba makes Albani and Albenses, Volo, volui and volavi?
For that verbs, which end with the letter o in the first person
singular, are variously formed in the perfect, analogy itself
admits, as cado makes cecidi, spondeo, spopondi, pingo pinxi,
lego legi, pono posui, frango fregi, laudo laudavi; 16. since
analogy was not sent down from heaven, when men were first
made, to give them rules for speaking, but was discovered after
men had begun to speak, and after it was observed how each
word in speaking terminated. It is not therefore founded on
reason, but on example; nor is it a law for speaking, but the
mere result of observation; so that nothing but custom has
been the origin of analogy.
17. Yet some people adhere to it
with a most unpleasantly perverse attachment to exactness; so
that they will say audaciter in preference to audacter, though all
orators adopt the latter, and emicavit instead of emicuit, conire
instead of coire. Such persons we may allow to say audivisse,
and scivisse, tribunale, and faciliter; let them also have their
frugalis, instead of frugi, for how else can frugalitas be
formed? 18. Let them also prove that centum millia nummum
and fidem Deum are two solecisms, since they err in both
case and number; for we were ignorant of this, forsooth, and
were not merely complying with custom and convenience, as in
most cases, of which Cicero treats nobly, as of everything else,
in his Orator. 19. Augustus, too, in his letters written to
Caius Caesar, corrects him for preferring to say calidum rather
than caldum, not because calidum is not Latin, but because
it is unpleasing, and, as he has himself expressed it bv a
Greek word, περιεργον.
20. All this indeed they consider as mere ορθοεπεια,
"orthoepy," which I by no means set aside; for what is so
necessary as correctness of speech? I think that we ought to adhere to
it as far as possible, and to make persevering resistance against innovators; but to retain words that are obsolete
and disused, is a species of impertinence, and of puerile ostentation
in little things. 21. Let the extremely learned man,
who has saluted you without an aspirate, and with the second
syllable lengthened, (for the verb, he will say, is avere,) say
also calefacere and conservavisse rather than what we say;
and with these let him join face, dice, and the like. 22. His
way is the right way; who will deny it? but a smoother and
more beaten road is close by the side of it.
There is nothing
however, with which I am more offended, than that these men,
led away by oblique cases, permit themselves, I do not say not
to find, but oven to alter nominative cases, as when ebur and
robur, so spoken and written by the greatest authors, are made
to change the vowel of the second syllable into o, because their
genitives are ruboris and eboris, and because sulfur and jecur
preserve the vowel u in the genitive. For which reason also
jecur and femur have raised disputes. 23. This change of
theirs is not less audacious than if they were to substitute the
letter o for u in the genitive case of sulfur and guttur, because
eboris and roboris are formed with o; after the example of
Antonius Gnipho [an eminent grammarian and rhetorician, whose school is
said to have been frequented by many great men, and even by Cicero
himself after he was praetor. See Suetonius on Eminent Grammarians, v. vii;
Macrob. Sat. iii. 12], who acknowledges that robur and ebur are
proper words, and even marmur, but would have the plurals
of them to be robura, ebura, marmura. 24. But if they
had paid attention to the affinity of letters, they would have
understood that roboris is as fairly formed from robur as
militis, limitis, from miles, limes, or judicis, vindicis, from
iudex, vindex, and would have observed some other forms to
which I have adverted above.
25. Do not similar nominative
cases, as I remarked, diverge into very dissimilar forms in
the oblique cases, as Virgo, Juno; fusus, lusus; cuspis, puppis;
and a thousand others? It happens, too, that some nouns are
not used in the plural, others not in the singular; some are
indeclinable; some depart altogether from the form of their
nominatives, as Jupiter. 26. The same peculiarity happens
in verbs, as fero, tuli, of which the preterperfect is found,
and nothing more. Nor is it of much importance, whether
those unused parts are actually not in existence, or whether
they are too harsh to be used; for what, for example, will
progenies make in the genitive singular, or what will spes make
in the genitive plural? Or how will quire and ruere, form
themselves in the perfect passive, or in the passive participles?
57. It is needless to advert to other words, when it is even
uncertain whether senatus makes senatus senatui, or senati
senato. It appears to me, therefore, to have been not
unhappily remarked that it is one thing to speak Latin, and
another to speak grammar. Of analogy I have now said
enough, and more than enough.
Etymology, which inquires into the origin of words, is called
by Cicero notation, because its designation in Aristotle is
συμβολον, that is, nota;
for to a literal rendering of ετυμολογια,
which would be veriloquium, Cicero himself, who formed that
word, is averse. There are some, who, looking rather to the
meaning of the word, call it origination. 20. This part of
grammar is sometimes of the utmost use; as often, indeed, as
the matter, concerning which there is any dispute, stands in
need of interpretation; as when Marcus Caelius would prove
that he was a homo frugi, "a frugal man," not because he was
temperate, (for on that point he could not speak falsely,) but
because he was profitable to many, that is fructuosus, from
whence, he said, was derived frugality. A place is accordingly
assigned to etymology in definitions. 30. Sometimes, also,
it endeavors to distinguish barbarous from polite words; as
when a question arises whether Sicily should be called
Triquetra or Triquedra, and whether we should say meridies
or medidies; and similar questions concerning other words which
yield to custom. 31. But it carries with it much learning, whether we
employ it in treating of words sprung from the Greek, which are very
numerous, especially those inflected according to the Aeolic dialect, to which our language has most
similitude, or in inquiring, from our knowledge of ancient
history, into the names of men, places, nations, cities; whence
come the names of the Bruti, Publicolae, Pici; why we say
Latium, Italia, Beneventum; what is our reason for using
the terms Capitol, Quirinal hill, and Argiletum.
33. I would now allude, also, to those minuter points, on which the
greatest lovers of etymology weary themselves; men who bring back to
their true derivation, by various and manifold arts, words
that have become a little distorted, shortening
or lengthening, adding, taking away, or interchanging letters
or syllables. In this pursuit, through weakness of judgment,
they run into the most contemptible absurdities. Let consul be
(I make no objection) from "consulting" or from "judging," for
the ancients called consulere "judicare," whence still remains
the phrase rogat boni consulas, that is, bonum judices. 33.
Let it be old age that has given a name to the senate, for the
senators are fathers; let rex, rector, and abundance of other
words, be indisputably from rego; nor would I dispute the
ordinary derivation of tegula, regula, and other words similar
to them; let classis, also, be from calare, "to call together,"
and let lepus be for levipes, and vulpes for volipes.
34. But shall we also allow words to be derived from contraries,
as lucus, "a grove," from luceo, " to shine," because, being thick
with shade, parum lucet, it does not shine? As ludus, "a
school," from ludo, "to play," because it is as far
as possible from play? As Ditis, " Pluto," from dives, "rich," because
he is by no means rich? Or shall we allow homo, "man," to
be from humus, "the ground," because he was sprung from
the ground, as if all animals had not the same origin, or as if
the first men had given a name to the ground before they gave
one to themselves? Shall we allow verba " words," to be
from aer verberatus, "beaten air?"
35. Let us go on, and
we shall get so far that stella, "a star," will be believed to
be luminis stilla, "a drop of light," the author of which
derivation, an eminent man in literature, it would be ungenerous
for me to name in regard to a point on which he
is censured by me. 36. But those who have recorded such
etymologies in books have themselves set their names to
them; and Caius Granius thought himself extremely clever
for saying that coelibes, "bachelors," was the same as coelites,
"inhabitants of heaven," because they are alike free from
a most heavy burden, resting his derivation, too, on an argument
from the Greek, for he affirmed that ηιθεους was
used in the same sense. Nor does Modestus [Suetonius
on Eminent Grammarians, c. xx] yield to him
in imagination, for he says that because Saturn cut of the
genitalia of Coelus, men who have no wives are, therefore,
called coelibes. 37. Lucius Aelius declares that pituita,
"phlegm," is so called quia petat vitam, because "it aims
at life."
But who may not be pardoned after Varro, who
wished to persuade Cicero (for it was to him that he wrote
this), that ager, "a field," is so called because in eo agatur
aliquid, "something is done in it," and that graculos,
"jack-daws," are so named because they fly gregatim, "in flocks,"
though it is evident that the one is derived from the Greek,
and the other from the cries of the birds themselves? But
of such importance was it to Varro to derive, that merula
"a blackbird,'' he declared, was so named because it flies
alone, as if mera volans. Some have not hesitated to apply
to etymology for the origin of every name or word; deducing
Longus and Rufus, as I remarked, from personal
peculiarities; strepere and murmurare from particular sounds; with which
they join, also, certain derivatives, as velox, "swift," deduced
from velocitas, "swiftness," and the greater number of
compounds (as being similar to them), which, doubtless, have their
origin from something, but demand no exercise of ingenuity,
for which, indeed, except on doubtful points, there is no
opportunity in these investigations.
39. Words derived from antiquity have not only illustrious
patrons, but also confer on style a certain majesty, not unattended
with pleasure; for they have the authority of age,
and, as they have been disused for a time, bring with them
a charm similar to that of novelty. 40. But there is need
of moderation in the use of them, in order that they may
not occur too frequently, nor show themselves too manifestly,
since nothing is more detestable than affectation; nor should
they be taken from a remote and already forgotten age, as
are topper, "quickly," antigerio, "very much," exanclare, " to
draw out," prosapia, "a race," and the verses of the Salii,
which are scarcely understood by the priests themselves. 41. Those
verses, however, religion forbids to be changed; and we must use what
has been consecrated; but how faulty is speech, of which the greatest
virtue is perspicuity, if it needs an interpreter! Consequently, as the oldest of new words will
be the best, so the newest of old words will be the best.
42. The case is similar with regard to authority; for though
he may seem to commit no fault who uses those words which
the greatest writers have handed down to him, yet it is of
much importance for him to consider, not only what words
they used, but how far they gave a sanction to them; for
no one would now tolerate from us tuburchinabundus,
"devouring," or lurchinabundus, "voracious," though Cato was the
father of them; nor would people endure lodices, "blankets,"
in the masculine gender, though that gender pleases Pollio;
nor gladiola for "little swords," though Messala has used it;
nor parricidatus, "parricide," which was thought scarcely
endurable in Caelius; nor would Calvus [Caius Licinius Calvus, the orator, mentioned with commendation
by Cicero, Brut. c. 82] induce me to use
collos, " necks;" all which words, indeed, those authors themselves would not now use.
43. There remains, therefore, custom, for it would be almost
ridiculous to prefer the language which men have spoken rather
than that which they now speak; what else, indeed, is old
language, but the old manner of speaking? But even for
following custom judgment is necessary; and we must settle,
in the first place, what that is which we call custom; 44. for if
custom be merely termed that which the greater number do, it
will furnish a most dangerous rule, not only for language, but,
what is of greater importance, for life. For where is there so
much virtue that what is right can please the majority? As,
therefore, to pluck out hairs, to cut the hair of the head in a
succession of rings, and to drink to excess in the bath,
whatever country those practices may have invaded, will not become
the custom, because no one of them is undeserving of censure,
though we bathe and clip our hair, and take our meals together
according to custom, so, in speaking, it is not whatever has
become a vicious practice with many, that is to be received as
a rule of language. 45. For, not to mention how the ignorant
commonly speak, we know that whole theatrea, and all the
crowd of the circus, have frequently uttered barbarous exclamations.
Custom in speaking, therefore, I shall call the
agreement of the educated; as I call custom in living the
agreement of the good.
CHAPTER VII.
1. Since we have mentioned what rules are to be followed
In speaking, we must now specify what are to be observed by
writers. What the Greeks call ορθογραφια, we may call the
art of writing correctly; an art which does not consist in
knowing of what letters every syllable is composed (for this
study is beneath the profession even of the grammarian), but
exercises its whole subtilty, in my opinion, on dubious points.
2. As it is the greatest of folly to place a mark on all long
syllables, since most of them are apparent from the very
nature of the word that is written, yet it is at times necessary
to mark them, as when the same letter gives sometimes one
sense and sometimes another, according as it is short or long;
thus malus is distinguished by a mark, to show whether it
means "a tree" or " a bad man;" 3. palus, too, signifies one
thing when its first syllable is long, and another when its
second is so; and when the same letter is short in the
nominative and long in the ablative, we have generally to
be informed by this mark which quantity we are to adopt.
4. Grammarians have in like manner thought that the
following distinction should be observed; namely, that we
should write the preposition ex, if the word specto was
compounded with it, with the addition of s in the second
syllable, exspecto; if pecto, without the s. 6. It has been a distinction,
also, observed by many, that ad, when it was a preposition,
should take the letter d, but when a conjunction, the letter
t; and that cum, if it signified time, should be written with
a q and two u's following, but if it meant accompaniment,
with a c. 6. Some other things were even more trifling than
these, as that quicquid should have a c for the fourth letter,
lest we should seem to ask a double question [quid?
quid?], and that we should write quotidie, not cotidie,
to show that it was for quot diebus. But these notions have already passed away among
other puerilities.
7. It is however a question, in writing prepositions, whether
it is proper to observe the sound which they make when joined
to another word, or that which they make when separate, as,
for instance, when I pronounce the word obtinuit; for our
method of writing requires that the second letter should be b;
while the ear catches rather the sound of p; 8. or when I say immunis,
for the letter n, which the composition of the word
requires, is influenced by the sound of the following syllable,
and changed into another m. 9. It is also to be observed, in
dividing compound words, whether you ought to attach the
middle consonant to the first or to the second syllable; for
aruspex, as its latter part is from spectare, will assign the
letter s to the third syllable; abstemius, as it is formed of
abstinentia temeti, "abstinence from wine," will leave the s to the
first syllable. 10. As to k, I think it should not be used in
any words, except those which it denotes of itself, so that it
may be put alone. This remark I have not omitted to make,
because there are some who think k necessary when a follows;
though there is the letter c, which suits itself to ail vowels.
11. But orthography submits to custom, and has therefore frequently
been altered. I say nothing of those ancient times when
there were fewer letters, and when their shapes were different
from these of ours, and their natures also different, as that of o
among the Greeks, which was sometimes long and sometimes
short, and, as among us, was sometimes put for the syllable
which it expresses by its mere name. [That is, for the
interjection.] 12. I say nothing also
of d, among the ancient Latins, being added as the last
letter to a great number of words, as is apparent from the rostral
pillar erected to Caius Duellius in the forum; nor
nor do I speak of g being used in the same manner, as, on
the pulvinar of the Sun, which is worshipped near the temple
of Romulus, is read vesperug, which we take for vesperugo.
13. Nor is it necessary to say anything here of the interchange
of letters, of which I have spoken above; for perhaps as they
wrote they also spoke.
14. It was for a long time a very common custom not to
double the semivowels; while, on the other hand, even down
to the time of Accius and later, they wrote, as I have remarked,
long syllables with two vowels. 15. Still longer
continued the practice of using e and i together, joining them
in the same manner as the Greeks in the diphthong ει. This
practice was adopted for a distinction in cases and numbers,
as Lucilius admonishes us:
Jam pueri venere: E postremum facito, atqae I,
Ut puerei plures fiant;
and afterwards,
Mendaci furique addes E, quum dare furei
Jusseris.
However this addition of e is both superfluous, since i has the
nature as well of a long as of a short letter, and also sometimes
inconvenient; for in those words which have e immediately
before the last syllable, and end with i long, we should use, if
we adopted that method, a double e, as aureei, argenteei, and
the like; and this would be extremely embarrassing to those
who are being taught to read; 17. as happens also among the
Greeks by the addition of the letter i, which they not only
write at the end of dative cases, but sometimes even in the
middle of a word, as ΑΗΙΣΤΗΙ, because etymology, in making
a division of the word into three syllables, requires that letter.
18. The diphthong ai, for the second letter of which we now
substitute e, our ancestors expressed, with a varied pronunciation,
by a and i, some using it in all cases like the Greeks
others only in the singular, when they had to form a genitive
or dative case, whence Virgil, a great lover of antiquity, has
inserted in his verses pictai vestis, and aulai; but in the plural
number of such nouns they use e, as Syllae, Galbae. 19. There
is on this point also a precept of Lucilius, which, as it is expressed in a
great number of verses, whoever is incredulous about it may seek in his
ninth book.
20. I may mention, too, that in the time of Cicero, and somewhat
later, the letter s, as often as it occurred between two long
vowels, or followed a long vowel, was doubled, as caussae, cassus,
divissiones; for that both he and Virgil wrote in this way, their
own hands show. 21. But those of a somewhat earlier period
wrote the word jussi, which we express with two s's, with only
one. That optimus, maximus, should take i as their middle letter,
which among the ancients was u, is said to have been brought
about by an inscription to Caius Caesar [Caligula, who first adopted this
title of optimus maximus; Sueton. c. 22]. 22. The word here we
now end with the letter e; but I still find in the books of the
old comic wrters Heri ad me venit [Terence, Phorm. i. 1, 2.]; which same mode of
spelling is found in the letters of Augustus, which he wrote
or corrected with his own hand [Sueton. Aug. c. 71; Cal. c. 8. See also Aul. Gell.
x. 24].
23. Did not Cato the Censor, also, for dicam and faciam, write dicem and faciem?
and did he not observe the same method in other verbs which
terminate in a similar way? This is indeed manifest from his
old writings, and is remarked by Messala in his book on the
letter s. Sibe and quase occur in the writings of many
authors; but whether the authors themselves intended them
to be written thus, I do not know; that Livy spelled them in
that way, I learn from Pedianus, who himself imitated Livy;
we end those words with the letter i.
25. Why need I allude to vortices and vorsus and other
similar words, in which Scipio Africanus is said to have first
changed the second letter into e? 26. Our tutors wrote
ceruum and seruum with the letters u and o, ceruom, seruom,
in order that the same two vowels, following each other, might
not coalesce and be confounded in the same sound; they are
now written with two u's, on the principle which I have
stated; though in neither way is the word which we conceive
exactly expressed. Nor was it without advantage that
Claudius introduced the Aelolic letter for such cases 27. It
is an improvement of the present day that we spell cui with
the three letters which I have just written; for in this word,
when we were boys, they used, making a very offensive sound, qu
and oi, only that it might be distinguished from qui.
28. What shall I say, too, of words that are written otherwise
than they are pronounced? Gaius is spelled with the
letter c, which, inverted, means a woman ; for that women
were called Caiae, as well as men Caii, appears even from our
nuptial ceremonies [in which the woman said, Ubi tu Caius, ibi
ego Caia]. 29. Nor does Gneius assume that letter, in
designating a praenomen, with which it is sounded. We read,
too, columna and consules with the letter n omitted;
and Subura, when it is designated by three letters, takes c as the
third. There are many other peculiarities of this kind; but I
fear that those which I have noticed have exceeded the limits
of so unimportant a subject.
30. On all such points let the grammarian use his own
judgment, for in this department it ought to be of the greatest
authority. For myself, I think that all words, (unless custom
has ordered otherwise,) should be written in conformity with
their sound. 31. For this is the use of letters, to preserve
words, and to restore them, like a deposit, to readers; and
they ought, therefore, to express exactly what we are to say.
32. These are the most important points as to speaking and
writing correctly. The other two departments, those of speaking with significancy
[the word implies perspicuity, clarity, and speaking
with propriety, using language suited to the subject, and putting
"proper words in proper places"] and elegance, I do not indeed take
away from the grammarians, but, as the duties of the rhetorician
remain for me to explain, reserve them for a more important part of my work.
33. Yet the reflection recurs to me, that some will regard
those matters of which I have just treated as extremely trifling,
and even as impediments to the accomplishment of anything
greater. Nor do I myself think that we ought to descend to
extreme solicitude, and puerile disputations, about them; I even
consider that the mind may be weakened and contracted by
being fixed upon them. 34. But no part of grammar will be
hurtful, except what is superfluous. Was Cicero the less of
an orator because he was most attentive to the study of
grammar, and because, as appears from his letters, he was a
rigid exactor, on all occasions, of correct language from his
son? Did the writings of Julius Caesar On Analogy diminish
the vigor of his intellect? Or was Messala less elegant as a
writer, because he devoted whole books, not merely to single
words, but even to single letters? These studies are injurious,
not to those who pass through them, but to those who dwell
immoderately upon them.
CHAPTER VIII.
1 . Reading remains to be considered; in which how a boy
may know when to take breath, where to divide a verse,
where the sense is concluded, where it begins, when the voice
is to be raised or lowered, what is to be uttered with any particular
inflexion of sound, or what is to be pronounced with
greater slowness or rapidity, with greater animation or gentleness
than other passages, can be taught only in practice. 2.
There is but one direction, therefore, which I have to give in
this part of my work, namely, that he may be able to do all
this successfully, let him understand what he reads.
Let his mode of reading, however, be, above all, manly,
uniting gravity with a certain degree of sweetness; and let
not his reading of the poets be like that of prose; for it is
verse, and the poets say that they sing; yet let it not
degenerate into sing-song, or be rendered effeminate with unnatural
softness, as is now the practice among most readers;
on which sort of reading we hear that Caius Caesar, while he
was still under age, observed happily to some one that was
practicing it, "If you are singing, you sing badly; if you pretend
to read, you nevertheless sing." 3. Nor would I have prosopopeiae
pronounced, as some would wish them, after the
manner of actors; though I think there should be a certain
alteration of the voice by which they may be distinguished
from those passages in which the poet speaks in his own person.
4. Other points demand much admonition to be given on
them; and care is to be taken, above all things, that tender
minds, which will imbibe deeply whatever has entered them
while rude and ignorant of everything, may learn, not only
what is eloquent, but, still more, what is morally good. 5.
It has accordingly been an excellent custom, that reading
should commence with Homer and Virgil, although, to
understand their merits, there is need of maturer judgment;
but for the acquisition of judgment there is abundance of time;
for they will not be read once only. In the meantime, let the
mind of the pupil be exalted with the sublimity of the heroic
verse, conceive ardor from the magnitude of the subjects, and be
imbued with the noblest sentiments.
6. The reading of
tragedies is beneficial; the lyric poets nourish the mind, provided
that you select from them, not merely authors, but
portions of their works; for the Greeks are licentious in
many of their writings, and I should be loath to interpret
Horace in certain passages. As to elegy, at least that which
treats of love, and hendecasyllables [Phalaecian veraes,
such as Catullus wrote], and poems in which
there are portions of Sotadic verses, (for concerning Sotadic
verses themselves no precept need even be mentioned,) let
them be altogether kept away, if it be possible; if not, let
them at least be reserved for the greater strength of mature
age. 7. Of comedy, which may contribute very much to
eloquence, as it extends to all sorts of characters and passions,
I will state a little further on, in the proper place, the good
which I think it may do to boys; when their morals are out of
danger, it will be among the subjects to be chiefly read. It
is of Menander that I speak, though I would not set aside
other comic writers; for the Latin authors, too, will confer
some benefit. 8. But those writings should be the subjects of
lectures for boys, which may best nourish the mind and
enlarge the thinking powers; for reading other books, which
relate merely to erudition, advanced life will afford sufficient
time.
The old Latin authors, however, will be of great use, though
most of them, indeed, were stronger in genius than in art.
Above all they will supply a copia verborum; while in their tragedies may be
found a weightiness of thought, and in their comedies elegance, and
something as it were of Atticism. 9. There will be seen in them, too, a
more careful regard to regularity of structure than in most of the
moderns, who have considered that the merit of every kind of composition
lies solely in the thoughts. Purity, certainly, and, that I may so
express myself, manliness, is to be gained from them; since we
ourselves have fallen into all the vices of refinement, even in our
manner of speaking. 10. Let us, moreover, trust to the practice of the
greatest orators, who have recourse to the
poems of the ancients, as well for the support of their arguments,
as for the adornment of their eloquence.
11. For in Cicero, most of all, and frequently, also, in Asinius, and
others nearest to his times, we see verses of Ennius, Accius,
Pacuvius, Lucilius, Terence, Caecilius, and other poets,
introduced, with the best effect, not only for showing the learning
of the speakers, but for giving pleasure to the hearers,
whose ears find in the charms of poetry a relief from the want
of elegance in forensic pleading. 12. To this is to be added
no mean advantage, as the speakers confirm what they have
stated by the sentiments of the poets, as by so many testimonies.
But those first observations of mine have reference
rather to boys, the latter to more advanced students, for the
love of letters, and the benefit of reading, are bounded, not by
the time spent at school, but by the extent of life.
13. In lecturing on the poets, the grammarian must attend
also to minor points; so that, after taking a verse to pieces,
he may require the parts of speech to be specified, and the
peculiarities of the feet, which are necessary to be known, not
merely for writing poetry, but even for prose composition; and
that he may distinguish what words are barbarous, or misapplied,
or used contrary to the rules of the language; 14.
not that the poets may thus be disparaged, (to whom, as they
are commonly forced to obey the metre, so much indulgence is granted, that even
solecisms are designated by other names in poetry, for we call them, as
I have remarked, metaplasms,
schematisms, and schemata [metaplasmus is any change in the form of a word,
effected by aphoeresis, paragoge, or any other figure], and give to necessity the praise
of merit,) but that the tutor may instruct the pupil in figurative
terms, and exercise his memory.
15. It is likewise useful, among the first rudiments of instruction, to show in
how many senses each word may be understood. About
glossemata, too, that is, words not in general use, no small
attention is requisite in the grammatical profession. 16. With
still greater care, however, let him teach all kinds of tropes,
from which not only poetry, but even prose, receives the
greatest ornament, as well as the two sorts of schemata or
figures, called figures of speech and figures of thought. My
observations on these figures, as well as those on tropes, I put
off to that portion of my work in which I shall have to speak
of the embellishments of composition. 17. But let the tutor,
above all things, impress upon the minds of his pupils what
merit there is in a just disposition of parts, and a becoming
treatment of subjects; what is well suited to each character;
what is to be commended in the thoughts, and what in the
words; where diffuseness is appropriate, and where contraction.
18. To these duties will be added explanations of historical
points, which must be sufficiently minute, but not carried into
superfluous disquisitions; for it will suffice to lecture on facts
which are generally admitted, or which are at least related by
eminent authors. To examine, indeed, what all writers, even
the most contemptible, have ever related, is a proof either of
extravagant laboriousness, or of useless ostentation, and chains
and overloads the mind, which might give its attention to other
things with more advantage. 19. For he who makes
researches into all sorts of writings, even such as are unworthy
to be read, is capable of giving his time even to old women's
tales.
Yet the writings of grammarians are full of noxious
matters of this kind, scarcely known even to the very men who
wrote them. 20. Since it is known to have happened to Didymus
[he is said by Athenaeus, iv. p. 139, to have written three thousand
five hundred books; by Senecs, Ep. 88, four thousand], than whom no man wrote more books, that, when
he denied a certain story, as unworthy of belief, his own book
containing it was laid before him. 21. This occurs chiefly in
fabulous stories, descending even to what is ridiculous, and
sometimes licentious; whence every unprincipled grammarian
has the liberty of inventing many of his comments, so that he
may lie with safety concerning whole books and authors, as it
may occur to him, for writers that never existed cannot be
produced against him. In the better known class of authors
they are often exposed by the curious. Hence it shall be
accounted by me among the merits of a grammarian to be
ignorant of some things.
CHAPTER IX.
1. Two of the departments, which this profession undertakes,
have now been concluded, namely, the art of speaking correctly,
and the explanation of authors; of which they call the
one methodice and the other historice. Let us add, however,
to the business of the grammarian, some rudiments of the art
of speaking, in which they may initiate their pupils while still
too young for the teacher of rhetoric. 2. Let boys learn, then,
to relate orally the fables of Aesop, which follow next after the
nurse's stories, in plain language, not rising at all above
mediocrity, and afterwards to express the same simplicity in
writing. Let them learn, too, to take to pieces the verses of
the poets, and then to express them in different words; and
afterwards to represent them, somewhat boldly, in a paraphrase,
in which it is allowable to abbreviate or embellish certain parts,
provided that the sense of the poet be preserved. 3. He who
shall successfully perform this exercise, which is difficult even
for accomplished professors, will be able to learn anything.
Let sentences, also, and chriae, and ethologies,
["A sentence is the enunciation of some general proposition,
exhorting to something, or deterring from something, or showing
what something is." Priscian, citing from Hermogenes, p. 1333, ed.
Putsch. " What the Greeks call χρεια, is the relation of some saying
or action, or of both together, showing its intention clearly, and
having generally some moral instruction in view." Priscian, ib. p.
1332] be written by
the learner, with the occasions of the sayings added according
to the grammarians, because these depend upon reading. The
nature of all these is similar, but their form different; because
a sentence is a general proposition; ethology is confined to
certain persons.
4. Of chriae several sorts are specified: one similar to a
sentence, which is introduced with a simple statement, He said,
or He was accustomed to say: another, which
includes its subject in an answer: He, being asked, or, when
this remark was made to him, replied; a third, not unlike
the second, commences, When some one had, not said, but
done, something. 5. Even in the acts of people some think
that there is a chria, as, Crates, having met with an ignorant
boy, beat his tutor: and there is another sort, almost like this,
which, however, they do not venture to call by the same name, but
term it a χρειωδες, as,
Milo, having been accustomed to carry the same calf every day, ended
by carrying a bull. In all these forms the declension is conducted through the same
cases, and a reason may be given as well for acts as for sayings.
Stories told by the poets should, I think, be treated by
boys, not with a view to eloquence, but for the purpose of
increasing their knowledge. Other exercises, of greater toil
and ardor, the Latin teachers of rhetoric, by abandoning
them, have rendered the necessary work of teachers of
grammar. The Greek rhetoricians have better understood the
weight and measure of their duties.
CHAPTER X.
1. These remarks I have made, as briefly as I could, upon
grammar, not so as to examine and speak of every thing,
which would be an infinite task, but merely of the most
essential points. I shall now add some concise observations
on the other departments of study, in which I think that boys
should be initiated before they are committed to the teacher of
rhetoric, in order that that circle of instruction, which the
Greeks call εγκυκλιος
παιδεια, may be completed.
2. For about the same age the study of other accomplishments
must be commenced; concerning which, as they are
themselves arts, and cannot be complete without the art of
oratory, but are nevertheless insufficient of themselves to
form an orator, it is made a question whether they are necessary
to this art. 3. Of what service is it, say some people,
for pleading a cause, or pronouncing a legal opinion, to know
how equilateral triangles may be erected upon a given line? Or
how will he, who has marked the sounds of the lyre by their names and
intervals, defend an accused person, or direct consultations, the better on that account? 4. They may perhaps
reckon, also, many speakers, effective in every way in the
forum, who have never attended a geometrician, and who
know nothing of musicians except by the common pleasure of
listening to them.
To these observers I answer in the first place (what
Cicero also frequently remarks in his book addressed to Brutus
[see the Orator ad M. Brutum, c. 1 and 29]), that it is not such an orator as is or has
been, that is to be formed by us, but that we have conceived
in our mind an idea of the perfect orator, an orator deficient
in no point whatever. 5. For when the philosophers would
form their wise man, who is to be perfect in every respect,
and, as they say, a kind of mortal god, they not only believe
that he should be instructed, in a general knowledge of divine
and human things, but conduct him through a course of
questions which are certainly little, if you consider them
merely in themselves, (as, sometimes, through studied subtleties
of argument,) not because questions about horns [the syllo-
gism: "You have what you have not lost; but you have not lost
horns; therefore you have horns." See Sen. Ep. Lib. v., and Politian,
Miscell. c. 54] or crocodiles [named from the following question: A crocodile,
having seized a woman's son, said that he would restore him to her, if
she would tell him truth; she replied, "you will not restore him;"
ought the crocodile to have restored the child or not?]
can form a wise man, but because a wise man ought never to
be in error even in the least matters.
6. In like manner, it
is not the geometrician, or the musician, or the other studies
which I shall add to theirs, that will make the perfect orator
(who ought to be a wise man), yet these accomplishments will
contribute to his perfection. We see an antidote, for example,
and other medicines to heal diseases and wounds, compounded
of many and sometimes opposite ingredients, from the various
qualities of which results that single compound, which resembles
none of them, yet takes its peculiar virtues from them
all; 7. mute insects, too, compose the exquisite flavor of
honey, inimitable by human reason, of various sorts of flowers
and juices; and shall we wonder that eloquence, than which
the providence of the gods has given nothing more excellent
to men, requires the aid of many arts, which, even though they
may not appear, or put themselves forward, in the course of a
speech, yet contribute to it a secret power, and are silently
felt?
8. "People have been eloquent," some one may say,
"without these arts;" but I want a perfect orator. "They
contribute little assistance," another may observe; but that, to
which even little shall be wanting, will not be a whole; and
it will be agreed that perfection is a whole, of which though
the hope may be on a distant height as it were, yet it is for us
to suggest every means of attaining it, that something more, at
least, may thus be done. But why should our courage fail
us? Nature does not forbid the formation of a perfect orator;
and it is disgraceful to despair of what is possible.
9. For myself, I could be quite satisfied with the judgment
of the ancients; for who is ignorant that music (to speak of
that science first) enjoyed, in the days of antiquity, so much,
not only of cultivation, but of reverence, that those who were
musicians were deemed also prophets and sages, as, not to
mention others, Orpheus and Linus, both of whom
are transmitted to the memory of posterity as having been descended
from the gods, and the one, because he soothed the rude and
barbarous minds of men by the wonderful effect of his strains,
as having drawn after him not only wild beasts, but even
rocks and woods. 10. Timagenes [a friend of Asinius Pollio,
disliked by Augustus for his freedom of speech, but distinguished
for his merits as a historian. See L. Seneca de Ira, c. 23; M. Seneca,
Controv. xxxiv.; and Vossius, who has collected many particulars
concerning him, de Hist. Graec. i. 24] declares that music was
the most ancient of sciences connected with literature; an
opinion to which the most celebrated poets give their support,
according to whom the praises of gods and heroes used to be
sung to the lyre at royal banquets.
Does not Virgil's lepas,
too, sing errantem lunam solisque labores, "the wandering
moon, and labors of the sun;" the illustrious poet thus
plainly asserting that music is united with the knowledge of
divine things? If this position be granted, music will be
necessary also for the orator; for, as I observed, this part of
learning, which, after being neglected by orators, has been
taken up by the philosophers, was a portion of our business,
and, without the knowledge of such subjects, there can be no
perfect eloquence.
12. Nor can any one doubt that men eminently renowned
for wisdom have been cultivators of music, when Pythagoras,
and those who followed him, spread abroad the notion, which
they doubtless received from antiquity, that the world itself
was constructed in conformity with the laws of music, which
the lyre afterwards imitated. 13. Nor were they content,
moreover, with that concord of discordant elements, which
they call 'αρμονια,
"harmony," but attributed even sound to
the celestial motions; for Plato, not only in certain
other passages, but especially in his Timaeus, cannot even be
understood except by those who have thoroughly imbibed the
principles of this part of learning. What shall I say, too, of the
philosophers in general, whose founder, Socrates himself,
was not ashamed, even in his old age, to learn to play on the
lyre?
14. It is related that the greatest generals used to
play on the harp and flute, and that the troops of the Lacedaemonians
were excited with musical notes. What other effect,
indeed, do horns and trumpets produce in our legions, since
the louder is the concert of their sounds, so much greater is
the glory of the Romans than that of other nations in war?
15. It was not without reason, therefore, that Plato thought
music necessary for a man who would be qualified for engaging
in government, and whom the Greeks call πολιτικος. Even the
chiefs of that sect which appears to some extremely austere,
and to others extremely harsh, were inclined to think that
some of the wise might bestow a portion of their attention on
this study. Lycurgus, also, the maker of most severe laws
for the Lacedaemonians, approved of the study of music.
16. Nature herself, indeed, seems to have given music to us as a
benefit, to enable us to endure labors with greater facility;
for musical sounds cheer even the rower; and it is not only
in those works, in which the efforts of many, while some
pleasing voice leads them, conspire together, that music is of
avail, but the toil even of people at work by themselves finds
itself soothed by song, however rude. 17. I appear, however, to be
making a eulogy on this finest of arts, rather than connecting
it with the orator. Let us pass lightly over the fact,
then, that grammar and music were once united; since
Archytas and Aristoxenus, indeed, thought grammar comprehended
under music; and that they themselves were teachers
of both arts, not only Sophron shows, (a writer, it is true, only
of mimes, but one whom Plato so highly valued, that he is said
to have had his books under his head when he was dying,) but
also Eupolis, whose Prodamus teaches both music and grammar,
and Maricas, that is to say, Hyperbolus, confesses that
he knows nothing of music but letters.
18. Aristophanes,
also, in more than one of his comedies, shows that boys were
accustomed to be thus instructed in times of old; and, in the
Hypobolimaeus of Menander, an old man, laying before a
father, who is claiming a son from him, an account as it were
of the expenses that he had bestowed upon his education, says
that he has paid a great deal to musicians and geometers.
19. Hence too it was customary at banquets that the lyre should be handed round after the meal; and Themistocles,
on confessing that he knew not how to play, "was accounted,"
to use the words of Cicero, "but imperfectly educated."
Among the Romans, likewise, it was usual to introduce lyres
and flutes at feasts. The verses of the Salii also have their
tune; and these customs, as they were all established by
Numa, prove that not even by those, who seem to have been
rude and given to war, was the cultivation of music neglected,
as far as that age admitted it. 21. It passed at length,
indeed, into a proverb among the Gauls, that the uneducated
had no commerce either with the Muses or the Graces.
22. But let us consider what peculiar advantage he who is
to be an orator may expect from music. Music has two kinds
of measures, the one in the sounds of the voice, the other in
the motions of the body; for in both a certain due regulation
is required. Aristoxenus the musician divides all that belongs
to the voice into ρυθμος,
"rhythm," and μελος
εμμετρον, "melody
in measure;" of which the one consists in modulation,
the other in singing and tunes. Are not all these qualifications,
then, necessary to the orator, the one of which relates
to gesture, the second to the collocation of words, and the
third to the inflexions of the voice, which in speaking are
extremely numerous? 23. Such is undoubtedly the case,
unless we suppose, perchance, that a regular structure and
smooth combination of words is requisite only in poems and
songs, and is superfluous in making a speech; or that composition
and modulation are not to be varied in speaking, as
in music, according to the nature of the subject.
24. Music, however, by means of the tone and modulation of the voice,
expresses sublime thoughts with grandeur, pleasant ones with
sweetness, and ordinary ones with calmness, and sympathizes
in its whole art with the feelings attendant on what is expressed.
25. In oratory, accordingly, the raising, lowering, or
other inflexion of the voice, tends to move the feelings of the
hearers; and we try to excite the indignation of the judges in
one modulation of phrase and voice, (that I may again use
the same term,) and their pity in another; for we see that
minds are affected in different ways even by musical instruments,
though no words cannot be uttered by them.
28. A graceful and becoming motion of the body, also,
which the Greeks call ευρυθμια,
is necessary, and cannot be
sought from any other art than music; a qualification on
which no small part of oratory depends, and for treating on
which a peculiar portion of our work is set apart. If an orator shall
pay extreme attention to his voice, what is so properly the business of
music? But neither is this department of my work to be anticipated; so that we must confine
ourselves, in the mean time, to the single example of Caius Gracchus,
the most eminent orator of his time, behind whom,
when he spoke in public, a musician used to stand, and to give,
with a pitch-pipe, which the Greeks call τοναριον, the tones in
which his voice was to be exerted. 28. To this he attended
even in his most turbulent harangues, both when he frightened
the patricians, and after he began to fear them.
For the sake of the less learned, and those, as they say, "of
a duller muse," I would wish to remove all doubt of the utility
of music. 29. They will allow, assuredly, that the poets
should be read by him who would be an orator; but are they,
then, to be read without a knowledge of music? If any one
is so blind of intellect, however, as to hesitate about the
reading of other poets, he will doubtless admit that those should
be read who have written poems for the lyre. 30. On these
matters I should have to enlarge more fully, if I recommended
this as a new study; but since it has been perpetuated from
the most ancient times, even from those of Chiron and Achilles
to our own, (among all, at least, who have not been averse to a
regular course of mental discipline,) I must not proceed to
make the point doubtful by anxiety to defend it.
31. Though I consider it sufficiently apparent, however, from the very
examples which I have now given, what music pleases me,
and to what extent, yet I think that I ought to declare more
expressly, that that sort of music is not recommended by me,
which, prevailing at present in the theatres, and being of an
effeminate character, languishing with lascivious notes, has in
a great degree destroyed whatever manliness was left among
us; but those strains in which the praises of heroes were sung,
and which heroes themselves sung; not the sounds of psalteries
and languishing lutes, which ought to be shunned even
by modest females, but the knowledge of the principles of the
art, which is of the highest efficacy in exciting and allaying the
passions. 32. For Pythagoras, as we have heard, calmed a
party of young men, when urged by their passions to offer
violence to a respectable family, by requesting the female
musician, who was playing to them, to change her strain to a
spondaic measure; and Chrysippus assigns a peculiar tune
for the lullaby of nurses, which is used with children. 33.
There is also a subject for declamation in the schools, not
unartfully invented, in which it is supposed that a flute-player,
who had played a Phrygian tune [how exciting the
Phrygian measure was may be seen in Jamblichus's Life of Pythagoras, c.
26. It was first used in the enthusiastic sacred ceremonies of the
Phrygian or Berecynthian mother] to a priest while he was
sacrificing, is accused, after the priest has been driven to madness,
and has thrown himself over a precipice, of having been the
cause of his death; and if such causes have to be pleaded by
an orator, and cannot be pleaded without a knowledge of
music, how can even the most prejudiced forbear to admit that
this art is necessary to our profession?
34. As to geometry, people admit that some attention to it is
of advantage in tender years; for they allow that the thinking
powers are excited, and the intellect sharpened by it, and that
a quickness of perception is thence produced; but they fancy
that it is not, like other sciences, profitable after it has been
acquired, but only whilst it is being studied. 35. Such is the
common opinion respecting it. But it is not without reason
that the greatest men have bestowed extreme attention on this
science; for as geometry is divided between numbers and
figures, the knowledge of numbers, assuredly, is necessary not
only to an orator, but to every one who has been initiated even
in the rudiments of learning. In pleading causes, it is very
often in request; when the speaker, if he hesitates, I do not say
about the amount of a calculation, but if he even betray, by
any uncertain or awkward movement of his fingers, a want of
confidence in his calculations, is thought to be but imperfectly
accomplished in his art. 36. The knowledge of linear figures,
too, is frequently required in causes; for law-suits occur concerning
boundaries and measures. But geometry has a still
greater connection with the art of oratory.
37. Order, in the first place, is necessary in geometry; and
is it not also necessary in eloquence? Geometry proves what
follows from what precedes, what is unknown from what is
known; and do we not draw similar conclusions in speaking?
Does not the well known mode of deduction from a number
of proposed questions consist almost wholly in syllogisms?
Accordingly you may find more persons to say that geometry
is allied to logic, than that it is allied to rhetoric. 38. But
even an orator, though rarely, will yet at times prove logically,
for he will use syllogisms if his subject shall require them, and
will of necessity use the enthymem, which is a rhetorical
syllogism. Besides, of all proofs, the strongest are what are
called geometrical demonstrations; and what does oratory
make its object more indisputably than proof?
Geometry often, moreover, by demonstration, proves what is
apparently true to be false. This is also done with respect to
numbers, by means of certain figures which they call
ψευδεγραφιας,
and at which we were accustomed to play when we
were boys. But there are other questions of a higher nature.
For who would not believe the asserter of the following proposition:
"Of whatever places the boundary lines measure
the same length, of those places the areas also, which are
contained by those lines, must necessarily be equal?" 40. But
this proposition is fallacious; for it makes a vast difference
what figure the boundary lines may form; and historians, who
have thought that the dimensions of islands are sufficiently
indicated by the space traversed in sailing round them, have
been justly censured by geometricians. 41. For the nearer
to perfection any figure is, the greater is its capacity; and if
the boundary line, accordingly, shall form a circle, which of all
plane figures is the most perfect, it will embrace a larger area
than if it shall form a square of equal circumference. Squares,
again, contain more than triangles of equal circuit, and triangles
themselves contain more when their sides are equal than
when they are unequal.
42. Some other examples may perhaps be too obscure; let us take an instance most easy of
comprehension even to the ignorant. There is scarcely any
man who does not know that the dimensions of an acre extend
two hundred and forty feet in length, and the half of that
number in breadth; and what its circumference is, and how
much ground it contains, it is easy to calculate. 43. A figure
of a hundred and eighty feet on each side, however, has the
same periphery, but a much larger area contained within its
four sides. If any one thinks it too much trouble to make the
calculation, he may learn the same truth by means of smaller
numbers. Ten feet, on each side of a square, will give forty
for the circumference, and a hundred for the area; but if
there were fifteen feet on each side, and five at each end, they
would, with the same circuit, deduct a fourth part from the
area enclosed. 44. If, again, nineteen feet be extended in
parallel lines, only one foot apart, they will contain no more
squares than those along which the parallels shall be drawn;
and yet the periphery will be of the same extent as that which encloses a hundred. Thus the further you depart from the
form of a square, the greater will be the loss to the area. 45.
It may therefore happen even that a smaller area may be
enclosed by a greater periphery than a larger one. Such is
the case in plane figures; for on hills, and in valleys, it is
evident even to the untaught that there is more ground than sky.
46. Need I add that geometry raises itself still higher, so as even
to ascertain the system of the world? When it demonstrates,
by calculations, the regular and appointed movements
of the celestial bodies, we learn that, in that system, there is
nothing unordained or fortuitous; a branch of knowledge
which may be sometimes of use to the orator. 47. When
Pericles freed the Athenians from fear, at the time that they
were alarmed by an eclipse of the sun, by explaining to them
the causes of the phaenomenon; or when Sulpicius Gallus, in
the army of Paulus Aemilius, made a speech on an eclipse of
the moon, that the minds of the soldiers might not be terrified
as by a supernatural prodigy, do they not, respectively,
appear to have discharged the duty of an orator? 48. Had
Nicias been possessed of such knowledge in Sicily, he would
not have been confounded with similar terror, and have given
over to destruction the finest of the Athenian armies; as Dion,
we know, when he went to overthrow the tyranny of Dionysius,
was not deterred by a similar phaenomenon.
49. Though the utility of geometry in war, however, be put out of the
question, though we do not dwell upon the fact that Archimedes alone
protracted the siege of Syracuse to a great extent,
it is sufficient, assuredly, to establish what I assert, that
numbers of questions, which it is difficult to solve by any other
method, as those about the mode of dividing, about division to
infinity, and about the rate of progressions, are accustomed to
be solved by those geometrical demonstrations; so that if an
orator has to speak (as the next book will show) on all subjects,
no man, assuredly, can become a perfect orator without
a knowledge of geometry.
CHAPTER XI.
1. Some time is also to be devoted to the actor, but only
so far as the future orator requires the art of delivery; for I do
not wish the boy, whom I educate for this pursuit, either to be
broken to the shrillness of a woman's voice, or to repeat the
tremulous tones of an old man's. 2. Neither let him imitate
the vices of the drunkard, nor adapt himself to the baseness
of the slave; nor let him learn to display the feelings of love,
or avarice, or fear; acquirements which are not at all necessary
to the orator, and which corrupt the mind, especially
while it is yet tender and uninformed in early youth; for
frequent imitation settles into habit. It is not even every
gesture or motion that is to be adopted from the actor; for
though the orator ought to regulate both to a certain degree,
yet he will be far from appearing in a theatrical character, and
will exhibit nothing extravagant either in his looks, or the
movements of his hands, or his walk; for if there is any
art used by speakers in these points, the first object of it
should be that it may not appear to be art.
4. What is then the duty of the teacher as to these particulars?
Let him, in the first place, correct faults of pronunciation,
if there be any, so that the words of the learner may be
fully expressed, and that every letter may be uttered with its
proper sound. For we find inconvenience from the two great
weakness or too great fullness of the sound of some letters;
some, as if too harsh for us, we utter but imperfectly, or
change them for others, not altogether dissimilar, but, as it were,
smoother. 5. Thus λ takes the place of ρ, in which even
Demosthenes found difficulty, (the nature of both which letters
is the same also with us,) and when c, and similarly g, are
wanting in full force, they are softened down into t and d.
6. Those niceties about the letter s, such a master will not
even tolerate; nor will he allow his pupil's words to sound in
his throat, or to rumble as from emptiness of the mouth; nor
will he (what is utterly at variance with purity of speaking)
permit him to overlay the simple sound of a word with a fuller
sort of pronunciation, which the Greeks call καταπεπλασμενον:
a term by which the sound of flutes is also designated, when,
after the holes are stopped through which they sound the shrill
notes, they give forth a bass sound through the direct outlet
only.
8. The teacher will be cautious, likewise, that concluding
syllables be not lost; that his pupil's speech be all of a similar
character; that whenever he has to raise his voice, the effort may
be that of his lungs, and not of his head; that his gesture may
be suited to his voice, and his looks to his gesture. 9. He will
have to take care, also, that the face of his pupil, while speaking,
look straight forward; that his lips be not distorted; that no
opening of the mouth immoderately distend his jaws; that his face be not
turned up, or his eyes cast down too much, or his head inclined to
either side. 10. The face offends in various ways; I have seen many
speakers, whose eye-brows were raised at every effort of the voice;
those of others I have seen contracted; and those of some even
disagreeing, as they turned up one towards the top of the head, while
with the other the eye itself was almost concealed. To all these matters,
as we shall hereafter show, a vast deal of importance is
to be attached; for nothing can please which is unbecoming.
12. The actor will also be required to teach how a narrative
should be delivered; with what authority persuasion should be
enforced; with what force anger may show itself; and what
tone of voice is adapted to excite pity. This instruction he will
give with the best effect, if he select particular passages from
plays, such as are most adapted for this object, that is, such as
most resemble pleadings. 13. The repetition of these passages
will not only be most beneficial to pronunciation, but also
highly efficient in fostering eloquence. 14. Such may be the
pupil's studies while immaturity of age will not admit of anything higher; but, as soon as it shall be proper for him to
read orations, and when he shall be able to perceive their
beauties, then, I would say, let some attentive and skillful tutor
attend him, who may not only form his style by reading, but
oblige him to learn select portions of speeches by heart,
and to deliver them standing, with a loud voice, and exactly as
he will have to plead; so that he may consequently exercise
by pronunciation both his voice and memory.
15. Nor do I think that those orators are to be blamed who
have devoted some time even to the masters in the palaestra.
I do not speak of those by whom part of life is spent among
oil, and the rest over wine, and who have oppressed the powers
of the mind by excessive attention to the body; (such characters
I should wish to be as far off as possible from the pupil that I
am training;) 16. but the same name is given to those by
whom gesture and motion are formed; so that the arms may
be properly extended; that the action of the hands may not
be ungraceful or unseemly; that the attitude may not be unbecoming; that there may be no awkwardness in advancing
the feet; and that the head and eyes may not be at variance
with the turn of the rest of the body. 17. For no one will deny
that all such particulars form a part of delivery, or will separate
delivery itself from oratory; and, assuredly, the orator
must not disdain to learn what he must practice, especially
when this chironomia, which is, as is expressed by the word
itself, the law of gesture, had its origin even in the heroic
ages, and was approved by the most eminent men of Greece,
even by Socrates himself; it was also regarded by Plato as a
part of the qualifications of a public man, and was not omitted by
Chrysippus in the directions which he wrote concerning the education
of children.
18. The Lacedaemonians, we have heard, had, among their
exercises, a certain kind of dance, as contributing to qualify men for war. Nor was dancing thought a
disgrace to the ancient Romans; as the dance which continues
to the present day, under the sanction and in the religious rites
of the priests, is a proof; as is also the remark of Crassus
in the third book of Cicero de Oratore, where he recommends
that an orator should adopt a bold and manly action of body, not
learned from the theatre and the player, but from the camp, or
even from the palaestra; the observation of which discipline
has descended without censure even to our time. 19. By me,
however, it will not be continued beyond the years of boyhood,
nor in them long; for I do not wish the gesture of an orator to be
formed to resemble that of a dancer, but I would have some influence
from such juvenile exercises left, so that the
gracefulness communicated to us while we wore learning may secretly
attend us when we are not thinking of our movements.
CHAPTER XII.
1. It is a common question whether, supposing all these
things are to be learned, they can all be taught and acquired
at the same time; for some deny that this is possible, as the
mind must be confused and wearied by so many studies of
different tendency for which neither the understanding, not
the body, nor time itself, can suffice; and even though mature
age may endure such labor, yet that of childhood ought not
to be thus burdened.
2. But these reasoners do not understand how great the
power of the human mind is; that mind which is so busy and
active, and which directs its attention, so to speak, to every
quarter, so that it cannot even confine itself to do only one thing,
but bestows its force upon several, not merely in the same day,
but at the same moment. 3. Do not players on the harp, for
example, exert their memory, and attend to the sound of their
voice, and the various inflexions of it, while, at the same time,
they strike part of the strings with their right hand, and pull,
stop, or let loose others with their left, while not even
their foot is idle, but beats time to their playing, all these
acts being done simultaneously?
4. Do not we advocates, when
surprised by a sudden necessity to plead, say one thing while
we are thinking of what is to follow, and while, at the very
same moment, the invention of arguments, the choice of
words, the arrangement of matter, gesture, delivery, look, and
attitude, are necessarily objects of our attention? If all these
considerations, of so varied a nature, are forced, as by a single
effort, before our mental vision, why may we not divide the
hours of the day among different kinds of study, especially as
variety itself refreshes and recruits the mind, while, on the
contrary, nothing is more annoying than to continue at one
uniform labor? Accordingly writing is relieved by reading,
and the tedium of reading itself is relieved by changes of
subject.
8. However many things we may have done, we
are yet to a certain degree fresh for that which we are going
to begin. Who, on the contrary, would not be stupefied, if he
were to listen to the same teacher of any art, whatever it
might be, through the whole day? But by change a person
will be recruited; as is the case with respect to food, by
varieties of which the stomach is re-invigorated, and is fed
with several sorts less unsatisfactorily than with one. Or let
those objectors tell me what other mode there is of learning.
Ought we to attend to the teacher of grammar only, and then
to the teacher of geometry only, and cease to think, during the
second course, of what we learned in the first? Should we
then transfer ourselves to the musician, our previous studies
being still allowed to escape us? Or while we are studying
Latin, ought we to pay no attention to Greek? Or, to make
an end of my questions at once, ought we to do nothing but
what comes last before us?
7. Why, then, do we not give
similar counsel to husbandmen, that they should not cultivate
at the same time their fields and their vineyards, their olives
and other trees, and that they should not bestow attention at
once on their meadows, their cattle, their gardens, and their
bee-hives? Why do we ourselves devote some portion of our
time to our public business, some to the wants of our friends,
some to our domestic accounts, some to the care of our persons,
and some to our pleasures, any one of which occupations would
weary us, if we pursued it without intermission? So much
more easy is it to do many things one after the other, than to
do one thing for a long time.
8. That boys will be unable to bear the fatigue of many
studies, is by no means to be apprehended; for no age suffers
less from fatigue. This may perhaps appear strange; but we
may prove it by experience. 9. For minds, before they are
hardened, are more ready to learn; as is proved by the fact
that children, within two years after they can fairly pronounce
words, speak almost the whole language, though no one incites
them to learn; but for how many years does the Latin tongue
resist the efforts of our purchased slaves! You may well understand, if you attempt to teach a grown up person to read,
that those who do everything in their own art with excellence,
are not without reason called παιδομαθεις,
that is, "instructed
from boyhood."
10. The temper of boys is better able to bear labor than that of men; for, as neither the falls of children,
with which they are so often thrown on the ground, nor their
crawling on hands and knees, nor, soon after, constant play,
and running all day hither and thither, inconvenience their
bodies so much as those of adults, because they are of little
weight, and no burden to themselves, so their minds likewise,
I conceive, suffer less from fatigue, because they exert
themselves with less effort, and do not apply to study by
putting any force upon themselves, but merely yield themselves
to others to be formed. 11. Moreover, in addition to
the other pliancy of that age, they follow their teachers, as it
were, with greater confidence, and do not set themselves to
measure what they have already done. Consideration about labor is as yet unknown to them; and, as we ourselves have
frequently experienced, toil has less effect upon the powers
than thought.
13. Nor will they ever, indeed, have more disposable time;
because all improvement at this age is from bearing. When
the pupil shall retire by himself to write, when he shall produce and compose from his own mind, he will then either not
have leisure, or will want inclination, to commence such
exercises as I have specified. 13. Since the teacher of grammar, therefore, cannot occupy the whole day, and indeed ought
not to do so, lest he should disgust the mind of his pupil, to
what studies can we better devote his fragmentary intervals, so to term them, of time? 14. For I would not wish the
pupil to be worn out in these exercises; nor do I desire that
he should sing, or accompany songs with musical notes, or
descend to the minutest investigations of geometry. Nor
would I make him like an actor in delivery, or like a dancing-master
in gesture; though, if I did require all such qualifications, there would still be abundance of time; for the immature part of life, which is devoted to learning, is long; and I
am not speaking of slow intellects 15. Why did Plato, let
me ask, excel in all these branches of knowledge which I
think necessary to be acquired by him who would be an
orator? He did so, because, not being satisfied with the
instruction which Athens could afford, or with the science of
the Pythagoreans, to whom he had sailed in Italy, he went
also to the priests of Egypt, and learned their mysteries.
16. We shroud our own indolence under the pretext of
difficulty; for we have no real love of our work; nor is eloquence
ever sought by us, because it is the most honorable and noble
of attainments, or for its own sake; but we apply ourselves to
labor only with mean views and for sordid gain. 17. Plenty
of orators may speak in the forum, with my permission, and
acquire riches also, without such accomplishments as I recommend; only may every trader in contemptible merchandise be
richer than they, and may the public crier make greater profit
by his voice! I would not wish to have even for a reader of
this work a man who would compute what returns his studies
will bring him. 18. But he who shall have conceived, as
with a divine power of imagination, the very idea itself of genuine oratory, and who shall keep before his eyes true
eloquence, the queen, as an eminent poet calls her, of the
world, and shall seek his gain, not from the pay that he
receives for his pleadings, but from his own mind, and from
contemplation and knowledge, a gain which is enduring and
independent of fortune, will easily prevail upon himself to
devote the time, which others spend at shows, in the Campus
Martius, at dice, or in idle talk, to say nothing of sleep and
the prolongation of banquets, to the studies of geometry and
music; and how much more pleasure will he secure from such
pursuits than from unintellectual gratifications! 19. For
divine providence has granted this favor to mankind, that
the more honorable occupations are also the more pleasing.
But the very pleasure of these reflections has carried me too
far. Let what I have said, therefore, suffice concerning the
studies in which a boy is to be instructed before he enters on
more important occupations; the next book will commence,
as it were, a new subject, and enter on the duties of the
teacher of rhetoric.
BOOK II.
CHAPTER 1.
1. It has been a prevalent custom (which daily gains
ground more and more) for pupils to be sent to the teachers
of eloquence, to the Latin teachers always, and to the Greeks
sometimes, at a more advanced age than reason requires. Of
this practice there are two causes: that the rhetoricians,
especially our own, have relinquished a part of their duties,
and that the grammarians have appropriated what does not
belong to them. 2. The rhetoricians think it their business
merely to declaim, and to teach the art and practice of
declaiming, confining themselves, too, to deliberative and
judicial subjects, (for others they despise as beneath their
profession,) while the grammarians, on their part, do not
deem it sufficient to have taken what has been left them,
(on which account also gratitude should be accorded them,) but
encroach even upon prosopopeiae and suasory speeches
[suasorias. Speeches of the kind which they call deliberative,
differing from controversiae, which is a term properly applied only to
judicial pleadings], in which even the very greatest
efforts of eloquence are displayed. 3. Hence, accordingly, it has
happened, that what was the first business of the one art has become the
last of the other, and that boys of an age to be employed in higher departments
of study remain sunk in the lower school, and practice rhetoric under the grammarian. Thus, what is
eminently ridiculous, a youth seems unfit to be sent to a
teacher of declamation until he already knows how to declaim.
4. Let us assign each of these professions its due limits.
Let grammar, (which, turning it into a Latin word, they have
called literatura, "literature,") know its own boundaries,
especially as it is so far advanced beyond the humility indicated
by its name, to which humility the early grammarians restricted
themselves; for, though but weak at its source, yet, having
gained strength from the poets and historians, it now flows
on in a full channel; since, besides the art of speaking correctly,
which would otherwise be far from a comprehensive art,
it has engrossed the study of almost all the highest departments
of learning; 5. and let not rhetoric, to which the power
of eloquence has given its name, decline its own duties, or
rejoice that the task belonging to itself is appropriated by
another; for while it neglects its duties, it is almost expelled
from its domain. 6. I would not deny, indeed, that some of
those who profess grammar, may make such progress in knowledge as to be able to teach the principles of oratory; but,
when they do so, they will be discharging the duties of a
rhetorician, and not their own.
7. We make it also a subject of inquiry, when a boy may
be considered ripe for learning what rhetoric teaches. In
which inquiry it is not to be considered of what age a boy is,
but what progress he has already made in his studies. That
I may not make a long discussion, I think that the question
when a boy ought to be sent to the teacher of rhetoric, is best
decided by the answer, when he shall be qualified. 8. But this
very point depends upon the preceding subject of consideration; for if the office of the grammarian is extended
even to suasory speeches, the necessity for the rhetorician
will come later. If the rhetorician, however, does not shrink
from the earliest duties of his profession, his attention is
required even from the time when the pupil begins narrations, and produces his little exercises in praising and
blaming.
9. Do we not know that it was a kind of exercise
among the ancients, suitable for improvement in eloquence, for pupils to
speak on theses [theses, or
quaestiones infinitae, are questions or topics not circumscribed by any
particulars relating to persons, places, or times; theses being thus
distinguished from hypotheses], common places
["communes loci,"
says Turnebus. "are general disquisitions on
points of morality; or questions on points of law, on which the
speaker might take either the affirmative or negative side"], and other questions, (without embracing particular circumstances or persons,)
on which causes, as well real as imaginary, depend? Hence
it is evident how dishonorably the profession of rhetoric has
abandoned that department which it held originally, and for
a long time solely. 10. But what is there among those
exercises, of which I have just now spoken, that does not
relate both to other matters peculiar to rhetoricians, and,
indisputably, to the sort of causes pleaded in courts of justice?
Have we not to make statements of facts in the forum? I
know not whether that department of rhetoric is not most of
all in request there.
11. Are not eulogy and invective often
introduced in those disputations? Do not common places, as
well those which are levelled against vice, (such as were composed, we read, by Cicero,) as those in which questions are
discussed generally, (such as were published by Quintus Hortensius, as, Ought we to trust to light proofs? and
for witnesses and against witnesses,) mix themselves with the inmost
substance of causes? 12. Those weapons are in some degree
to be prepared, that we may use them whenever circumstances require. He who shall suppose that these matters do not
concern the orator, will think that a statue is not begun when
its limbs are cast. [See Aristotle's Rhetoric, i. 16.] Nor let any one blame this haste of mine
(as some will consider it) on the supposition that I think the
pupil who is to be committed to the professor of rhetoric is to be
altogether withdrawn from the teachers of grammar.
13. To
these also their proper time shall be allowed, nor need there
be any fear that the boy will be overburdened with the lessons
of two masters. His labor will not be increased, but that
which was confounded under one master will be divided; and
each tutor will thus be more efficient in his own province.
This method, to which the Greeks still adhere, has been disregarded by the Latin rhetoricians, and, indeed, with some
appearance of excuse, as there have been others to take their
duty.
CHAPTER II.
1. As soon therefore as a boy shall have attained such proficiency in his studies, as to be able to comprehend what
we
have called the first precepts of the teachers of rhetoric, he
must be put under the professors of that art.
2. Of these professors the morals must first be ascertained,
a point of which I proceed to treat in this part of my work
not because I do not think that the same examination is to be
made, and with the utmost care, in regard also to other teachers
(as indeed I have shown in the preceding book,) but because
the very age of the pupils makes attention to the matter
still more necessary. 3. For boys are consigned to these
professors when almost grown up, and continue their studies
under them even after they are become men; and greater care must
in consequence be adopted with regard to them, in order that the purity of the master may secure their more tender
years from corruption, and his authority deter their bolder age
from licentiousness. 4. Nor is it enough that he give, in
himself, an example of the strictest morality, unless he regulate,
also, by severity of discipline, the conduct of those who come
to receive his instructions.
Let him adopt, then, above all things, the feelings of a
parent towards his pupils, and consider that he succeeds to the
place of those by whom the children were entrusted to him.
5. Let him neither have vices in himself, nor tolerate them
in others. Let his austerity not be stern, nor his affability too
easy, lest dislike arise from the one, or contempt from the
other. Let him discourse frequently on what is honorable
and good, for the oftener he admonishes, the more seldom will
he have to chastise. Let him not be of an angry temper,
and yet not a conniver at what ought to be corrected. Let
him be plain in his mode of teaching, and patient of labor,
but rather diligent in exacting tasks than fond of giving them
of excessive length. 6. Let him reply readily to those who put
questions to him, and question of his own accord those who
do not. In commending the exercises of his pupils, let him be
neither niggardly nor lavish; for the one quality begets dislike
of labor, and the other self-complacency.
7. In amending what requires correction, let him not be harsh, and, least of all,
not reproachful; for that very circumstance, that some tutors
blame as if they hated, deters many young men from their
proposed course of study. Let him every day say something,
and even much, which, when the pupils hear, they may carry
away with them, for though he may point out to them, in their
course of reading, plenty of examples for their imitation, yet
the living voice, as it is called, feeds the mind more nutritiously,
and especially the voice of the teacher, whom his pupils, if
they are but rightly instructed, both love and reverence. How
much more readily we imitate those whom we like, can scarcely
be expressed.
9. The liberty of standing up and showing exultation, in
giving applause, as is done under most teachers, is by no means
to be allowed to boys; for the approbation even of young men,
when they listen to others, ought to be but temperate. Hence
it will result that the pupil will depend on the judgment of
the master, and will think that he has expressed properly
whatever shall have been approved by him. 10. But that
most mischievous politeness, as it is now termed, which is shown
by students in their praise of each other's compositions, whatever be their merits, is not only unbecoming and theatrical,
and foreign to strictly regulated schools, but even a most
destructive enemy to study, for care and toil may well appear
superfluous, when praise is ready for whatever the pupils have
produced.
11. Those therefore who listen, as well as he who
speaks, ought to watch the countenance of the master, for
they will thus discern what is to be approved and what to be
condemned; and thus power will be gained from composition,
and judgment from being heard. 12. But now, eager and
ready, they not only start up at every period, but dart forward,
and cry out with indecorous transports. The compliment is
repaid in kind, and upon such applause depends the fortune of
a declamation; and hence result vanity and self-conceit, insomuch that, being elated with the tumultuous approbation of
their class-fellows, they are inclined, if they receive but little
praise from the master, to form an ill opinion of him. 13.
But let masters, also, desire to be heard themselves with attention and modesty; for the master ought not to speak to suit the
taste of his pupils, but the pupils to suit that of the master.
If possible, moreover, his attention should be directed to
observe what each pupil commends in his speeches, and for what
reason; and he may then rejoice that what he says will give
pleasure, not more on his own account than on that of his
pupils who judge with correctness.
14. That mere boys should sit mixed with young men, I
do not approve; for though such a man as ought to preside
over their studies and conduct, may keep even the eldest of
his pupils under control, yet the more tender ought to be
separate from the more mature, and they should all be kept
free, not merely from the guilt of licentiousness, but even
from the suspicion of it. 15. This point I thought proper
briefly to notice; that the master and his school should be
clear of gross vice, I do not suppose it necessary to intimate.
And if there is any father who would not shrink from flagrant
vice in choosing a tutor for his son, let him be assured that all
other rules, which I am endeavoring to lay down for the
benefit of youth, are, when this consideration is disregarded,
useless to him.
CHAPTER III.
1. Nor is the opinion of those to be passed in silence, who,
even when they think boys fit for the professor of rhetoric,
imagine that he is not at once to be consigned to the most
eminent, but detain him for some time under inferior teachers,
with the notion that moderate ability in a master is not only
better adapted for beginning instruction in art, but easier for
comprehension and imitation, as well as less disdainful of
undertaking the trouble of the elements. 2. On this head I
think no long labor necessary to show how much better it is
to be imbued with the best instructions, and how much difficulty is attendant on eradicating faults which have once gained
ground, as double duty falls on succeeding masters, and the
task indeed of unteaching is heavier and more important than
that of teaching at first. 3. Accordingly they say that
Timotheus, a famous instructor in playing the flute, was
accustomed to ask as much more pay from those whom
another had taught as from those who presented themselves
to him in a state of ignorance.
The mistakes committed in
the matter, however, are two; one, that people think inferior
teachers sufficient for a time, and, from having an easily
satisfied appetite, are content with their instructions; (such supineness, though deserving of reprehension, would yet he
in some degree endurable, if teachers of that class taught
only worse, and not less;) the other, which is even more
common, that people imagine that those who have attained
eminent qualifications for speaking will not descend to inferior
matters, and that this is sometimes the case because they
disdain to bestow attention on minuter points, and sometimes
because they cannot give instruction in them.
5. For my part, I do not consider him, who is unwilling to teach little
things, in the number of preceptors; but I argue that the
ablest teachers can teach little things best, if they will; first,
because it is likely that he who excels others in eloquence, has
gained the most accurate knowledge of the means by which
men attain eloquence; 6. secondly, because method, which,
with the best qualified instructors, is always plainest, is of
great efficacy, in teaching; and lastly, because no man rises to
such a height in greater things that lesser fade entirely from his
view. Unless indeed we believe that though Phidias made a
Jupiter well, another might have wrought, in better style than
he, the accessories to the decoration of the work; or that an
orator may not know how to speak; or that an eminent physician may be unable to cure trilling ailments.
7. Is there not then, it may be asked, a certain height of eloquence
too elevated for the immaturity of boyhood to comprehend it? I readily confess that there is; but the eloquent
professor must also be a man of sense, not ignorant of teaching, and
lowering himself to the capacity of the learner; as any fast walker, if
he should happen to walk with a child, would give him his hand, relax
his pace, and not go on quicker than his companion could follow. 8. What
shall be said, too, if it generally happens that instructions given by
the most learned are far more easy to be understood, and more perspicuous than those of others? For perspicuity is the chief
virtue of eloquence, and the less ability a man has, the more
he tries to raise and swell himself out, as those of short
stature exalt themselves on tip-toe, and the weak use most
threats. 9. As to those whose style is inflated, displaying a
vitiated taste, and who are fond of sounding words, or faulty
from any other mode of vicious affectation, I am convinced
that they labor under the fault, not of strength, but of weakness, as bodies are swollen, not with health, but with disease,
and as men who have erred from the straight road generally
make stoppages. Accordingly, the less able a teacher is, the
more obscure will he be.
10. It has not escaped my memory, that I said in the
preceding book, (when I observed that education in schools
was preferable to that at home,) that pupils commencing their
studies, or but little advanced in them, devote themselves
more readily to imitate their school-fellows than their master,
such imitation being more easy to them. This remark may
be understood by some in such a sense, that the opinion which
I now advocate may appear inconsistent with that which I
advanced before. 11. But such inconsistency will be far
from me; for what I then said is the very best of reasons
why a boy should be consigned to the best possible instructor,
because even the pupils under him, being better taught than
those under inferior masters, will either speak in such a
manner as it may not be objectionable to imitate, or, if they
commit any faults, will be immediately corrected, whereas the
less learned teacher will perhaps praise even what is wrong,
and cause it, by his judgment, to recommend itself to those
who listen to it. 12. Let a master therefore be excellent as
well in eloquence as in morals; one who, like Homer's Phoenix
[Iliad, ix. 432],
may teach his pupil at once to speak and to act.
CHAPTER IV.
I SHALL now proceed to state what I conceive to be the
first duties of rhetoricians in giving instruction to their
pupils, putting off for a while the consideration of what is
alone called, in common language, the art of rhetoric; for to me it
appears most eligible to commence with that to which the pupil has
learned something similar under the grammarians.
2. Since of narrations, (besides that which we use in pleadings,) we
understand that there are three kinds; the fable
[or mythological subject], which is the subject
of tragedies and poems, and which is remote, not merely from truth, but
from the appearance of truth; the argumentum, which comedies represent,
and which, though false, has a resemblance to truth; and the history, in
which is contained a relation of facts; and since we have consigned
poetic narratives to the grammarians, let the historical form the commencement of study under the
rhetorician; a kind of narrative which, as it has more of
truth, has also more of substance. 3. What appears to me
the best method of narrating, I will show when I treat of the
judicial part of pleading. In the meantime it will suffice to
intimate that it ought not to be dry and jejune, (for what
necessity would there be to bestow so much pains upon study,
if it were thought sufficient to state facts without dress or
decoration?) nor ought it to be erratic, and wantonly adorned
with far-fetched descriptions, in which many speakers indulge
with an emulation of poetic license. 4. Both these kinds of
narrative are faulty, yet that which springs from poverty is
worse than that which comes from exuberance.
From boys perfection of style can neither be required nor
expected; but the fertile genius, fond of noble efforts, and
conceiving at times a more than reasonable degree of ardor,
is greatly to be preferred. Nor, if there be something of
exuberance in a pupil of that age, would it at all displease me.
I would even have it an object with teachers themselves to
nourish minds that are still tender with more indulgence, and
to allow them to be satiated, as it were, with the milk of
more liberal studies. The body, which mature age may afterwards nerve, may for a time be somewhat plumper than seems
desirable. 6. Hence there is hope of strength; while a
child that has the outline of all his limbs exact commonly
portends weakness in subsequent years. Let that age be
daring, invent much, and delight in what it invents, though
it be often not sufficiently severe and correct. The remedy
for exuberance is easy; barrenness is incurable by any labor.
7. That temper in boys will afford me little hope in which
mental effort is prematurely restrained by judgment. I like what is
produced to be extremely copious, profuse even beyond the limits of
propriety. Years will greatly reduce superfluity; judgment will smooth away much of it; something
will be worn off, as it were, by use, if there be but metal
from which something may be hewn and polished off, and
such metal there will be, if we do not make the plate too thin
at first, so that deep cutting may break it. 8. That I hold
such opinions concerning this age, he will be less likely to
wonder who shall have read what Cicero [De Orat. ii.
21] says: "I wish
fecundity in a young man to give itself full scope."
Above all, therefore, and especially for boys, a dry master is
to be avoided, not less than a dry soil, void of all moisture, for
plants that are still tender. Under the influence of such a
tutor, they at once become dwarfish, looking as it were
towards the ground, and daring to aspire to nothing above
every day talk. To them, leanness is in place of health, and
weakness instead of judgment; and, while they think it
sufficient to be free from fault, they fall into the fault of
being free from all merit. Let not even maturity itself,
therefore, come too fast; let not the must, while yet in the
vat, become mellow, for so it will bear years, and be improved
by age.
10. Nor is it improper for me, moreover, to offer this admonition; that the powers of boys sometimes sink under too
great severity in correction; for they despond, and grieve, and
at last hate their work, and, what is most prejudicial, while
they fear every thing, they cease to attempt any thing.
11. There is a similar conviction in the minds of the cultivators of trees in the country, who think that the knife must
not be applied to tender shoots, as they appear to shrink from
the steel, and to be unable as yet to bear an incision.
12. A
teacher ought therefore to be as agreeable as possible, that
remedies, which are rough in their own nature, may be
rendered soothing by gentleness of hand; he ought to praise
some parts of his pupils' performances, to tolerate some, and
to alter others, giving his reasons why the alterations are
made; and also to make some passages clearer by adding
something of his own. It will also be of service too at limes,
for the master to dictate whole subjects himself, which the
pupil may imitate and admire for the present as his own. 13. But if a boy's composition were so faulty as not to admit
of correction, I have found him benefited whenever I told him
to write on the same subject again, after it had received fresh
treatment from me, observing that " he could do still better,"
since study is cheered by nothing more than hope.
14. Different ages, however, are to be corrected in different
ways, and work is to be required and amended according to
the degree of the pupil's abilities. I used to say to boys when they attempted any thing extravagant or verbose, that "I was
satisfied with it for the present, but that a time would come
when I should not allow them to produce compositions of such
a character." Thus they were satisfied with their abilities, and
yet not led to form a wrong judgment.
15. But that I may return to the point from which I
digressed, I should wish narrations to be composed with the
utmost possible care; for as it is of service to boys at an early
age, when their speech is but just commenced, to repeat what
they have heard in order to improve their faculty of speaking;
(let them accordingly be made, and with very good reason, to
go over their story again, and to pursue it from the middle,
either backwards or forwards; but let this be done only while
they are still at the knees of their teacher, and, as they can do
nothing else, are beginning to connect words and things, that
they may thus strengthen their memory;) so, when they shall
have attained the command of pure and correct language, extemporary
garrulity, without waiting for thought, or scarcely
taking time to rise, is the offspring of more ostentatious
boastfulness.
16. Hence arises empty exultation in ignorant
parents, and in their children contempt of application, want of
all modesty, a habit of speaking in the worst style, the practice
of all kinds of faults, and, what has often been fatal even to
great proficiency, an arrogant conceit of their own abilities.
17. There will be a proper time for acquiring facility of
speech, nor will that part of my subject be lightly passed over
by me; but in the mean time it will be sufficient if a boy with
all his care, and with the utmost application of which that age
is capable, can write something tolerable. To this practice let
him accustom himself, and make it natural to him. He only
will succeed in attaining the eminence at which we aim, or
the point next below it, who shall learn to speak correctly
before he learns to speak rapidly.
18. To narrations is added, not without advantage, the task
of refuting and confirming them, which is called ανασκευη and
κατασκευη. This may be done, not only with regard to
fabulous subjects, and such as are related in poetry, but with
regard even to records in our own annals; as if it be inquired
whether it is credible that a crow settled upon the head of
Valerius when he was fighting, to annoy the face and eyes of his
Gallic enemy with his beak and wings [Livy, book vii; Aul.
Gell. ix. 2], there will be ample
matter for discussion on both sides of the question; 19. as
there will also be concerning the serpent, of which Scipio is
said to have been born [Aul. Gell. vii. 1], as well as about the wolf of Romulus,
and the Egeria of Numa. As to the histories of the Greeks,
there is generally license in them similar to that of the poets.
Questions are often wont to arise, too, concerning the time or
place at which a thing is said to have been done; sometimes
even about a person; as Livy, for instance, is frequently in
doubt, and other historians differ one from another.
20. The pupil will then proceed by degrees to higher
efforts, to praise illustrious characters and censure the immoral;
an exercise of manifold advantage; for the mind is
thus employed about a multiplicity and variety of matters;
the understanding is formed by the contemplation of good and
evil. Hence is acquired, too, an extensive knowledge of
things in general; and the pupil is soon furnished with
examples, which are of great weight in every kind of causes,
and which he will use as occasion requires. 21. Next succeeds
exercise in comparison, which of two characters is the better or
the worse, which, though it is managed in a similar way, yet
both doubles the topics, and treats not only of the nature, but
of the degrees of virtues and of vices. But on the management
of praise and the contrary, as it is the third part of rhetoric,
I shall give directions in the proper place.
22. Common places, (I speak of those in which, without
specifying persons, it is usual to declaim against vices themselves,
as against those of the adulterer, the gamester, the
licentious person,) are of the very nature of speeches on trials
and, if you add the name of an accused party, are real accusations. These, however, are usually altered from their
treatment as general subjects to something specific, as when
the subject of a declamation is a blind adulterer, a poor
gamester, a licentious old man. 23. Sometimes also they
have their use in a defense; for we occasionally speak in favor
of luxury or licentiousness; and a procurer or parasite is
sometimes defended in such a way, that we advocate, not the
person, but the vice.
24. Theses, which are drawn from the comparison of things,
as whether a country or city life is more desirable, and whether
the merit of a lawyer or a soldier is the greater, are eminently
proper and copious subjects for exercise in speaking, and contribute
greatly to improvement, both in the province of persuasion and in discussions on trials. The latter of the two
subjects just mentioned is handled with great copiousness by
Cicero in his pleading for Muraena. 26. Such theses as the following,
whether a man ought to marry, and whether political offices should be
sought, belong almost wholly to the deliberative species, for, if persons be but added, they will be
suasory.
26. My teachers were accustomed to prepare us for conjectural causes
by a kind of exercise far from useless, and very
pleasant to us, in which they desired us to investigate and
show why Venus among the Lacedaemonians was represented
armed [the cause is said by Lactautius, Inst. Div. i. 26, to have been the
bravery exhibited by the Spartan women on a certain occasion against
the Messenians, when a temple was vowed to Venus armata]; why Cupid was thought to be a boy, and winged, and
armed with arrows and a torch [See Propert. ii. 9], and questions of a similar
nature, in which we endeavored to ascertain the intention, or
object about which there is so often a question in controversies. This may be regarded as a sort of chria.
27. That such questions as those about witnesses, whether
we ought always to believe them, and concerning arguments,
whether we ought to put any trust in trifling ones, belong to
forensic pleading, is so manifest that some speakers
[As Hortensius; see ii. 1, 11], not
undistinguished in civil offices, have kept them ready in writing,
and have carefully committed them to memory, that,
whenever opportunity should offer, their extemporary speeches
might be decorated with them, as with ornaments fitted into
them. 28. By which practice, (for I cannot delay to express
my judgment on the point,) they appeared to me to confess
great weakness in themselves. For what can such men produce
appropriate to particular causes, of which the aspect is
perpetually varied and new? How can they reply to questions
propounded by the opposite party? How can they at once
meet objections, or interrogate a witness, when, even on topics
of the commonest kind, such as are handled in most causes,
they are unable to pursue the most ordinary thoughts in any
words but those which they have long before prepared? 29.
When they say the same things in various pleadings, their
cold meat, as it were, served up over and over again, must
either create loathing in the speakers themselves, or their
unhappy household furniture, which, as among the ambitious
poor, is worn out by being used for several different purposes,
must, when detected so often by the memory of their hearers,
cause a feeling of shame in them; 30. especially as there is
scarcely any common place so common, which can incorporate
well with any pleading, unless it be bound by some link to
the peculiar question under consideration, and which will not show
that it is not so much inserted as attached; 31. either
because it is unlike the rest, or because it is very frequently
borrowed without reason, not because it is wanted, but because
it is ready; as some speakers, for the sake of sentiment, introduce
the most verbose common places, whereas it is from
the subject itself that sentiments ought to arise. 32. Such
remarks are ornamental and useful if they spring from the
question, but every remark, however beautiful, unless it tends
to gain the cause, is certainly superfluous, and sometimes even
noxious. But this digression has been sufficiently prolonged.
33. The praise or censure of laws requites more mature
powers, such as may almost suffice for the very highest efforts.
Whether this exercise partakes more of the nature of deliberative
or controversial oratory, is a point that varies according to
the custom and right of particular nations. Among the
Greeks the proposer of laws was called to plead before the
judge; among the Romans it was customary to recommend or
disparage a law before the public assembly. In either case,
however, few arguments, and those almost certain, are
advanced; for there are but three kinds of laws, relating to
sacred, public, or private rights. 34. This division has regard
chiefly to the commendation of a law, as when the speaker
extols it by a kind of gradation, because it is a law, because it
is public, because it is made to promote the worship of the gods.
35. Points about which questions usually arise, are common to
all laws; for a doubt may be started, either concerning the right
of him who proposes the law, (as concerning that of
Publius Clodius who was accused of not having been properly
created tribune, [Clodius, being a patrician by birth, could not be made a tribune
of the people, without having been first made a plebeian by adoption.
Cicero maintained that his adoption had been irregular, Pro Domo, c.
13-17]) or concerning the validity of the proposal
Itself, a doubt which may refer to a variety of matters, as
for instance, whether the proposal has been published on three
market days, or whether the law may be said to have been
proposed, or to be proposed, on an improper day, or contrary
to protests, or to the auspices, or in any other way at variance
with legitimate proceedings; or whether it be opposed to any
law still in force.
36. But such considerations do not enter
into these early exercises, which are without any allusion to
persons, times, or particular causes. Other points, whether
treated in real or fictitious discussions, are much the same;
for the fault of any law must be either in words or in matter.
37. As to words, it is questioned whether they be sufficiently
expressive; or whether there is any ambiguity in them; as to
matter, whether the law is consistent with itself; whether it
ought to have reference to past time, or to individuals. But
the most common inquiry is, whether it be proper or expedient.
38. Nor am I ignorant that of this inquiry many divisions
are made by most professors; but I, under the term proper,
include consistency with justice, piety, religion, and other
similar virtues. The consideration of justice, however, is
usually discussed with reference to more than one point; for
a question may either be raised about the subject of the
law, as whether it be deserving of punishment or reward, or
about the measure of reward or punishment, to which an objection
may be taken as well for being too great as too little. 39.
Expediency, also, is sometimes determined by the nature al
the measure, sometimes by the circumstances of the time.
As to some laws, it becomes a question, whether they can be
enforced. Nor ought students to be ignorant that laws are
sometimes censured wholly, sometimes partly, as examples of
both are afforded us in highly celebrated orations. 40. Nor
does it escape my recollection that there are laws which are
not proposed for perpetuity, but with regard to temporary honors
or commands, such as the Manilian law, about which
there is an oration of Cicero. But concerning these no directions
can be given in this place; for they depend upon the
peculiar nature of the subjects on which the discussion is
raised, and not on any general consideration.
41. On such subjects did the ancients, for the most part,
exercise the faculty of eloquence, borrowing their mode of
argument, however, from the logicians. To speak on fictitious
cases, in imitation of pleadings in the forum or in public councils,
is generally allowed to have become a practice among
the Greeks, about the time of Demetrius Phalereus. 42.
Whether that sort of exercise was invented by him, I (as I
have acknowledged also in another book) have not succeeded in
discovering; nor do those who affirm most positively that he did invent
it, rest their opinion on any writer of good authority; but that the Latin teachers of eloquence commenced
this practice towards the end of the life of Lucius Crassus,
Cicero [De Orat. iii. 24. Concerning Plotius, see Suet. de Clar. Rhet.
cap.
2; Seneca Rhet. p. 134 Bip.; Varro in fragm. p. 289 Bip.;
Quintilian, xi. 3. 143] tells us; of which teachers the most
eminent was Plotius.
CHAPTER V.
1. But of the proper mode of declaiming I shall speak a
little further on; in the mean while, as we are treating of the
first rudiments of rhetoric, I should not omit, I think, to
observe how much the professor would contribute to the
advancement of his pupils, if, as the explanation of the poets
is required from teachers of grammar, so he, in like manner,
would exercise the pupils under his care in the reading of
history, and even still more in that of speeches; a practice
which I myself have adopted in the case of a few pupils, whose
age required it, and whose parents thought it would be serviceable to
them. 2. But though I then deemed it an excellent method, two
circumstances were obstructions to the practice of it; that long custom had established a different
mode of teaching and that they were mostly full-grown youths,
who did not require that exercise, that were forming themselves on my model.
3. But though I should make a new
discovery ever so late, I should not be ashamed to recommend
it for the future. I know, however, that this is now done
among the Greeks, but chiefly by assistant-masters, since the
time would seem hardly sufficient, if the professors were
always to lecture to each pupil as he read. 4. Such lecturing,
indeed, as is given, that boys may follow the writing of an
author easily and distinctly with their eyes, and such even as
explains the meaning of every word, at all uncommon, that
occurs, is to be regarded as far below the profession of a
teacher of rhetoric.
5. But to point out the beauties of authors, and, if occasion
ever present itself, their faults, is eminently consistent with
that profession and engagement, by which he offers himself to
the public as a master of eloquence, especially as I do not
require such toil from teachers, that they should call their
pupils to their lap, and labor at the reading of whatever book
each of them may fancy. 6. For to me it seems easier, as
well as far more advantageous, that the master, after calling
for silence, should appoint some one pupil to read, (and it will
be best that this duty should be imposed on them by turns,)
that they may thus accustom themselves to clear pronunciation;
7. and then, after explaining the cause for which the
oration was composed, (for so that which is said will be better
understood,) that he should leave nothing unnoticed which is important
to be remarked, either in the thought or the language; that he should
observe what method is adopted in the exordium for conciliating the
judge; what clearness, brevity, and apparent sincerity, is displayed in
the statement of facts; what design there is in certain passages, and
what well concealed artifice; (for that is the only true art in pleading
which cannot be perceived except by a skillful pleader;) 8. what judgment
appears in the division of the matter; how subtle and urgent is the
argumentation; with what force the speaker excites, with what amenity he
soothes: what severity is shown in his invectives, what urbanity in his
jests; how he commands the feelings, forces a way into the understanding, and
makes the opinions of the judges coincide with what he
asserts. 9. In regard to the style, too, he should notice any
expression that is peculiarly appropriate, elegant, or sublime;
when the amplification deserves praise; what quality is opposed
to it, what phrases are happily metaphorical, what
figures of speech are used, what part of the composition is
smooth and polished, and yet manly and vigorous.
10. Nor is it without advantage, indeed, that inelegant and
faulty speeches, yet such as many, from depravity of taste,
would admire, should be read before boys, and that it should
be shown how many expressions in them are inappropriate,
obscure, tumid, low, mean, affected, or effeminate; expressions
which, however, are not only extolled by many readers, but,
what is worse, are extolled for the very reason that they are
vicious, 11. for straight-forward language, naturally expressed,
seems to some of us to have nothing of genius; but whatever
departs, in any way, from the common course, we admire as
something exquisite; as, with some persons, more regard is
shown for figures that are distorted, and in any respect
monstrous, than for such as have lost none of the advantages
of ordinary conformation. 12. Some, too, who are attracted
by appearance, think that there is more beauty in men who are
depilated and smooth, who dress their locks, hot from the curling-irons,
with pins, and who are radiant with a complexion not their own, than unsophisticated nature can give;
as if beauty of person could be thought to spring from corruption of manners.
l3. Nor will the preceptor be under the obligation merely
to teach these things, but frequently to ask questions upon
them, and try the judgment of his pupils. Thus carelessness
will not come upon them while they listen, nor will the instructions
that shall be given fail to enter their ears; and they
will at the same time be conducted to the end which is sought
in this exercise, namely that they themselves may conceive
and understand. For what object have we in teaching them,
but that they may not always require to be taught?
14. I will venture to say that this sort of diligent exercise
will contribute more to the improvement of students than all
the treatises of all the rhetoricians that ever wrote; which
doubtless, however, are of considerable use, but their scope is
more general; and how indeed can they go into all kinds of
questions that arise almost every day? 15. So, though
certain general precepts are given in the military art, it will
yet be of far more advantage to know what plan any leader
has adopted wisely or imprudently, and in what place or at
what time; for in almost every art precepts are of much less
avail than practical experiments. 16. Shall a teacher declaim
that he may be a model to his hearers, and will not Cicero
and Demosthenes, if read, profit them more? Shall a pupil
if he commits faults in declaiming, be corrected before the
rest, and will it not be more serviceable to him to correct the
speech of another? Indisputably; and even more agreeable;
for every one prefers that others' faults should be blamed
rather than his own. 17. Nor are there wanting more arguments for me to offer; but the advantage of this plan can
escape the observation of no one; and I wish that there may
not be so much unwillingness to adopt it as there will be
pleasure in having adopted it.
18. If this method be followed there will remain a question
not very difficult to answer, which is, what authors ought to
be read by beginners? Some have recommended inferior
writers, as they thought them easier of comprehension; others
have advocated the more florid kind of writers, as being better
adapted to nourish the minds of the young. 19. For my
part, I would have the best authors commenced at once, and
read always; but I would choose the clearest in style, and
most intelligible; recommending Livy, for instance, to be
read by boys rather than Sallust, who, however, is the greater
historian, but to understand him there is need of some proficiency.
20. Cicero, as it seems to me, is agreeable even to
beginners, and sufficiently intelligible, and may not only profit,
but even be loved; and next to Cicero, (as Livy advises,)
such authors as most resemble Cicero.
21. There are two points in style on which I think that the
greatest caution should be used in respect to boys: one is that no
master, from being too much an admirer of antiquity, should allow them
to harden, as it were, in the reading of the Gracchi, Cato, and other like authors; for they would thus
become uncouth and dry; since they cannot, as yet, understand their force of thought, and, content with adopting their
style, which, at the time it was written, was doubtless excellent,
but is quite unsuitable to our day, they will appear to
themselves to resemble those eminent men. 22. The other
point, which is the opposite of the former, is, lest, being
captivated with the flowers of modern affectation, they should
be so seduced by a corrupt kind of pleasure, as to love that
luscious manner of writing which is the more agreeable to the
minds of youth in proportion as it has more affinity with
them.
23. When their taste is formed, however, and out of
danger of being corrupted, I should recommend them to read
not only the ancients, (from whom if a solid and manly force
of thought be adopted, while the rust of a rude age is cleared
off, our present style will receive additional grace,) but also
the writers of the present day, in whom there is much merit.
24. For nature has not condemned us to stupidity, but we
ourselves have changed our mode of speaking, and have
indulged our fancies more than we ought; and thus the
ancients did not excel us so much in genius as in severity of
manner. It will be possible, therefore, to select from the
moderns many qualities for imitation, but care must be taken
that they be not contaminated with other qualities with which
they are mixed. Yet that there have been recently, and are
now, many writers whom we may imitate entirely, I would not
only allow, (for why should I not?) but even affirm. 26. But
who they are it is not for everybody to decide. We may even
err with greater safety in regard to the ancients; and I would
therefore defer the reading of the moderns, that imitation may
not go before judgment.
CHAPTER VI.
1. There has been also a diversity of practice among
teachers in the following respect. Some of them, not confining themselves to giving directions as to the division of any subject
which they assigned their pupils for declamation, developed it more
fully by speaking on it themselves, and amplified it not only with
proofs but with appeals to the feelings. 2. Others, giving merely the
first outlines, expatiated after the declamations were composed, on whatever
points each pupil had omitted, and polished some passages
with no less care than they would have used if they had themselves been rising to speak in public.
Both methods are beneficial; and, therefore, for my own part, I give
no distinction to either of them above the other; but, if it should be necessary to follow only one of the two,
it will be of greater service to point out the right way at first,
than to recall those who have gone astray from their errors;
3. first, because to the subsequent emendation they merely
listen, but the preliminary division they carry to their meditation
and their composition; and, secondly, because they more
willingly attend to one who gives directions than to one who
finds faults. Whatever pupils, too, are of a high spirit, are
apt, especially in the present state of manners, to be angry at
admonition, and offer silent resistance to it. 4. Not that
faults are therefore to be less openly corrected; for regard is
to be had to the other pupils, who will think that whatever the
master has not amended is right.
But both methods should
be united, and used as occasion may require. To beginners
should be given matter designed, as it were, beforehand, in
proportion to the abilities of each. But when they shall
appear to have formed themselves sufficiently on their model, a few brief directions may be given them, following which,
they may advance by their own strength without any support. 6. It is proper
that they should sometimes be left to themselves, lest, from the bad habit of being always led by the
efforts of others, they should lose all capacity of attempting
and producing anything for themselves. But when they seem
to judge pretty accurately of what ought to be said, the labor
of the teacher is almost at an end; though, should they still
commit errors, they must be again put under a guide.
7. Something of this kind we see birds practice, which divide
food, collected in their beaks, among their tender and helpless
young ones; but, when they seem sufficiently grown, teach
them, by degrees, to venture out of the nest, and flutter
round their place of abode, themselves leading the way; and
at last leave their strength, when properly tried, to the open
sky and their own self-confidence. [Valerius Flaccus,
vii. 375.]
CHAPTER VII.
1. One change, I think, should certainly be made in what is customary
with regard to the age of which we are speaking. Pupils should not be
obliged to learn by heart what they have composed, and to repeat it, as
is usual, on a certain day, a task which it is fathers that principally
exact, thinking that their children then only study when they repeat
frequent declamations; whereas proficiency depends chiefly on the
diligent cultivation of style. 2. For though I would wish boys to
compose, and to spend much time in that employment, yet, as to learning
by heart, I would rather recommend for that purpose select passages from
orations or histories, or any other sort of writings deserving of such
attention.
3. The memory will thus be more efficiently exercised in mastering what is
another's than what is their own; and those who shall have
been practiced in this more difficult kind of labor, will fix in
their minds, without trouble, what they themselves have
composed, as being more familiar to them; they will also
accustom themselves to the best compositions, and they will
always have in their memory something which they may
imitate, and will, even without being aware, re-produce that
fashion of style which they have deeply impressed upon their
minds. 4. They will have at command, moreover, an abundance of the best words, phrases, and figures, not sought for
the occasion, but offering themselves spontaneously, as it
were, from a store treasured within them. To this is added
the power of quoting the happy expressions of any author,
which is agreeable in common conversation, and useful in
pleading; for phrases which are not coined for the sake of the
cause in hand have the greater weight, and often gain us
more applause than if they were our own.
5. Yet pupils should sometimes be permitted to recite what
they themselves have written, that they may reap the full
reward of their labor from that kind of applause which is most
desired. This permission will most properly be granted
when they have produced something more polished than ordinary, that they may thus be presented with some return for
their study, and rejoice that they have deserved to recite their
composition.
CHAPTER VIII.
1. It is generally, and not without reason, regarded as an excellent
quality in a master to observe accurately the differences of ability in
those whom he has undertaken to instruct, and to ascertain in what
direction the nature of each particularly inclines him; for there is in
talent an incredible variety; nor are the forms of the mind fewer than
those of the body. 2. This may be understood even from orators themselves, who
differ so much from each other in their style of speaking, that
no one is like another, though most of them have set themselves to imitate those whom they admired. 3. It has also
been thought advantageous by most teachers to instruct each
pupil in such a manner as to cherish by learning the good
qualities inherited from nature, so that the powers may be
assisted in their progress towards the object to which they
chiefly direct themselves.
As a master of palaestric exercises,
when he enters a gymnasium full of boys, is able, after trying
their strength and comprehension in every possible way, to
decide for what kind of exercise each ought to be trained;
4. so a teacher of eloquence, they say, when he has clearly
observed which boy's genius delights most in a concise and
polished manner of speaking, and which in a spirited, or
grave, or smooth, or rough, or brilliant, or elegant one, will so
accommodate his instructions to each, that he will be advanced
in that department in which he shows most ability; 5. because
nature attains far greater power when seconded by culture;
and he that is led contrary to nature, cannot make due progress in the studies for which he is unfit, and makes those
talents, for the exercise of which he seemed born, weaker by
neglecting to cultivate them.
6. This opinion seems to me (for to him that follows reason
there is free exercise of judgment even in opposition to
received persuasions) just only in part. To distinguish peculiarities of talent is absolutely necessary; and to make choice
of particular studies to suit them, is what no man would discountenance. 7. For one youth will be fitter for the study of
history than another; one will be qualified for writing poetry,
another for the study of law, and some perhaps fit only to be
sent into the fields. The teacher of rhetoric will decide in
accordance with these peculiarities, just as the master of the
palaestra will make one of his pupils a runner, another a boxer,
another a wrestler, or fit him for any other of the exercises that
are practised at the sacred games.
8. But he who is destined for public speaking must strive
to excel, not merely in one accomplishment, but in all the
accomplishments that are requisite for that art, even though
some of them may seem too difficult for him when he is learning
them; for instruction would be altogether superfluous if
the natural state of the mind were sufficient. 9. If a pupil
that is vitiated in taste, and turgid in his style, as many are,
is put under our care, shall we allow him to go on in his own
way? Him that is dry and jejune in his manner, shall we not
nourish, and, as it were, clothe? For if it be necessary to
prune something away from certain pupils, why should it not
be allowable to add something to others?
10. Yet I would not
fight against nature; for I do not think that any good quality,
which is innate, should be detracted, but that whatever is
inactive or deficient should be invigorated or supplied. Was
that famous teacher Isocrates, whose writings are not stronger
proofs that he spoke well, than his scholars that he taught well,
inclined, when he formed such an opinion of Ephorus and
Theopompus as to say that "the one wanted the rein and the
other the spur," [see Cic. de Orat. iii. 9; Brut. c.
56; also Quintil. x. 1, 74] to think that the slowness in the dull, and
the ardor in the more impetuous, were to be fostered by education? On the contrary,
he thought that the qualities of each ought to be mixed with those of the other. 12. We must
so far accommodate ourselves, however, to feeble intellects,
that they may be trained only to that to which nature invites
them; for thus they will do with more success the only thing
which they can do.
But if richer material fall into our hands,
from which we justly conceive hopes of a true orator, no
rhetorical excellence must be left unstudied. 13. For though
such a genius be more inclined, as indeed it must be, to the
exercise of certain powers, yet it will not be averse to that of others, and will render them, by study, equal to those in which
it naturally excelled; just as the skillful trainer in bodily
exercise, (that I may adhere to my former illustration,) will
not, if he undertakes to form a pancratiast, teach him to
strike with his fist or his heel only, or instruct him merely in
wrestling, or only in certain artifices of wrestling, but will
practice him in everything pertaining to the pancratiastic art.
There may perhaps be some pupil unequal to some of these
exercises. He must then apply chiefly to that in which he
can succeed. 14. For two things are especially to be avoided;
one, to attempt what cannot be accomplished; and the other,
to divert a pupil from what he does well to something else for
which he is less qualified. But if he be capable of instruction, the tutor, like Nicostratus whom we, when young, knew
at an advanced age, will bring to bear upon him every art of
instruction alike, and render him invincible, as Nicostratus
was in wrestling and boxing [a pancratiast and wrestler. See Pausan.
v. 21], for success in both of which contests he was crowned on the same day. 15. How much more
must such training, indeed, be pursued by the teacher of the
future orator! For it is not enough that he should speak
concisely, or artfully, or vehemently, any more than for a
singing master to excel in acute, or middle, or grave tones
only, or even in particular subdivisions of them: since eloquence is, like a harp, not perfect, unless, with all its strings
stretched, it be in unison from the highest to the lowest note.
CHAPTER IX.
1. Having spoken thus fully concerning the duties of
teachers, I give pupils, for the present, only this one admonition,
that they are to love their tutors not less than their studies,
and to regard them as parents, not indeed of their bodies, but
of their minds. 2. Such affection contributes greatly to improvement,
for pupils, under its influence, will not only listen
with pleasure, but will believe what is taught them, and will
desire to resemble their instructors. They will come together,
in assembling for school, with pleasure and cheerfulness; they
will not be angry when corrected, and will be delighted when
praised; and they will strive, by their devotion to study, to become
as dear as possible to the master. 8. For as it is the
duty of preceptors to teach, so it is that of pupils to show
themselves teachable; neither of these duties, else, will be of
avail without the other. And as the generation of man is
effected by both parents, and as you will in vain scatter seed,
unless the furrowed ground, previously softened, cherish it,
so neither can eloquence come to its growth unless by mutual
agreement between him who communicates and him who
receives.
CHAPTER X.
1. When the pupil has been well instructed, and sufficiently
exercised, in these preliminary studies, which are not in themselves inconsiderable, but
members and portions, as it were, of
higher branches of learning, the time will have nearly arrived
for entering on deliberative and judicial subjects. But before
I proceed to speak of those matters, I must say a few words
on the art of declamation, which, though the most recently
invented of all exercises, is indeed by far the most useful.
2. For it comprehends within itself all those exercises of which
I have been treating, and presents us with a very close resemblance to reality; and it has been so much adopted, accordingly,
that it is thought by many sufficient of itself to form oratory,
since no excellence in continued speaking can be specified,
which is not found in this prelude to speaking.
3. The
practice however has so degenerated through the fault of the
teachers, that the license and ignorance of declaimers have been
among the chief causes that have corrupted eloquence. But
of that which is good by nature we may surely make a good
use. 4. Let therefore the subjects themselves, which shall be
imagined, be as like as possible to truth; and let declamations
to the utmost extent that is practicable, imitate those pleadings for which
they were introduced as a preparation. 5. For as to magicians,
and the pestilence, and oracles, [the 326th declamation of those called
Quintilian's: A people suffering from pestilence sent a deputy in
consult an oracle about a remedy; the answer given him was that he
must sacrifice his own son. On his return he communicated the oracle
to his son, but concealed it from the public authorities, telling them
that they had to perform certain sacred rites. When the rites were
finished, the pestilence did not abate; and the son then put himself
to death. After the pestilence had subsided, the father was accused of
treason to the state. See also Declamat. 384, and the 19th and 43rd
of those ascribed to Calphurnius Flaccus] and step-mothers
more cruel than those of tragedy, and other subjects
more imaginary than these, we shall in vain seek them among
sponsions and interdicts [law terms; sponsio was when a litigant engaged to pay a certain
sum of money if he lost the cause; an interdict was when the praetor
ordered or forbade anything to be done, chiefly in regard to property]. What, then, it may be said, shall we
never suffer students to handle such topics as are above belief,
and (to say the truth) poetical, so that they may expatiate and
exult in their subject, and swell forth as it were into full
body?
6. It would indeed be best not to suffer them; but
at least let not the subjects, if grand and turgid, appear also,
to him who regards them with severe judgment, foolish and
ridiculous; so that, if we must grant the use of such topics, let
the declaimer swell himself occasionally to the full, provided
he understands that, as four-footed animals, when they have
been blown with green fodder, are cured by losing blood, and
thus return to food suited to maintain their strength, so must
his turgidity be diminished, and whatever corrupt humors he
has contracted be discharged, if he wishes to be healthy and
strong; for otherwise his empty swelling will be hampered at
the first attempt at any real pleading.
7. Those, assuredly, who think that the whole exercise of
declaiming is altogether different from forensic pleading, do
not see even the reason for which that exercise was instituted.
8. For, if it is no preparation for the forum, it is merely like
theatrical ostentation, or insane raving. To what purpose is
it to instruct a judge, who has no existence? To state a case
that all know to be fictitious? To bring proofs of a point on which no
man will pronounce sentence? This indeed is nothing more than trifling;
but how ridiculous is it to excite our feelings, and to work upon an audience with anger and sorrow,
unless we are preparing ourselves by imitations of battle for
serious contests and a regular field?
9. Will there then be no difference, it may be asked, between the mode of speaking
at the bar, and mere exercise in declamation? I answer, that
if we speak for the sake of improvement, there will be no
difference. I wish, too, that it were made a part of the exercise to use
names; that causes more complicated, and requiring longer pleadings, were invented; that we were less afraid of
words in daily use; and that we were in the habit of mingling
jests with our declamation; all which points, however we may
have been practiced in the schools in other respects, find us
novices at the bar.
10. But even if a declamation be composed merely for display, we ought surely to exert our voice in some degree to
please the audience. For even in those oratorical compositions, which are doubtless based in some degree upon truth, but
are adapted to please the multitude, (such as are the panegyrics which we read, and all that epideictic kind of eloquence,)
it is allowable to use great elegance, and not only to acknowledge the
efforts of art, (which ought generally to be concealed
in forensic pleadings,) but to display it to those who are called
together for the purpose of witnessing it. 12. Declamation,
therefore, as it is an imitation of real pleadings and deliberations, ought closely to resemble reality, but, as it carries with
it something of ostentation, to clothe itself in a certain elegance. 13. Such is the practice of actors, who do not pronounce exactly as we speak in common conversation, for such
pronunciation would be devoid of art; nor do they depart far
from nature, as by such a fault imitation would be destroyed;
but they exalt the simplicity of familiar discourse with a certain scenic grace.
14. However some inconveniences will attend us from the
nature of the subjects which we have imagined, especially as
many particulars in them are left uncertain, which we settle as
suits our purpose, as age, fortune, children, parents, strength,
laws, and manners of cities; and other things of a similar
kind. 15. Sometimes, too, we draw arguments from the very
faults of the imaginary causes. But on each of these points
we shall speak in its proper place. For though the whole object of the
work intended by us has regard to the formation of an orator, yet, lest
students may think anything wanting, we shall not omit, in passing, whatever may occur that fairly relates to the teaching of the schools.
CHAPTER XI.
1. From this point, then, I am to enter upon that portion
of the art with which those who have omitted the preceding
portions usually commence. I see, however, that some will
oppose me at the very threshold; men who think that
eloquence has no need of rules of this kind, and who, satisfied
with their own natural ability, and the common methods of
teaching and exercise in the schools, even ridicule my diligence; following the example of certain professors of great
reputation. It was one of those characters, I believe, who,
being asked what a figure and what a thought was, answered
that "he did not know, but that, if it had any relation to his
subject, it would be found in his declamation." 2. Another
of them replied to a person who asked him "whether he was a
follower of Theodorus or Apollodorus," [Theodorus and Apollodorus were well-known
rhetoricians,
often mentioned by Quintilian, and leaders of parties] "I am a prize
fighter." Nor could he indeed have escaped an avowal of
his ignorance with greater wit. But such men, as they have
attained eminent repute through the goodness of their natural powers,
and have uttered many things even worthy of remembrance, have had very
many imitators that resemble
them in negligence, but very few that approach them in
ability.
3. They make it their boast that they speak from
impulse, and merely exert their natural powers; and say that
there is no need of proofs or arrangement in fictitious subjects,
but only of grand thoughts, to hear which the auditory will be
crowded, and of which the best are the offspring of venturesomeness. 4. In meditation, also, as they use no method,
they either wait, often for some days, looking at the ceiling
for some great thought that may spontaneously present itself,
or, exciting themselves with inarticulate sounds, as with a
trumpet, they adapt the wildest gestures of body, not to the
utterance, but to the excogitation of words.
5. Some, before they have conceived any thoughts, fix upon
certain heads, under which something eloquent is to be
introduced; but, after modulating their words to themselves, aloud and
for a long time, they desert their proposed arrangement, from despairing of the possibility of forming any
connection, and then turn to one train of ideas, and again to
another, all equally common and hackneyed. 6. Those however who seem to have most method, do not bestow their
efforts on fictitious causes, but on common topics, in which
they do not direct their view to any certain object, but throw
out detached thoughts as they occur to them. 7. Hence it
happens that their speech, being unconnected and made up of
different pieces, cannot hang together, but is like the note-books of boys, in which they enter promiscuously whatever has
been commended in the declamations of others. Yet they
sometimes strike out fine sentiments and good thoughts (for so
indeed they are accustomed to boast); but barbarians and
slaves do the same; and, if this be sufficient, there is no art
at all in eloquence
CHAPTER XII.
1. I must not forbear to acknowledge, however, that people
in general adopt the notion that the unlearned appear to speak
with more force than the learned. But this opinion has its
origin chiefly in the mistake of those who judge erroneously,
and who think that what has no art has the more energy; just
as if they should conceive it a greater proof of strength to
break through a door than to open it, to rupture a knot than
to untie it, to drag an animal than to lead it. 2. By such
persons a gladiator, who rushes to battle without any knowledge of arms, and a wrestler, who struggles with the whole
force of his body to effect that which he has once attempted, is
called so much the braver; though the latter is often laid
prostrate by his own strength, and the other, however violent
his assault, is withstood by a gentle turn of his adversary's
wrist.
3. But there are some things concerning this point that very
naturally deceive the unskillful; for division, though it is of great
consequence in pleadings, diminishes the appearance of
strength; what is rough is imagined more bulky than what is
polished; and objects when scattered are thought more
numerous than when they are ranged in order.
4. There is also a certain affinity between particular excellences
and faults, in consequence of which a railer passes for a
free speaker, a rash for a bold one, a prolix for a copious one.
But an ignorant pleader rails too openly and too frequently, to
the peril of the party whose cause he has undertaken, and
often to his own. 6. Yet this practice attracts the notice of
people to him, because they readily listen to what they would
not themselves utter.
Such a speaker, too, is far from avoiding that venturesomeness which lies in mere expression, and makes desperate
efforts; whence it may happen that he who is always seeking
something extravagant, may sometimes find something great;
but it happens only seldom, and does not compensate for
undoubted faults.
6. It is on this account that unlearned speakers seem sometimes to have greater copiousness of language, because they
pour forth every thing; while the learned use selection and moderation. Besides,
unlearned pleaders seldom adhere to
the object of proving what they have asserted; by this means
they avoid what appears to judges of bad taste the dryness of
questions and arguments, and seek nothing else but matter in
which they may please the ears of the court with senseless
gratifications.
7. Their fine sentiments themselves, too, at which alone they
aim, are more striking when all around them is poor and
mean; as lights are most brilliant, not amidst shades as
Cicero says [De Orat. iii. 26], but amidst utter darkness. Let such speakers
therefore be called as ingenious as the world pleases, provided
it be granted that a man of real eloquence would receive the
praise given to them as an insult.
8. Still it must be allowed that learning does take away
something, as the file takes something from rough metal, the
whetstone from blunt instruments, and age from wine; but it
takes away what is faulty; and that which learning has
polished is less only because it is better.
9. But such pleaders try by their delivery to gain the reputation of speaking with energy; for they bawl on every
occasion and bellow out every thing with uplifted hand, as they call it, raging like madmen with incessant action, panting
and swaggering, and with every kind of gesture and movement
of the head. 10. To clap the hands together, to stamp the
foot on the ground, to strike the thigh, the breast, and the
forehead with the hand, makes a wonderful impression on an
audience of the lower order [mire ad pullatum circulum facit. The color or dirt of the toga,
and still more of the tunica, which many of the poor wore without
anything over it, characterizes a multitude of the lower and uneducated class of people. So Plin.
Ep. vii. 17: lllos quoque sordidos et pullatos reveremur], while the polished speaker, as he
knows how to temper, to vary, and to arrange the several
parts of his speech, so in delivery he knows how to adapt his
action to every variety of complexion in what he utters; and,
if any rule appears to him deserving of constant attention, it
would be that he should prefer always to be and to seem
modest. But the other sort of speakers call that force which
ought rather to be called violence.
11. But we may at times see not only pleaders, but, what is far more
disgraceful, teachers, who, after having had some short practice in
speaking, abandon all method and indulge in every kind of irregularity
as inclination prompts them, and call those who have paid more regard to
learning than themselves, foolish, lifeless, timid, weak, and whatever
other epithet of reproach occurs to them. 12. Let me then congratulate
them as having become eloquent without labor, without method,
without study; but let me, as I have long withdrawn from the
duties of teaching and of speaking in the forum, because I
thought it most honorable to terminate my career while my
services were still desired, console my leisure in meditating
and composing precepts which I trust will be of use to young
men of ability, and which, I am sure, are a pleasure to myself.
CHAPTER XIII.
1. But let no man require from me such a system of
precepts as is laid down by most authors of books of rules, a system in which I should have to make certain laws, fixed by
immutable necessity, for all students of eloquence, commencing
with the proemium, and what must be the character of it, saying that the statement of facts must come next, and what rule
must be observed in stating them; that after this must come the
proposition, or as some have preferred to call it, the excursion;
and then that there must be a certain order of
questions; adding also other precepts, which some speakers
observe as if it were unlawful to do otherwise, and as if they
were acting under orders; 2. for rhetoric would be a very
easy and small matter, if it could be included in one short
body of rules, but rules must generally be altered to suit
the nature of each individual case, the time, the occasion, and
necessity itself; consequently, one great quality in an orator
is discretion, because he must turn his thoughts in various
directions, according to the different bearings of his subject.
3. What if you should direct a general, that, whenever he draws
up his troops for battle, he must range his front in line, extend
his wings to the right and left, and station his cavalry to defend his flanks? Such a method will perhaps be
the best, as
often as it is practicable; but it will be subject to alteration
from the nature of the ground, if a hill come in the way, if a
river interpose, if obstruction be caused by declivities, woods,
or any other obstacles: 4. the character of the enemy, too,
may make a change necessary, or the nature of the contest in
which he has to engage; and he will have to fight, sometimes
with his troops in extended line, sometimes in the form of
wedges, and to employ, sometimes his auxiliaries, and sometimes his own legions; and sometimes it will be of advantage
to turn his back in pretended flight.
5. In like manner,
whether an exordium be necessary or superfluous, whether it
should be short or long, whether it should be wholly addressed
to the judge, or, by the aid of some figure of speech, directed
occasionally to others, whether the statement of facts should
be concise or copious, continuous or broken, in the order of
events or in any other, the nature of the causes themselves
must show. 6. The case is the same with regard to the order
of examination, since, in the same cause, one question may
often be of advantage to one side, and another question to the
other, to be asked first; for the precepts of oratory are not
established by laws or public decrees, but whatever is contained in them was discovered by expediency. 7. Yet I shall
not deny that it is in general of service to attend to rules, or I
should not write any; but if expediency shall suggest any
thing at variance with them, we shall have to follow it
deserting the authority of teachers.
8. For my part I shall, above all things.
Direct, enjoin, and o'er and o'er repeat,
[A verse from Virgil, Aen. iii. 436]
that an orator, in all his pleadings, should keep two things
in view, what is becoming, and what is expedient; but it
is frequently expedient, and sometimes becoming, to make
some deviations from the regular and settled order, as, in
statues and pictures, we see the dress, look, and attitude,
varied. 8. In a statue, exactly upright, there is but very
little gracefulness, for the face will look straight forward, the arms hang down, the feet will be joined, and the
whole figure, from top to toe, will be rigidity itself; but a
gentle bend, or, to use the expression, motion of the
body, gives a certain animation to figures. Accordingly, the
hands are not always placed in the same position, and a
thousand varieties are given to the countenance.
10. Some
figures are in a running or rushing posture, some are seated
or reclining, some are uncovered, and others veiled, some partake of both conditions. What is more distorted and
elaborate
than the Discobolus of Myron? [See Plin. H. N. xxxiv. 19. Lucian Philopseud. vol. vii. p. 268.
ed. Bip.] Yet if any one should find
fault with that figure for not being upright, would he not
prove himself void of all understanding of the art, in which
the very novelty and difficulty of the execution is what is most
deserving of praise? 11. Such graces and charms rhetorical
figures afford, both such as are in the thoughts and such as
lie in words, for they depart in some degree from the right
line, and exhibit the merit of deviation from common practice.
12. The whole face is generally represented in a painting, yet
Apelles painted the figure of Antigonus with only one side of his face towards the spectator, that its disfigurement from the
loss of an eye might be concealed. Are not some things, in
like manner, to be concealed in speaking, whether, it may be,
because they ought not to be told, or because they cannot be
expressed as they deserve? 13. It was in this way that Timanthes, a painter, I believe, of Cythnus
[see Plin. H. N. xxxv. 36; Cic. Orat. c. 22; Val. Max.
viii. 11, ext. But it has been justly observed that
the painter took the hint from Euripides, Iphig. Aul. 1550.
What Euripides says is, that "Agamemnon, when he saw Iphigenia
going to be sacrificed, uttered a groan, and, turning away his head,
shed
tears, veiling his face with his robe"], acted, in the
picture by which he carried off the prize from Colotes, of
Teium; for when, at the sacrifice of Iphigenia, he had represented Calchas looking sorrowful, Ulysses more sorrowful, and
had given to Menelaus the utmost grief that his art could
depict, not knowing, as his power of representing feeling was
exhausted, how he could fitly paint the countenance of the
father, he threw a veil over his head, and left his grief to be
estimated by the spectator from his own heart.
14. To this
device is not the remark of Sallust somewhat similar, For I
think it better to say nothing concerning Carthage, than to say
but little? For these reasons it has always been customary
with me, to bind myself as little as possible to rules which the
Greeks call καθολικα, and which we, translating the word as
well as we can, term universalia or perpetualia, "general" or
"constant;" for rules are rarely found of such a nature, that
they may not be shaken in some part, or wholly overthrown.
But of rules I shall speak more fully, and of each in its
own place. 15. In the mean time, I would not have young
men think themselves sufficiently accomplished, if they have
learned by art some one of those little books on rhetoric,
which are commonly handed about, and fancy that they are thus
safe under the decrees of theory. The art of speaking depends
on great labor, constant study, varied exercise, repeated trials, the deepest sagacity, and the readiest judgment. 16.
But it is assisted by rules, provided that they point out a fair
road, and not one single wheel-rut, from which he who thinks it
unlawful to decline, must be contented with the slow progress
of those who walk on ropes.
Accordingly, we often quit the
main road, (which has been formed perhaps by the labor of
an army,) being attracted by a shorter path; or if bridges,
broken down by torrents, have intersected the direct way, we
are compelled to go round about; and if the gate be stopped
up by flames, we shall have to force a way through the wall.
17. The work of eloquence is extensive and of infinite variety,
presenting something new almost daily; nor will all that is
possible ever have been said of it. But the precepts which
have been transmitted to us I will endeavor to set forth,
considering, at the same time, which of them are the most
valuable, whether anything in them seems likely to be changed for
the better, and whether any additions may be made to them,
or anything taken from them.
CHAPTER XIV.
1. Some who have translated ρητορικη from Greek into
Latin, have called it ars oratoria and oratrix. I would not
deprive those writers of their due praise, for endeavoring to
add to the copiousness of the Latin language, but all Greek
words do not obey our will, in attempting to render them from
the Greek, as all our words, in like manner, do not obey that
of the Greeks, when they try to express something of ours in
their own tongue. 3. This translation is not less harsh than
the essentia and entia of Flavius [it is probable that he is the same person whom writers in general
call Papirius Fabianus, a contemporary of Seneca, a philosopher well
acquainted with the nature of things, as he is called by Plin. H. N.
xxxvi. 24. But from Sen. Ep. 58, it appears, according
to the emendation of Muretus, now generally adopted, that Cicero had
previously used the word], for the Greek ουσια:
nor is it indeed exact, for oratoria will be taken in the same
sense as elocutoria, oratrix as elocutrix, but the word rhetorice,
of which we are speaking, is the same sort of word as eloquentia,
and it is doubtless used in two senses by the Greeks.
3. In one acceptation it is an adjective, ars rhetorica, as navis
piratica: in the other a substantive, like philosophia or amicitia. We
wish it now to have the signification of a substantive, just as γραμματικη is rendered by the substantive
literatura, not by literatrix, which would be similar to oratrix,
nor by literatoria, which would be similar to oratoria; but for
the word rhetorice, no equivalent Latin word has been found.
4. Let us not, however, dispute about the use of it, especially
as we must adopt many other Greek words; for if I may use
the terms physicus, musicus, geometres, I shall offer no unseemly violence to them by attempting to turn them into
Latin; and since Cicero himself uses a Greek title for the books which he first wrote upon the art, we certainly need
be under no apprehension of appearing to have rashly trusted
the greatest of orators as to the name of his own art.
Rhetoric, then, (for we shall henceforth use this term without dread of sarcastic objections,) will be best divided, in my
opinion, in such a manner, that we may speak first of the art,
next of the artist, and then of the work. The art will be that
which ought to be attained by study, and is the knowledge how
to speak well. The artificer is he who has thoroughly acquired
the art, that is, the orator, whose business is to speak well.
The work is what is achieved by the artificer, that is, good
speaking. All these are to be considered under special heads; but of the
particulars that are to follow, I shall speak in their
several places; at present I shall proceed to consider what
is to be said on the first general head.
CHAPTER XV.
1. First of all, then, we have to consider what rhetoric is.
It is, indeed, defined in various ways; but its definition gives
rise chiefly to two considerations, for the dispute is, in general,
either concerning the quality of the thing itself, or concerning
the comprehension of the terms in which it is defined. The
first and chief difference of opinion on the subject is, that
some think it possible even for bad men to have the name of orators;
while others (to whose opinion I attach myself) maintain that the name, and the art of which we are speaking, can
be conceded only to good men. [This was the opinion also of Cato the
Censor, given in his book De Oratore addressed to his son, as appears from Seneca the father ,
Praef. ad Controv. 1. i.]
2. Of those who separate the talent of speaking from the
greater and more desirable praise of a good life, some have
called rhetoric merely a power, some a science, but not a virtue, some a
habit, some an art, but having nothing in common with science and virtue; some even an abuse of art, that
is, a κακοτεχνια. 3. All these have generally supposed, that
the business of oratory lies either in persuading, or in speaking
in a manner adapted to persuade, for such art may be attained
by one who is far from being a good man. The most common
definition therefore is, that oratory is the power of persuading.
What I call a power, some call a faculty, and others a talent,
but that this discrepancy may be attended with no ambiguity, I mean by power, δυναμις.
4. This opinion had its origin
from Isocrates if the treatise on the art, which is in circulation
under his name, is really his. That rhetorician, though he
had none of the feelings of those who defame the business of
the orator, gives too rash a definition of the art when he says,
"That rhetoric is the worker of persuasion, πειθους
δημιουργος
for I shall not allow myself to use the peculiar term that
Ennius applies to Marcus Cethegus, SUADE medulla.
5. In Plato too, Gorgias, in the Dialogue inscribed with his name,
says almost the same thing; but Plato wishes it to be received as the opinion of Gorgias,
not as his own. Cicero, in several passages [De Orat. i. 31; Quaest.
Acad. i. 8; De Invent. i. 5, init.] of his writings, has said,
that the duty of an orator is to speak in a way adapted to persuade. 6. In his
books on Rhetoric also, but with which, doubtless, he was not satisfied
[he shows his dissatisfaction with his Rhetorica, or books de Inventione,
"qui sibi exciderint," Orat. i. 2, init.], he makes the end of eloquence to be persuasion.
But money, likewise, has the power of persuasion, and
interest, and the authority and dignity of a speaker, and
even his very look, unaccompanied by language, when either the remembrance of the services of any individual, or
a pitiable appearance, or beauty of person, draws forth an
opinion. 7. Thus when Antonius, in his defense of Manius
Aquilius, exhibited on his breast, by tearing his client's robe,
the scars of the wounds which he had received for his
country, he did not trust to the power of his eloquence, but
applied force, as it were, to the eyes of the Roman people,
who, it was thought, were chiefly induced by the sight to
acquit the accused. 8. That Servius Galba [when be was praetor in Spain he had put to death
a body of
Lusitanians after pledging the public faith that their lives should be
spared; an act for which he was accused before the people by the
tribune Libo, who was supported by Cato. See Cic. de
Oral. i. 53] escaped merely
through the pity which he excited, when he not only produced
his own little children before the assembly, but carried round
in his hands the son of Sulpicius Gallus, is testified, not only
by the records of others, but by the speech of Cato. 9.
Phryne too, people think, was freed from peril, not by the
pleading of Hyperides, though it was admirable, but by the exposure of
her figure, which, otherwise most striking, he had uncovered by opening
her robe. If, then, all such things persuade, the definition of which we have spoken is not satisfactory.
10. Those, accordingly, have appeared to themselves more
exact, who, though they have the same general opinion as to
rhetoric, have pronounced it to be the power of persuading by
speaking. This definition Gorgias gives, in the Dialogue which
we have just mentioned, being forced to do so, as it wore, by
Socrates. Theodectes, if the treatise on rhetoric, which is
inscribed with his name, is his, (or it may rather, perhaps, as
has been supposed, be the work of Aristotle,) does not dissent
from Gorgias, for it is asserted in that book, that the object of
oratory is to lead men by speaking to that which the speaker wishes.
11. But not even this definition is sufficiently comprehensive; for not
only the orator, but others, as harlots, flatterers, and seducers, persuade, or lead to that which they
wish, by speaking. But the orator, on the contrary, does not
always persuade; so that sometimes this is not his peculiar
object; sometimes it is an object common to him with others,
who are very different from orators. 13. Yet Apollodorus
varies but little from this definition, as he says, that the first
and supreme object of judicial pleading is to persuade the
judge, and to lead him to whatever opinion the speaker may
wish, for he thus subjects the orator to the power of fortune,
so that, if he does not succeed in persuading, he cannot retain
the name of an orator.
13. Some, on the other hand, detach themselves from all considerations as to the event, as Aristotle,
who says, that oratory is the power of finding out whatever can
persuade in speaking [Rhet. i. 2, 1]. But this definition has not only the
fault of which we have just spoken, but the additional one of
comprehending nothing but invention, which, without elocution,
cannot constitute oratory. 14. To Hermagoras, who says,
that the object of oratory is to speak persuasively, and to
others, who express themselves to the same purpose, though
not in the same words, but tell us that the object of oratory is
to say all that ought to be said in order to persuade, a
sufficient answer was given when we showed that to persuade is
not the business of the orator only.
15. Various other opinions have been added to these, for some have
thought that oratory may be employed about all subjects, others only
about political affairs, but which of these notions is nearer to truth,
I shall inquire in that part of my work which will be devoted to the
question. 16. Aristotle seems to have put everything in the power of
oratory when he says, that it is the power of saying on every subject
whatever can be found to persuade: and such is the case with Patrocles,
who, indeed, does not add on every subject, but, as he
makes no exception, shows that his idea is the same, for he
calls oratory the power of finding whatever is persuasive in
speaking, both which definitions embrace invention alone.
Theodorus, in order to avoid this defect, decides oratory to
be the power of discovering and expressing, with elegance,
whatever is credible on any subject whatever.
17. But, while
one who is not an orator may find out what is credible as well
as what is persuasive, he, by adding on any subject whatever
grants more than the preceding makers of definitions, and
allows the title of a most honorable art to those who may
persuade even to crime. 18. Gorgias, in Plato, calls himself
a master of persuasion in courts of justice and other assemblies,
and says that he treats both of what is just and what is
unjust; and Socrates allows him the art of persuading, but not
of teaching.
19. Those who have not granted all subjects to the orator,
have made distinctions in their definitions, as they were necessitated,
with more anxiety and verbosity. One of these is
Ariston, a disciple of Critolaus, the Peripatetic, whose definition
of oratory is, that it is the science of discovering and
expressing what ought to be said on political affairs, in language
adapted to persuade the people. 20 He considers oratory a
science, because he is a Peripatetic, not a virtue, like the
Stoics [Cicero, de Orat. iii. 18, says that the Stoics alone, of all the
philosophers, have called eloquence virtue and wisdom; see also Acad.
Quaest. i. 2. The Stoics necessarily held this opinion, as they also gave
dialectics and physics the name of virtues, Cic. de Fin.
iii. 21], but, in adding adapted to persuade the people, he
throws dishonor on the art of oratory, as if he thought it
unsuited to persuade the learned.
But of all who think
that the orator is to discourse only on political questions, it
may be said, once for all, that many duties of the orator are
set aside by them; for instance, all laudatory speaking, which
is the third part of oratory [the epideictic, the other two parts being the
deliberative and the judicial]. 21. Theodoras, of Gadara, (to
proceed with those who have thought oratory an art, not a virtue,)
defines more cautiously, for he says, (let me borrow the words of those
who have translated his phraseology from the Greek,) that oratory is an
art that discovers, and judges, and enunciates with suitable eloquence,
according to the measure of that which may be found adapted to
persuading, in any subject connected with political affairs.
22. Cornelius Celsus, in like manner, says that the object of
oratory is to speak persuasively on doubtful and political matters.
To these definitions there are some, not very dissimilar, given by others,
such as this: oratory is the power of judging and discoursing
an such civil questions as are submitted lo it, with a certain
persuasiveness, a certain action of the body, and a certain mode
of delivering what it expresses. 23. There are a thousand
other definitions, but either similar, or composed of similar
elements, which we shall notice when we come to treat upon
the subjects of oratory.
Some have thought it neither a power, nor a science, nor an
art; Critolaus calls it the practice of speaking; (for such is
the meaning of the word τριζη:) Athenaeus, the art of deceiving.
24. But most writers, satisfied with reading a few
passages from Plato's Gorgias [Plato Gorg. sect. 43, seqq. p. 462, ed. Steph.], unskillfully extracted by their
predecessors, (for they neither consult the whole of that
dialogue, nor any of the other writings of Plato,) have fallen
into a very grave error, supposing that that philosopher entertained such an opinion as to think
that oratory was not an art,
but a certain skillfulness in flattering and pleasing; 25. or, as
he says in another place, the simulation of one part of polity,
and the fourth sort of flattery, for he assigns two parts of
polity to the body, medicine, and, as they interpret it, exercise,
and two to the mind, law and justice, and then calls the art of
cooks the flattery or simulation of medicine, and the art of
dealers in slaves the simulation of the effects of exercise, as
they produce a false complexion by paint and the appearance
of strength by unsolid fat; the simulation of legal science he
calls sophistry, and that of justice rhetoric.
26. All this is,
indeed, expressed in that Dialogue, and uttered by Socrates,
under whose person Plato seems to intimate what he thinks;
but some of his dialogues were composed merely to refute those
who argued on the other side, and are called ελεγκτικοι:
others were written to teach, and are called δογματικοι.
27.
But Socrates, or Plato, thought that sort of oratory, which was
then practiced, to be of a dogmatic character, for he speaks of
it as being κατα τουτον τον
τροπον ον υμεις
πολιτευεσθε,
[Sect. 120, p. 500 C] "according to the manner in which you manage public affairs,"
and understands oratory of a sincere and honorable nature.
The dispute with Gorgias is accordingly thus terminated: "It
is therefore necessary that the orator be a just man, and that
the just man should wish to do just things."
[Sect. 35, p. 460 C.]
28 When this has been said, Gorgias is silent, but Polus resumes the subject,
who, from the ardor of youth, is somewhat inconsiderate, and
in reply to whom the remarks on simulation and flattery are
made. Callicles, who is even more vehement, speaks next, but is reduced
to the conclusion, that "he who would be a true orator must be a just
man, and must know what is just;" [Sect. 136, p. 508
C]
and it is therefore evident, that oratory was not considered by
Plato an evil, but that he thought true oratory could not be
attained by any but a just and good man. 29. In the Phaedrus he sets forth still more clearly, that the art cannot be fully
acquired without a knowledge of justice, an opinion to which I
also assent. Would Plato, if he had held any other sentiments, have written the Defense of Socrates, and the Eulogy
of those who fell in defense of their country, compositions
which are certainly work for the orator? [Plato wrote a funeral oration on some Athenians who had fallen
in battle [Menexenus?]; a composition, says Cicero, which was so well received, that
it was recited publicly on a certain day in every year.]
30. But he has
even inveighed against that class of men who used their
abilities in speaking for bad ends. Socrates also thought the
speech, which Lysias had written for him when accused, improper for him to use, though it was a general practice, at that
time, to compose for parties appearing before the judges
speeches which they themselves might deliver; and thus
an elusion of the law, by which one man was not allowed
to speak for another, was effected. 31. By Plato, also,
those who separated oratory from justice, and preferred what is probable to what is true, were thought no proper
teachers of the art, for so he signifies, too, in his Phaedrus.
32. Cornelius Celsus, moreover, may be thought to have been
of the same opinion with those to whom I have just referred,
for his words are, the orator aims only at the semblance of
truth; and he adds, a little after, not purity of conscience, but the
victory of his client, is the reward of the pleader. Were such
assertions true, it would become only the worst of men to give such
pernicious weapons to the most mischievous of characters, and to aid dishonesty with precepts; but let those
who hold this opinion consider what ground they have for it.
33. Let me, for my part, as I have undertaken to form a
perfect orator, whom I would have, above all, to be a good
man, return to those who have better thoughts of the art.
Some have pronounced oratory to be identical with civil
polity; Cicero calls it a part of civil polity; and a knowledge
of civil polity, he thinks, is nothing less than wisdom itself.
Some have made it a part of philosophy, among whom is
Isocrates. 34. With this character of it, the definition that
oratory is the science of speaking well, agrees excellently, for
it embraces all the virtues of oratory at once, and includes also
the character of the true orator, as he cannot speak well
unless he be a good man. 35. To the same purpose is the
definition of Chrysippus, derived from Cleanthes ["Cleanthes wrote a treatise on the art of rhetoric, and so did
Chrysippus, but their writings were of such a nature that if a man
wished his mouth closed for ever he has nothing to do but read them."
Cic. de Fin. iv. 3], the science
of speaking properly. There are more definitions in the same
philosopher, but they relate rather to other questions.
A definition framed in these terms, to persuade to what is necessary,
would convey the same notion, except that it makes the art
depend on the result. 36. Areus [he may possibly have been the Stoic philosopher of Alexandria,
for whose sake Caesar Octavianus spared that city; see Plut. in Anton.
p. 953 A] defines oratory well, saying that it is to speak according to the excellence of speech.
Those also exclude bad men from oratory who consider it as
the knowledge of civil duties, since they deem such knowledge
virtue; but they confine it within too narrow bounds, and to
political questions. Albutius [Caius Albucius Silus, of Novaria, a rhetorician of the age of
Augustus. See Senec. Rhet. Contr. iii. praef. p. 197 Bip.; also Sueton.
de Rhet. 6], no obscure professor or author,
allows that it is the art of speaking well, but errs in giving it
limitations, adding, on political questions, and with probability,
of both which restrictions I have already disposed; those, too,
are men of good intention, who consider it the business of
oratory to think and speak rightly.
37. These are almost all the most celebrated definitions, and
those about which there is the most controversy; for to
discuss all would neither be much to the purpose, nor would
be in my power; since a foolish desire, as I think, has prevailed among the writers of treatises on rhetoric, to define
nothing in the same terms that another had already used; a
vain-glorious practice which shall be far from me. 38. For I
shall say, not what I shall invent, but what I shall approve;
as, for instance, that oratory is the art of speaking well;
since, when the best definition is found, he who seeks for
another must seek for a worse.
This being admitted, it is evident at the same time what
object, what highest and ultimate end, oratory has; that object
or end which is called in Greek τελος, and to which every art
tends; for if oratory be the art of speaking well, its object and
ultimate end must be to speak well.
CHAPTER XVI.
1. Next comes the question whether oratory is useful; for
some are accustomed to declaim violently against it, and, what
is most ungenerous, to make use of the power of oratory to lay
accusations against oratory; 2. they say that eloquence is that
which saves the wicked from punishment; by the dishonesty of
which the innocent are at times condemned; by which deliberations are influenced to the worse; by which not only
popular seditions and tumults, but even inexpiable wars, are
excited; and of which the efficacy is the greatest when it exerts
itself for falsehood against truth. 3. Even to Socrates, the comic
writers make it a reproach that he taught how to make the worse
reason appear the better; and Plato on his part says that Tisias and Gorgias
["Tisias and Gorgias, by the power of words, make small things
great, and great things small." Plato Phaedr. p. 217, A.; see also p.
273, A, B, C] professed the same art. 4. To these
they add examples from Greek and Roman history, and give a
list of persons who, by exerting such eloquence aa was mischievous, not only to individuals but to communities, have
disturbed or overthrown the constitutions of whole states;
asserting that eloquence on that account was banished from the
state of Lacedaemon, and that even at Athens, where the
orator was forbidden to move the passions, the powers of
eloquence were in a manner curtailed. 5. Under such a mode of reasoning, neither will generals,
nor magistrates, nor medicine, nor even wisdom itself, be of
any utility; for Flaminius [the general who was defeated by Hannibal at the lake Thrasimenus] was a general, and the Gracchi,
Saturnini, and Glauciae were magistrates; in the hands of physicians
poisons have been found; and among those who abuse the name of
philosophers have been occasionally detected the most horrible crimes.
6. We must reject food, for it has often given rise to ill health; we
must never go under roofs, for they sometimes fall upon those who dwell
beneath them; a sword must not be forged for a soldier, for a robber may
use the same weapon. Who does not know that fire and water, without
which life cannot exist, and, (that I may not confine myself to things
of earth,) that the sun and moon, the chief of the celestial luminaries,
sometimes produce hurtful effects?
7. Will it be denied, however, that the blind Appius, by the
force of his eloquence, broke off a dishonorable treaty of peace
about to be concluded with Pyrrhus? Was not the divine
eloquence of Cicero, in opposition to the agrarian laws, even
popular? [A speech against the agrarian laws could not have been well
received by the people, without being in the highest degree forcible and
eloquent. "While you spoke, (O Cicero!) the tribes relinquished the
agrarian law, that is, their own meat and drink." Plin. H. N. vii. 31.] Did it not quell the daring of Catiline, and gain,
in the toga, the honor of thanksgivings, the highest that is given to
generals victorious in the field? 8. Does not oratory often free the
alarmed minds of soldiers from fear and persuade them, when they are going to face so many perils in
battle, that glory is better than life?
Nor indeed would the Lacedaemonians and Athenians influence me more than the
people of Rome, among whom the highest respect has always
been paid to orators. 9. Nor do I think that founders of cities
would have induced their unsettled multitudes to form themselves into communities by any other means than by the influence of the art of speaking
[see Cicero de Inv. i. 2; De Orat. i. 8]; nor would legislators, without the
utmost power of oratory, have prevailed on men to bind themselves
to submit to the dominion of law. 10. Even the very rules
for the conduct of life, beautiful as they are by nature, have
yet greater power in forming the mind when the radiance of
eloquence illumines the beauty of the precepts. Though the
weapons of eloquence, therefore, have effect in both directions,
it is not just that that should be accounted an evil which we
may use to a good purpose.
11. But these points may perhaps be left to the consideration of those who think that the substance of eloquence lies
in the power to persuade. But if eloquence be the art of
speaking well, (the definition which I adopt,) so that a true
orator must be, above all, a good man, it must assuredly be
acknowledged that it is a useful art. 12. In truth, the
sovereign deity, the parent of all things, the architect of the world, has distinguished man from other beings, such at least
as were to be mortal, by nothing more than by the faculty of
speech. 13. Bodily frames superior in size, in strength, in
firmness, in endurance, in activity, we see among dumb creatures, and observe, too, that they have less need than we
have of external assistance. To walk, to feed themselves,
to swim over water, they learn, in less time than we can, from
nature herself, without the aid of any other teacher. 14.
Most of them, also, are equipped against cold by the produce
of their own bodies; weapons for their defense are born with
them; and their food lies before their faces; to supply all
which wants mankind have the greatest difficulty.
The divinity has therefore given us reason, superior to all other
qualities, and appointed us to be sharers of it with the immortal gods.
15. But reason could neither profit us so much, nor manifest itself so
plainly within us, if we could not express by speech what we have
conceived in our minds; a faculty which we see wanting in other animals,
far more than, to a certain degree, understanding and reflection. 16.
For to contrive habitations, to construct nests, to bring up their young,
to hatch them, to lay up provision for the winter, to produce
works inimitable by us, (as those of wax and honey,) is perhaps
a proof of some portion of reason; but as, though they do such
things, they are without the faculty of speech, they are called
dumb and irrational. 17. Even to men, to whom speech has
been denied, of how little avail is divine reason!
If, therefore,
we have received from the gods nothing more valuable than
speech, what can we consider more deserving of cultivation
and exercise? or in what can we more strongly desire to be
superior to other men, than in that by which man himself is
superior to other animals, especially as in no kind of exertion
does labor more plentifully bring its reward? 18. This will
be so much the more evident, if we reflect from what origin,
and to what extent, the art of eloquence has advanced, and
how far it may still be improved. 19. For, not to mention
how beneficial it is, and how becoming in a man of virtue, to
defend his friends, to direct a senate or people by his counsels,
or to lead an army to whatever enterprise he may desire, is it
not extremely honorable to attain, by the common understanding and words which all men use, so high a degree of esteem and glory as to appear not to speak or plead, but, as
was the case with Pericles, to hurl forth lightning and thunder?
CHAPTER XVII.
1. There would be no end if I should allow myself to expatiate, and indulge my inclination, on this head. Let us
proceed, therefore, to the question that follows, whether oratory
be an art. 2. That it is an art, every one of those who have
given rules about eloquence has been so far from doubting,
that it is shown by the very titles of their books, that they are
written on the oratorical art; and Cicero also says, that what
is called oratory is artificial eloquence. This distinction, it is
not only orators that have claimed for themselves, (since they
may be thought, perhaps, to have given their profession something more than its due,) but the philosophers, the Stoics, and
most of the Peripatetics, agree with them.
3. For myself, I
confess, that I was in some doubt whether I should look upon
this part of the inquiry as necessary to be considered; for who
is so destitute, I will not say of learning, but of the common
understanding of mankind, as to imagine that the work of
building, or weaving, or molding vessels out of clay, is an
art, but that oratory, the greatest and noblest of works, has
attained such a height of excellence without being an art? Those, indeed, who have maintained the contrary opinion, I
suppose not so much to have believed what they advanced, as
to have been desirous of exercising their powers on a subject
of difficulty, like Polycrates, when he eulogized Busiris and
Clytaemnestra; though he is said also to have written the
speech that was delivered against Socrates; nor would that indeed have been inconsistent with his other compositions.
5. Some will have oratory to be a natural talent, though
they do not deny that it may be assisted by art. Thus
Antonius, in Cicero de Oratore [i. 20; ii. 7, 8], says that oratory is an effect
of observation, not an art; but this is not advanced that we
may receive it as true, but that the character of Antonius, an
orator who tried to conceal the art that he used, may be supported. 6. But Lysias seems to have really entertained this
opinion; for which the argument is, that the ignorant, and
barbarians, and slaves, when they speak for themselves, say
something that resembles an exordium, they state facts, prove,
refute, and (adopting the form of a peroration) deprecate.
7. The supporters of this notion also avail themselves of certain
quibbles upon words, that nothing that proceeds from art was
before art, but that mankind have always been able to speak
for themselves and against others; that teachers of the art
appeared only in later times, and first of all about the age of
Tisias and Corax [Corax was a Sicilian, who, about B.C. 470, secured himself great
influence at Syracuse by means of his oratorical powers. He is said
to have been the earliest writer on rhetoric. Tisias was his pupil.
See Cic. Brut. 12; de Orat. i. 20; Quint, iii. 1, 8]; that oratory was therefore before art, and
is consequently not an art.
8. As to the period, indeed, in
which the teaching of oratory commenced, I am not anxious
to inquire; we find Phoenix, however, in Homer [Il.
ix. 432], as an
instructor, not only in acting but in speaking, as well as
several other orators; we see all the varieties of eloquence in
the three generals [the copious style in the oratory of Nestor; the
simple in that of
Menelaus; and the middle in that of Ulysses. See Aul. Gell. vii. 4;
Clarke ad Il. iii. 213], and contests in eloquence proposed
among the young men [Il. xv. 284], and among the figures on the shield
of Achilles [Il. xviii. 497-508] are represented both law-suits and pleaders.
9. It would even be sufficient for me to observe, that everything
which art has brought to perfection had its origin in nature,
else, from the number of the arts must be excluded medicine,
which resulted from the observation of what was beneficial or
detrimental to health, and which, as some think, consists
wholly in experiments, for somebody had, doubtless, bound up a wound
before the dressing of wounds became an art, and had allayed fever by
repose and abstinence, not because he saw the reason of such regimen,
but because the malady itself drove him to it.
10. Else, too, architecture must not be considered an
art, for the first generation of men built cottages
without art; nor music, since singing and dancing, to some sort
of tune, are practiced among all nations. 11. So, if any kind
of speaking whatever is to be called oratory, I will admit that
oratory existed before it was an art; but if every one that
speaks is not an orator, and if men in early times did not
speak as orators, our reasoners must confess that an orator is
formed by art, and did not exist before art. This being
admitted, another argument which they use is set aside,
namely, that that has no concern with art which a man who has
not learned it can do, but that men who have not learned
oratory can make speeches. 12. To support this argument
they observe, that Demades [Sext. Empir. p. 291. Fabric. Harl.
ii. p. 868], a waterman, and Aeschines [Demosth. pro Cor. p. 307, 314, 329, ed. Reisk], an
actor, were orators; but they are mistaken; for he who has not learned
to be an orator cannot properly be called one, and it may be more justly
said, that those men learned late in life, than that they never learned
at all; though Aeschines, indeed;
had some introduction to learning in his youth, as his father
was a teacher; nor is It certain that Demades did not learn;
and he might, by constant practice in speaking, which is the
most efficient mode of learning, have made himself master of
all the power of language that he ever possessed. 13. But
we may safely say, that he would have been a better speaker
if he had learned, for he never ventured to write out his
speeches for publication [Cic. Brut. c. 9; Quint. xii.
10, 49], though we know that he produced
considerable effect in delivering them.
14. Aristotle, for the sake of investigation, as is usual with him
has conceived, with his peculiar subtlety, certain arguments at variance with my opinion in his Gryllus
[the work is lost. Gryllus was the son of Xenophon, that was
killed at Mantineia. Aristotle seems to have borrowed his name; and
he related, according to Diog. Laert. ii. 58, that many eulogies were
written on Gryllus, even for the sake of pleasing his father. The
Gryllus of Aristotle is mentioned by Diog. Laert. v. 22]; but he has also
written three books on the art of rhetoric, in the first of which
he not only admits that it is an art, but allows it a connection
with civil polity, as well as with logic [Rhet. i. 2,
1]. 15. Critolaus, and
Athenodorus, of Rhodes, have advanced many arguments on
the opposite side. Agnon, by the very title of his book, in
which he avows that he brings an accusation against rhetoric,
has deprived himself of all claim to be trusted. As to Epicurus
[see xii. 2, 24; Cic. de Fin. i. 7], who shrunk from all learning, I am not at all
surprised at him.
16. These reasoners say a great deal, but it is based upon
few arguments; I shall therefore reply to the strongest of
them in a very few words, that the discussion may not be
protracted to an infinite length. 17. Their first argument is
with regard to the subject or matter, "for all arts," they say,
"have some subject," as is true, "but that
oratory has no peculiar subject," an assertion which I shall subsequently prove
to be false. 18. The next argument is a more false charge,
for "no art," they say, "acquiesces in false conclusions, since
art cannot be founded but on perception, which is always
true; but that oratory adopts false conclusions, and is, consequently, not an art." 19. That oratory sometimes advances
what is false instead of what is true, I will admit, but I shall
not for that reason acknowledge that the speaker acquiesces in
false conclusions, for it is one thing for a matter to appear in
a certain light to a person himself, and another for the person
to make it appear in that light to others.
A general often
employs false representations, as did Hanniibal, when, being
hemmed in by Fabius, he tied faggots to the horns of oxen,
and set them on fire, and, driving the herd up the opposite
hills in the night, presented to the enemy the appearance of a
retiring army; but Hannibal merely deceived Fabius; he himself knew very well what the reality was. 20. Theopompus,
the Lacedaemonian, when, on changing clothes with his wife,
he escaped from prison in the disguise of a woman, came to
no false conclusion concerning himself, though he conveyed a
false notion to his guards. So the orator, whenever he puts
what is false for what is true, knows that it is false, and that
he is stating it instead of truth; he adopts, therefore, no false
conclusion himself, but merely misleads another. 21. Cicero,
when he threw a mist, as he boasts, over the eyes of the judges
in the cause of Cluentius, was not himself deprived of sight;
nor is a painter, when, by the power of his art, he makes us
fancy that some objects stand out in a picture, and others
recede, unaware that the objects are all on a flat surface.
22. But they allege also, that "all arts have a certain
definite end to which they are directed; but that in oratory there
is sometimes no end at all, and, at other times, the end which
is professed is not attained." They speak falsely, however, in
this respect likewise, for we have already shown, that oratory
has an end, and have stated what that end is, an end which
the true orator will always attain, for he will always speak
well. 23. The objection might, perhaps, hold good against
those who think that the end of oratory is to persuade, but my
orator and his art, as defined by me, do not depend upon the
result; he indeed who speaks directs his efforts towards victory, but when he has spoken well, though he may not be
victorious, he has attained the full end of his art. 24. So a
pilot is desirous to gain the port with his vessel in safety, but
if he is carried away from it by a tempest, he will not be the
less a pilot, and will repeat the well-known saying, "May I
but keep the helm right!" [A proverbial expression, from the Greek ορθαν
ταν ναυν; a
portion of a prayer to Neptune: Grant, O Neptune, that I may guide
the ship right.]
25. The physician makes the
health of the patient his object, but if, through the violence of
the disease, the intemperance of the sick person, or any other
circumstance, he does not effect his purpose, yet, if he has done everything according to rule, he has not lost sight of the
object of medicine. So it is the object of an orator to speak well, for
his art, as we shall soon show still more clearly, consists in the act, and not in the result. 26. That other allegation, which is frequently made, must accordingly be false also,
that an art knows when it has attained its end, but that oratory
does not know, for every speaker is aware when he has spoken
well.
They also charge oratory with having recourse to vicious
means, which no true arts adopt, because it advances what is
false, and endeavors to excite the passions. 27. But neither
of those means is dishonorable, when it is used from a good
motive, and, consequently, cannot be vicious. To tell a falsehood is sometimes allowed, even to a wise man
[Cic. Off. ii. 14, 16, 17]; and the
orator will be compelled to appeal to the feelings of the judges,
if they cannot otherwise be induced to favor the right side.
28. Unenlightened men sit as judges [the reader will remember that the judices of the Romans were
similar to our jurymen, but more numerous], who must, at times, be
deceived, that they may not err in their decisions. If indeed
judges were wise men; if assemblies of the people, and every
sort of public council, consisted of wise men; if envy, favor,
prejudice, and false witnesses, had no influence, there would
be very little room for eloquence, which would be employed
almost wholly to give pleasure. 29. But as the minds of the
hearers waver, and truth is exposed to so many obstructions,
the orator must use artifice in his efforts, and adopt such means
as may promote his purpose, since he who has turned from the
right way cannot be brought back to it but by another turning.
30. Some common sarcasms against oratory are drawn from
the charge, that orators speak on both sides of a question;
hence the remarks, that "no art contradicts itself, but that
oratory contradicts itself;" that "no art destroys what it has
itself done, but that this is the case with what oratory does;"
that "it teaches either what we ought to say, or what we ought not to say, and that, in the one case, it cannot be an art,
because it teaches what is not to be said, and, in the other, it
cannot be an art, because, when it has taught what is to be
said, it teaches also what is directly opposed to it." 31. All these charges, it is evident, are applicable only to that species
of oratory which is repudiated by a good man and by virtue
herself; since, where the cause is unjust, there true oratory
has no place, so that it can hardly happen, even in the most
extraordinary case, that a real orator, that is, a good man, will
speak on both sides.
32. Yet, since it may happen, in the
course of things, that just causes may, at times, lead two wise
men to take different sides, (for the Stoics think that wise men
may even contend with one another, if reason leads them
to do so,) I will make some reply to the objections, and
in such a way that they shall be proved to be advanced
groundlessly, and directed only against such as allow the
name of orator to speakers of bad character. 33, For
oratory does not contradict itself; one cause is matched against
another cause, but not oratory against itself. If two men,
who have been taught the same accomplishment, contend
with one another, the accomplishment which they have been
taught will not, on that account, be proved not to be an art;
for, if such were the case, there could be no art in arms, because gladiators, bred under the same master, are often
matched together; nor would there be any art in piloting a
ship, because, in naval engagements, pilot is often opposed to
pilot; nor in generalship, because general contends with
general.
34. Nor does oratory destroy what it has done, for
the orator does not overthrow the argument advanced by himself, nor does
oratory overthrow it, because, by those who think that the end of
oratory is to persuade, as well as by the two wise men, whom, as I said
before, some chance may have opposed to one another, it is probability
that is sought; and if, of two things, one at length appears more
probable than the other, the more probable is not opposed to that which
previously appeared probable; for as that which is more white is
not adverse to that which is less white, nor that which is more
sweet contrary to that which is less sweet, so neither is that
which is more probable contrary to that which is less probable.
35. Nor does oratory ever teach what we ought not to say, or
that which is contrary to what we ought to say, but that which
we ought to say in whatever cause we may take in hand. 36.
And truth, though generally, is not always to be defended;
the public good sometimes requires that a falsehood should be
supported.
In Cicero's second book De Oratore [C. 7. The words are put into the mouth of Antonius], are also advanced
the following objections: that art has place in things which
are known, but that the pleading of an orator depends on
opinion, not on knowledge, since he both addresses himself to
those who do not know, and sometimes says what he himself
does not know. 37. One of these points, whether the judges
have a knowledge of what is addressed to them, has nothing
to do with the art of the orator; to the other, that art has
place in things which are known, I must give some answer.
Oratory is the art of speaking well, and the orator knows how
to speak well. 38. But it is said, he does not know whether
what he says is true; neither do the philosophers, who say
that fire, or water, or the four elements, or indivisible atoms,
are the principles from which all things had their origin,
know that what they say is true; nor do those who calculate
the distances of the stars, and the magnitudes of the sun and
the earth, yet every one of them calls his system an art;
but if their reasoning has such effect that they seem not to
imagine, but, from the force of their demonstrations, to know
what they assert, similar reasoning may have a similar effect
in the case of the orator.
39. But, it is further urged, he does
not know whether the cause which he advocates has truth on
its side; nor, I answer, does the physician know whether the
patient, who says that he has the head-ache, really has it, yet
he will treat him on the assumption that his assertion is true,
and medicine will surely be allowed to be an art. Need I add,
that oratory does not always purpose to say what is true, but
does always purpose to say what is like truth? but the orator
must know whether what he says is like truth or not. 40.
Those who are unfavorable to oratory add, that pleaders often
defend, in certain causes, that which they have assailed in
others; but this is the fault, not of the art, but of the person.
These are the principal charges that are brought against
oratory. There are others of less moment, but drawn from
the same sources.
41. But that it is an art, may be proved in a very few
words; for whether, as Cleanthes maintained, an art is a
power working its effects by a course, that is by method, no man
will doubt that there is a certain course and method in
oratory; or whether that definition, approved by almost everybody, that an art consists of perceptions consenting and co-operating to some end useful to life, be adopted also by us, we
have already shown that everything to which this definition
applies is to be found in oratory. 42. Need I show that it
depends on understanding and practice, like other arts? If
logic be an art, as is generally admitted, oratory must certainly
be an art, as it differs from logic rather in species than in
genus. Nor must we omit to observe that in whatever pursuit
one man may act according to a method, and another without
regard to that method, that pursuit is an art; and that in
whatever pursuit he who has learned succeeds better than he
who has not learned, that pursuit is an art.
43. But, in the pursuit of oratory, not only will the learned
excel the unlearned, but the more learned will excel the less
learned; otherwise there would not be so many rules in it,
or so many great men to teach it. This ought to be acknowledged by every one, and especially by me, who allow the
attainment of oratory only to the man of virtue.
CHAPTER XVIII.
1. But as some arts consist merely in an insight into things,
that is, knowledge of them, and judgment concerning them,
such as astronomy, which requires no act, but is confined to
a mere understanding of the matters that form the subject
of it (a sort of art which is called θεωρητικη, "theoretic");
others in action, the object of which lies in the act, and is
fulfilled in it, leaving nothing produced from it (a sort of art
which is called πρακτικη, "practic"), as dancing; 2. others in
production, which attain their end in the execution of the
work which is submitted to the eye (a sort which we call ποιητικη,
"productive"), as painting, we may pretty safely
determine that oratory consists in act, for it accomplishes in
the act all that it has to do. Such indeed has been the judgment pronounced upon it by every one.
3. To me, however, it appears to partake greatly of the other
sort of arts; for the subject of it may sometimes be restricted
to contemplation; since there will be oratory in an orator even
though he be silent; and if, either designedly, or from being
disabled by any accident, he has ceased to plead, he will not
cease to be an orator, more than a physician who has left off practice ceases to a physician. 4. There is some enjoyment, and
perhaps the greatest of all enjoyments, in retired meditation,
and the pleasure derived from knowledge is pure when it is
withdrawn from action, that is, from toil, and enjoys the calm
contemplation of itself. 5. But oratory will also effect something similar to a productive art in written speeches and historical
compositions, a kind of writings which we justly consider as allied to
oratory. Yet if it must be classed as one of the three sorts of arts
which I have mentioned, let it, as its performance consists chiefly in the mere act, and as it is most
frequently exhibited in act, be called an active, or a practical
art, for the one term is of the same signification as the other.
CHAPTER XIX.
1. I am aware that it is also a question whether nature or learning
contributes most to oratory. This inquiry, however, has no concern with
the subject of my work; for a perfect orator can be formed only with the
aid of both; but I think it of great importance how far we consider that
there is a question on the point. 2. If you suppose either to be
independent of the other, nature will be able to do much without
learning, but learning will be of no avail without the assistance of
nature. But if they be united in equal parts, I shall be inclined to
think that, when both are but moderate, the influence of nature is
nevertheless the greater; but finished orators, I consider, owe more to
learning than to nature.
Thus the best
husbandman cannot improve soil of no fertility, while from fertile
ground something good will be produced even without the aid of
the husbandman; yet if the husbandman bestows his labor on
rich land, he will produce more effect than the goodness of the
soil of itself. 3. Had Praxiteles attempted to hew a statue out
of a millstone, I should have preferred to it an unhewn block
of Parian marble; but if that statuary had fashioned the marble, more
value would have accrued to it from his workmanship than was in the marble itself. In a word, nature is
the material for learning; the one forms, and the other is
formed. Art can do nothing without material; material has
its value even independent of art; but perfection of art is of
more consequence than perfection of material.
CHAPTER XX.
1. It is a question of a higher nature, whether oratory is to
be regarded as one of those indifferent arts, which deserve
neither praise nor blame in themselves, but become useful or
otherwise according to the characters of those who practice
them; or whether it is, as many of the philosophers are of
opinion, a positive virtue.
2. The way, indeed, in which many have proceeded and still
proceed in the practice of speaking, I consider either as no art,
ατεχνεια, as it is called, (for I see numbers rushing to speak
without rule or learning, just as impudence or hunger has
prompted them,) or as it were a bad art, which we term κακοτεχνια; for I imagine that there have been many who
have exerted, and that there are some who still exert, their
talent in speaking to the injury of mankind. 3. There is also
a kind of ματαιοτεχνια, a vain imitation of art, which indeed
has in itself neither good nor evil, but a mere frivolous exercise of skill, such as that of the man who sent grains of vetches,
shot from a distance in succession, and without missing,
through a needle, and whom Alexander, after witnessing his
dexterity, is said to have presented with a bushel of vetches;
which was indeed a most suitable reward for his performance.
4. To him I compare those who spend their time, with great
study and labor, in the composition of declamations, which
they strive to make as unlike as possible to anything that
happens in real life.
But that oratory which I endeavor to teach, of which I conceive the idea in my mind, which is attainable only by a good
man, and which alone is true oratory, must be regarded as a virtue. 5. This is an opinion which the philosophers support by many
subtle arguments, but which appears to me to be more clearly
established by the simpler mode of proof which follows, and
which is peculiarly my own. What is said by the philosophers
is this: If it is a quality of virtue to be consistent with itself
as to what ought to be done and what ought not to be done,
(that quality, namely, which is called prudence,) the same
quality will have its office as to what ought to be said or not to
be said.
6. And if there are virtues, for the generation of
which, even before we receive any instruction, certain principles and seeds are given us by nature, (as for that of justice,
of which some notion is manifested even in the most ignorant
and the most barbarous,) it is evident that we are so formed
originally as to be able to speak for ourselves, though not
indeed perfectly, yet in such a manner as to show that certain seeds of the faculty of eloquence are in us. 7. But in
those arts which have no connection with virtue, there is not
the same nature. As there are two kinds of speech, therefore,
the continuous, which is called oratory, and the concise,
which is termed logic, (which Zeno thought so nearly connected
that he compared the one to a clenched fist, and the other to
an open hand,) if the art of disputation be a virtue, there will
be no doubt of the virtue of that which is of so much more
noble and expansive a nature.
But I wish the reader to understand this more fully and
plainly from what is done by oratory; for how will an orator
succeed in eulogy, unless he has a clear knowledge of what is
honorable and what is disgraceful? Or in persuasion, unless he
understands what is advantageous? Or in judicial pleadings, unless he
has a knowledge of justice? Does not oratory also demand fortitude, as the orator has often to speak in opposition to
the turbulent threats of the populace, often with perilous defiance
of powerful individuals, and sometimes, as on the trial of Milo, amidst surrounding weapons of soldiers? So that if oratory be
not a virtue, it cannot be perfect.
9. If, moreover, there is a sort of virtue in every species of
animals, in which it excels the rest, or the greater number, of other
animals, as force in the lion, and swiftness in the horse, and it is
certain that man excels other animals in reason and speech, why should
we not consider that the distinctive virtue of man lies as much in
eloquence as in reason? Crassus in Cicero [De Orat.
iii. 14] justly makes an assertion to this effect:
"For eloquence," says he, "is one of the most eminent virtues;" and Cicero himself, in his own character, both in his
epistles to Brutus, and in many other passages of his writings
[Partit. Orat. c. 23, init.; Acad. Q. i. 2],
calls eloquence a virtue.
10. But, it may be alleged, a vicious man will sometimes produce an exordium, a statement of facts, and a series of arguments, in such a way that nothing shall be desired in them.
So, we may answer, a robber will fight with great bravery, yet
fortitude will still be a virtue; and a dishonest slave will bear
torments without a groan, yet endurance of pain will still merit
its praise. Many other things of the same nature occur, but
from different principles of action. Let what I have said,
therefore, as to eloquence being a virtue, be sufficient, for of
its usefulness I have treated above.
CHAPTER XXI.
1. As to the material of oratory, some have said that it is
speech; an opinion which Gorgias in Plato [Plato Gorg.
p. 449 E] is represented as
holding. If this be understood in such a way that a discourse,
composed on any subject, is to be termed a speech, it is
not the material, but the work; as the statue is the work of a
statuary; for speeches, like statues, are produced by art. But
if by this term we understand mere words, words are of no
effect without matter. 2. Some have said that the material
of oratory is persuasive arguments; which indeed are part of
its business, and are the produce of art, but require material
for their composition. Others say that its material is questions
of civil administration; an opinion which is wrong, not
as to the quality of the matter, but in the restriction attached;
for such questions are the subject of oratory, but not the only
subject.
3. Some, as oratory is a virtue, say that the subject
of it is the whole of human life. Others, as no part of human
life is affected by every virtue, but most virtues are concerned
only with particular portions of life, (as justice, fortitude,
temperance, are regarded as confined to their proper duties
and their own limits,) say that oratory is to be restricted to
one special part, and assign to it the pragmatic department of
ethics, or that which relates to the transactions of civil life.
4. For my part, I consider, and not without authorities to
support me, that the material of oratory is everything that
may come before an orator for discussion. For Socrates in
Plato seems to say to Gorgias [Gorg. p. 449-454]
that the matter of oratory is not in words but in things. In the Phaedrus
[P. 261 A] he plainly shows that
oratory has place, not only in judicial proceedings and political
deliberations, but also in private and domestic matters. Hence it is manifest that this was the opinion of Plato
himself. 6. Cicero, too, in one passage [De Orat. i.
15; Inv. i. 4], calls the material
of oratory the topics which are submitted to it for discussion,
but supposes that particular topics only are submitted to it.
But in another passage [De Orat. i. 6] he gives his opinion that an orator
has to speak upon all subjects, expressing himself in the
following words: "The art of the orator, however, and his very profession of speaking well, seems to undertake and
promise that he will speak elegantly and copiously on whatever subject may be proposed to him." 6. In a third passage
[De Orat. iii. 14],
also, he says: " But by an orator, whatever occurs in human
life (since it is on human life that an orator's attention is to
be fixed, as the matter that comes under his consideration)
ought to have been examined, heard of, read, discussed, handled, and managed."
7. But this material of oratory, as we define it, that is, the
subjects that come before it, some have at one time stigmatized
as indefinite, at another as not belonging to oratory, and have
called it, as thus characterized, an ars circumcurrens, an infinitely
discursive art, as discoursing on any kind of subject. 8. With
such as make these observations I have no great quarrel; for
they allow that oratory speaks on all matters, though they deny
that it has any peculiar material, because its material is manifold.
9. But though the material be manifold, it is not infinite; and
other arts, of less consideration, deal with manifold material,
as architecture, for instance, for it has to do with everything
that is of use for building; and the art of engraving, which
works with gold, silver, brass, and iron. As to sculpture, it
extends itself, besides the metals which I have just named,
to wood, ivory, marble, glass, and jewels.
10. Nor will a topic
cease to belong to the orator because the professor of another
art may treat of it; for if I should ask what is the material of
the statuary, the answer will be "brass;" or if I should ask
what is the material of the founder of vases, that is the worker
in the art which the Greeks call χαλκευτικη, the reply would
also be " brass;" though vases differ very much from statues.
11. Nor ought medicine to lose the name of an art, because
anointing and exercise are common to it with the palaestra, or
because a knowledge of the quality of meats is common to it
with cookery.
12. As to the objection which some make, that it is the
business of philosophy to discourse of what is good, useful,
and just, it makes nothing against me; for when they say a
philosopher, they mean a good man; and why then should I
be surprised that an orator, whom I consider to be also a good
man, should discourse upon the same subjects? 13. especially
when I have shown, in the preceding book, that philosophers
have taken possession of this province because it was abandoned by the orators, a province which had always belonged
to oratory, so that the philosophers are rather trespassing
upon our ground. Since it is the business of logic, too, to discuss whatever comes before it, and logic is uncontinuous oratory, why may not the business of continuous oratory be
thought the same?
14. It is a remark constantly made by some, that an orator
must he skilled in all arts if he is to speak upon all subjects. I
might reply to this in the words of Cicero [De Orat. i.
6], in whom I find
this passage: "In my opinion no man can become a thoroughly
accomplished orator, unless he shall have attained a knowledge
of every subject of importance, and of all the liberal arts;" but
for my argument it is sufficient that an orator be acquainted
with the subject on which he has to speak. 15. He has not
a knowledge of all causes, and yet he ought to be able to speak
upon all. On what causes, then, will he speak? on such as he has learned. The same will be the case also with regard to
the arts and sciences; those on which he shall have to speak
he will study for the occasion, and on those which he has
studied he will speak.
16. What then, it may be said, will not a builder speak of
building, or a musician of music, better than an orator? Assuredly he will speak better, if the orator does not know what
is the subject of inquiry in the case before him, with regard to
matters connected with those sciences. An ignorant and illiterate
person, appearing before a court, will plead his own cause better than
an orator who does not know what the subject of dispute is; but an orator will express what he has
learned from the builder, or the musician, or from his client,
better than the person who has instructed him. 17. But the
builder will speak well on building, or the musician on music,
if any point in those arts shall require to be established by his
opinion; he will not he an orator, but he will perform his part
like an orator, as when an unprofessional person binds up a
wound, he will not be a surgeon, yet he will act as a surgeon.
18. Do subjects of this kind never come to be mentioned in panegyrical, or deliberative, or judicial oratory? When it was
under deliberation, whether a harbor should be constructed
at Ostia [see Suet. Claud. c. 20, where it is stated that the work had often
been contemplated by Julius Caesar, but deferred from time to time on
account of its difficulty], were not orators called to deliver opinions on the
subject? yet what was wanted was the professional knowledge
of the architect. 10. Does not the orator enter on the question, whether discolorations and tumors of the body are
symptoms of ill health or of poison? yet such inquiries belong to the profession of medicine? Will an orator never
have to speak of dimensions and numbers? yet we may say
that such matters belong to mathematics; for my part, I
believe that any subject whatever may, by some chance, come
under the cognizance of the orator. If a matter does not come
under his cognizance, he will have no concern with it.
20. Thus I have justly said, that the material of oratory is
everything that is brought under its notice for discussion, an
assertion which even our daily conversation supports, for
whenever we have any subject on which to speak, we often
signify by some prefatory remark, that the matter is laid
before us. 31. So much was Gorgias [Plato Gorg.
p. 447 C. In reference to this passage of Plato, see
Cic. de Orat. iii. 32; i. 22, de Inv. i. 5, de Fin. ii. 1] of opinion that an orator must speak
of everything, that he allowed himself to be questioned by the people in
his lecture-room, upon any subject on which any one of them chose to interrogate him.
Hermagoras also, by saying, that "the matter of oratory lies
in the cause and the questions connected with it," comprehends under it every subject that can possibly come before it
for discussion. 22. If indeed he supposed that the questions
do not belong to oratory, he is of a different opinion from me;
but if they do belong to oratory, I am supported by his
authority, for there is no subject that may not form part of a
cause or the questions connected with it. 23. Aristotle
[Rhet. i. 3, 8; Cic. de Invent. i. 5], too,
by making three kinds of oratory, the judicial, the deliberative,
and the demonstrative, has put almost everything into the
hands of the orator, for there is no subject that may not enter
into one of the three kinds.
24. An inquiry has been also started, though by a very few
writers, concerning the instrument of oratory. The instrument
I call that without which material cannot be fashioned and
adapted to the object which we wish to effect. But I consider
that it is not the art that requires the instrument, but the
artificer. Professional knowledge needs no tool, as it may be
complete though it produces nothing, but the artist must have
his tool, as the engraver his graving-instrument, and the
painter his pencils. I shall therefore reserve the consideration
of this point for that part of my work in which I intend to
speak of the orator.
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